The Alexander Romance (a Series Of Fictional Stories About Alexander The Great) Doesn’t Just Celebrate
The Alexander Romance (a series of fictional stories about Alexander the Great) doesn’t just celebrate Alexander’s virility and skill in warfare; it also portrays him as insatiably curious about the world. In one story, Alexander descends deep under the sea in a primitive diving bell. He brought with him a rooster (to help him keep time by crowing), a dog, and a cat.
We have a version of the story from the Mughal Empire in the late 1500s:
And another from Germany in the 1400s:
{WHF} {Ko-Fi} {Medium}
More Posts from S-afshar and Others
Cosmas Megalommatis, Shamash: World Mythology-1989
Κοσμάς Μεγαλομμάτης, Σαμάς: Παγκόσμια Μυθολογία, Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια, 1989
Кузьма Мегаломматис, Шамаш: мировая мифология, Греческая педагогическая энциклопедия, 1989
Kosmas Megalommatis, Šamaš (oder Schamasch): Weltmythologie, Griechische Pädagogische Enzyklopädie, 1989
Kosmas Gözübüyükoğlu, Şamaş: Dünya Mitolojisi, Yunan Pedagoji Ansiklopedisi, 1989
قزمان ميغالوماتيس، شمش : اساطیر جهانی، دایره المعارف آموزشی یونانی، 1989
Côme Megalommatis, Shamash: Mythologie mondiale, Encyclopédie pédagogique grecque, 1989
1989 قزمان ميغالوماتيس، شمش : الأساطير العالمية، الموسوعة التربوية اليونانية،
Cosimo Megalommatis, Šamaš: mitologia mondiale, Enciclopedia pedagogica greca, 1989
Cosimo Megalommatis, Shamash: mitología mundial, Enciclopedia pedagógica griega, 1989
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A small terracotta cylinder recording the work on the walls of the city of Babylon by the king Nabopolassar (r. 626-605 BCE), founder of the Neo-Babylonian Empire. From Babylon, Mesopotamia, Iraq. Neo-Babylonian period, 625-605 BCE. British Museum (ID: BM 26263)
Neynava: a Contemporary Music Accompaniment or the Diachronic Echo of the Orient?
Нейнава: современное музыкальное сопровождение или диахроническое эхо Востока?
(чтобы прочитать русскоязычную версию, листайте вниз!)
107 Pictures in Album / 107 Фотографии в альбоме: https://vk.com/album429864789_285631354
Music / Музыка:
Back in the middle 1980s, Hossein Ali Zadeh's Neynava was, first and foremost, my constant music accompaniment from Nineveh, Assyria, Kalhu (Nimrud), Arbil and Kirkuk to Cizre, Hakkari, Van, Urmia, Tekab, Hamadan and Kermanshah, throughout all the valleys of the Anti-Taurus and Zagros.
In summer, spring, winter and autumn, in Northern Iraq, Eastern Turkey or Western Iran, when I entered a bus, a minibus or a taxi, after resuming my seat, I always put the cassette in my tape recorder (Sony Walkman) and started playing the music. I saw interminable landscapes, traveling on the Neynava sound waves.
The years passed, the techniques changed, the exercises became more difficult, the explorations went back and forth, and the speed became comparable to the tempo of Ferdowsi's narratives. My inclination to these transcendental Russian Mountains, the constant roller coaster of my life, took me to different places in variable times.
Moving from Sargon of Akkad to Tamerlane, exploring the tellurian matter, discovering the aquatic undulations, and traveling on the aerial trajectories, I arrived in the Invisible Palace of Nezami Ganjavi.
And when the mysterious "Seven" became the ostensible "Eight", instead of me traveling, the various places and the diverse times came to visit me. Only then I discovered the radiation of the Tears of the Man, the vibration of the Blood of God, the blessings of Ludlul Bel Nemeqi, and the Truth of the Hidden Quran.
- Was I a soldier in the Battle?
- Where are the Mountains of the Ultimate Limit?
- What makes the inexorable strength of the Soft Waters?
- How long can an Army endure when crossing the sand of the desert, which is the Entrance to the Netherworld?
- Whom does the Sperm of God heal?
- Is the Fight of the Man always meant to entertain the Soul of a Mountain and the Heart of a River?
- Are all these inimical reflections truly real beings or did we all create them because of our fears?
- Will the 600 Anunnaki rise at last to greet us in a sign of approbation?
After I stayed long at the very bottom of the cylinders of these hitherto unanswered questions, I decided to rise and come back to my daily occupations. Through the myriad of corridors, across the innumerable pathways of atemporal existence, thanks to the absolute control of ethereal particles and to the balance of electromagnetic vibrations, when the velocity becomes infinite and the oscillation none, by means of spiritual anxiety, pulmonary benediction, mental supplication, cordial empathy and intestinal nihility, I crossed the nonexistent space of time and appeared at the peak of a mountain.
The Ardalani shepherd who was in the near slopes had two dogs, one male and one female. The male dog started to rub against my right leg, and the female against my left leg. The shepherd asked me how many years we were left with and I said how many millennia had passed.
The affinity of numbers is a joyful experience. Delighted because of our mutual nutritional abstinence, vitalized due to our reciprocal celibacy, electrified thanks to our mental chastity, empty of thoughts, free of desires, and clear of feelings, we embraced one another, heart on heart, as it happened since the times of Sargon of Akkad, paid tribute to one another, and returned to our respective times.
The number of affinities is a distressing experience. And the sole solace for me now is my Ardalani friend whom I so unexpectedly encountered and from whom I so much learned. I feel that you may perhaps wish to ask me why, willing to come back to my daily occupations, I inadvertently met the Ardalani shepherd. I thought you knew; sometimes, I make mistakes.
An echo was coming from the four corners of the Universe; it was an incredible resonance within the cylinders of these hitherto unanswered questions. The myriad of corridors only reinforced this echo; the innumerable pathways made it impossible for me to escape the enchanting echo. Then, when the velocity becomes finite and the oscillation begins, first the cordial empathy is held captive. With your feelings captive, you stop at an earlier moment. There I met the Ardalani shepherd.
He was not Ardalani or, if you prefer, he was as Ardalani as I am. We both had simply stopped at the time of the Ardalan Khan Helo. Enchanted by the same echo, we both made a mistake. The Ardalani shepherd was returning to his time, which has not yet come. To reach the antediluvian times that he wanted to explore he came out of the Sea of Glass. We spoke about our experience and he asked me whether I know the sublime echo. I replied positively; I knew the echo only too well. It was Neynava, my constant music accompaniment.
The Ardalani shepherd found it blissful and as ecstatic as every ascetic sound is. That's why finally my mistake was beneficial. Thanks to my sentimental ineptitude, I came to learn so much about the shepherds of the future, namely an epoch which is very close to us. In this forthcoming epoch, the Earth will be different, free of cities and villages, empty of buildings, and clean of things. The turquoise color of the sky will be due to the total absence of sea and salt waters. The few worthwhile men and women, who will survive, will not eat anything and will not copulate. It will be a free world with no thoughts, no feelings, and no desires; that's why there will be no wars, no killings, and no sicknesses.
Immaculate conception will be the majestic manner by which the life of forthcoming generations will be starting, and luminescent birth will the royal manner by which the activity of forthcoming generations will be beginning on the surface of the Earth, where there will be no more deserts.
My Ardalani friend travels always with his sheep and the two dogs; in his perfect, imperial world, all people are nomads. Their vestibular abilities are superior; their tactile functions are as subtle as the underlying force of Ether demands; their auditory duties are as harmonious as the Crystal Firmament; and their olfactory purposes are as angelic as the Frankincense of Punt-Somalia. Their formidable visual capabilities, as consequence of their luminescent birth, are unfathomable as they are able to turn their eyes into a Lighthouse of their bodies. And their Light is not darkness, as it happens in our ending times.
And despite the incessant echo of Neynava, I still remember the last reassuring and comforting words of my Ardalani friend. In the critical years of upheaval, when all the rulers of today's world and most of the worthless populations will perish in eternal fire, during the 1335 days of the darkness, two unexpected, divine presents will be offered to the worthwhile, moral and ascetic survivors:
- the invisible conduit -within which the Sun sails for all- will not be affected but perfectly protected, and
- the Moon will be the only luminary to shed ample light on a limited part of the Earth from where Life will restart. This will be the location where Gishgida, the Tree of Life, will appear among the Chosen People whom the Savior will drive back to their land.
East of Tigris River and around the Tree of Life a Luminous Cylinder will be the Sign of God's Everlasting Love - to the very few and most worthwhile ones.
These were the benefits of my attunement with Neynava.
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Нейнава: современное музыкальное сопровождение или диахроническое эхо Востока?
Еще в середине 1980-х Нейнава Хоссейна Али Заде была, прежде всего, моим постоянным музыкальным сопровождением от Ниневии, Ассирии, Калху (Нимруд), Арбиля и Киркука до Джизре, Хаккари, Вана, Урмии, Текаб, Хамадана и Керманшаха на протяжении всего долины Анти-Тавра и Загроса.
Летом, весной, зимой и осенью, в Северном Ираке, Восточной Турции или Западном Иране, когда я садился в автобус, микроавтобус или такси, после того, как занял свое место, я всегда вставлял кассету в свой магнитофон (Sony Walkman) и начал играть музыку. Я видел бесконечные пейзажи, путешествуя по звуковым волнам Нейнавы.
Шли годы, менялись техники, упражнения усложнялись, исследования шли вперед и назад, а скорость становилась сравнимой с темпом повествований Фирдоуси. Моя тяга к этим заоблачным русским горам, постоянным американским горкам моей жизни, приводила меня в разные места в разное время.
Двигаясь от Саргона Аккадского к Тамерлану, исследуя теллурическую материю, открывая водные волны и путешествуя по воздушным траекториям, я прибыл в Незримый Дворец Незами Гянджеви.
И когда таинственная «Семерка» стала мнимой «Восьмеркой», вместо меня в путешествии ко мне стали приходить разные места и переменные времена. Только тогда я обнаружил излучение Слез Человека, вибрацию Крови Бога, благословения Лудлул Бел Немеки и Истину Сокровенного Корана.
- Был ли я солдатом в битве?
- Где Горы Предельного Предела?
- В чем неумолимая сила Мягких Вод?
- Как долго может продержаться Армия, пересекая песок пустыни, являющейся Входом в Преисподнюю?
- Кого исцеляет Сперма Бога?
- Всегда ли Борьба Человека предназначена для того, чтобы развлечь Душу Горы и Сердце Реки?
- Действительно ли все эти враждебные отражения являются реальными существами или мы все создали их из-за наших страхов?
- Поднимутся ли, наконец, 600 аннунаков, чтобы поприветствовать нас в знак одобрения?
После того, как я долго пробыл на самом дне цилиндров этих до сих пор остававшихся без ответа вопросов, я решил встать и вернуться к своим повседневным занятиям. Мириадами коридоров, бесчисленными путями вневременного существования, благодаря абсолютному контролю над эфирными частицами и равновесию электромагнитных вибраций, когда скорость становится бесконечной, а колебание нет, посредством духовного беспокойства, легочного благословения, ментального мольбой, сердечным сочувствием и внутренним ничтожеством я пересек несуществующее пространство времени и оказался на вершине горы.
У пастуха Ардалани, который был на близлежащих склонах, было две собаки, самец и самка. Кобель начал тереться о мою правую ногу, а самка — о левую. Пастух спросил меня, сколько лет нам осталось, и я сказал, сколько тысячелетий прошло.
Близость чисел – это радостное переживание. Обрадованные нашим взаимным воздержанием от пищи, оживлённые нашим взаимным безбрачием, наэлектризованные благодаря нашему душевному целомудрию, пустые от мыслей, свободные от желаний и ясные от чувств, мы обнялись сердцем к сердцу, как это бывало издревле. Саргона Аккадского, отдали дань уважения друг другу и вернулись в наше время.
Количество сродств — удручающий опыт. И единственным утешением для меня теперь является мой друг Ардалани, с которым я так неожиданно столкнулся и от которого так многому научился. Я чувствую, что вы, возможно, захотите спросить меня, почему, желая вернуться к своим повседневным занятиям, я случайно встретил ардаланского пастуха. Я думал, вы знали; иногда я ошибаюсь.
Эхо шло из четырех уголков Вселенной; это был невероятный резонанс в цилиндрах этих до сих пор остававшихся без ответа вопросов. Мириада коридоров только усиливала это эхо; бесчисленные пути сделали невозможным для меня избежать чарующего эха. Затем, когда скорость становится конечной и начинается колебание, сначала пленяется сердечное сопереживание. Когда ваши чувства находятся в плену, вы останавливаетесь в более ранний момент. Там я встретил ардаланского пастуха.
Он не был Ардалани, или, если хотите, он был таким же Ардалани, как я.
Мы оба просто остановились во время Ардаланского хана Хело. Очарованные одним и тем же эхом, мы оба совершили ошибку. Пастух Арделани возвращался в свое время, которое еще не пришло. Чтобы достичь допотопных времен, которые он хотел исследовать, он вышел из Стеклянного Моря. Мы говорили о нашем опыте, и он спросил меня, знаю ли я возвышенное эхо. я ответил положительно; Я слишком хорошо знал эхо. Это была Нейнава, мое постоянное музыкальное сопровождение.
Пастух Ардалани находил его блаженным и таким же восторженным, как и каждый аскетический звук. Вот почему, наконец, моя ошибка пошла на пользу. Благодаря моей сентиментальной неумелости я так много узнал о пастухах будущего, именно об очень близкой нам эпохе. В эту грядущую эпоху Земля будет другой, свободной от городов и деревень, пустой от зданий и чистой от вещей. Бирюзовый цвет неба будет обусловлен полным отсутствием морской и соленой воды. Те немногие достойные мужчины и женщины, которые выживут, ничего не будут есть и не будут совокупляться. Это будет свободный мир без мыслей, без чувств и без желаний; поэтому не будет ни войн, ни убийств, ни болезней.
Непорочное зачатие будет величественным образом, которым будет начинаться жизнь грядущих поколений, а светоносное рождение будет царским образом, которым начнется деятельность грядущих поколений на поверхности Земли, где не будет больше пустынь.
Мой друг Ардалани всегда путешествует со своими овцами и двумя собаками; в его совершенном имперском мире все люди — кочевники. Их вестибулярные способности превосходны, их тактильные функции столь же тонки, как и основная сила эфира; их слуховые обязанности так же гармоничны, как Хрустальный Небесный свод; и их обонятельные цели столь же ангельские, как ладан Пунт-Сомали. Их огромные визуальные способности, как следствие их светящегося рождения, непостижимы, поскольку они способны превратить свои глаза в Маяк своих тел. И их Свет не тьма, как это бывает в наши последние времена.
И несмотря на непрекращающееся эхо Нейнавы, я до сих пор помню последние ободряющие и утешительные слова моего ардаланского друга. В критические годы потрясений, когда все правители сегодняшнего мира и большая часть никчемного населения погибнут в вечном огне, в течение 1335 дней мрака, два неожиданных божественных подарка будут предложены достойным, нравственным и аскетически уцелевшим:
- невидимый канал, по которому плывет Солнце для всех, не будет затронут, но полностью защищен, и
- Луна будет единственным светилом, проливающим достаточно света на ограниченную часть Земли, откуда возобновится Жизнь. Это будет место, где Гишгида, Древо Жизни, появится среди Избранного Народа, которого Спаситель вернет на свою землю.
К востоку от реки Тигр и вокруг Древа Жизни Светящийся Цилиндр будет Знаком Вечной Любви Бога - для очень немногих и самых достойных.
Таковы были преимущества моей настройки на Нейнаву.
Κοσμάς Μεγαλομμάτης, Απσού: Παγκόσμια Μυθολογία-1989
Κοσμάς Μεγαλομμάτης, Απσού: Παγκόσμια Μυθολογία, Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια, 1989
Кузьма Мегаломматис, Абзу (и Апсу): мировая мифология, Греческая педагогическая энциклопедия, 1989
Kosmas Megalommatis, Abzu: Weltmythologie, Griechische Pädagogische Enzyklopädie, 1989
Kosmas Gözübüyükoğlu, Apsû: Dünya Mitolojisi, Yunan Pedagoji Ansiklopedisi, 1989
قزمان ميغالوماتيس، آبزو : اساطیر جهانی، دایره المعارف آموزشی یونانی، 1989
Côme Megalommatis, Apsû (et Abzu): Mythologie mondiale, Encyclopédie pédagogique grecque, 1989
1989 قزمان ميغالوماتيس، أبزو: الأساطير العالمية، الموسوعة التربوية اليونانية،
Cosimo Megalommatis, Apsû: mitologia mondiale, Enciclopedia pedagogica greca, 1989
Cosimo Megalommatis, Apsú (o Abzu): mitología mundial, Enciclopedia pedagógica griega, 1989
Cosmas Megalommatis, Apsu: World Mythology, Greek Pedagogical Encyclopedia, 1989
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Summer Landscape (1875) by Pierre-Auguste Renoir
Shoutout to the time my partner and I got so excited to see Ea-Nasir's hate mail in person that we failed to notice the Code of Hammurabi next to it
How the international community treated the Islamic Republic of Iran
Η διεθνής αντιμετώπιση της ισλαμικής Περσίας, του Κοσμά Μεγαλομμάτη: Εποπτεία 119, Ιανουάριος 1987, σελ. 38-48
How the international community treated the Islamic Republic of Iran, by Cosmas Megalommatis: Epopteia (‘Overview’) 119, January 1987, p. 38-48
Как международное сообщество относилось к Исламской Республике Иран, (автор:) Кузьма Мегаломматис: Эпоптея («Обзор») 119, январь 1987 г., стр. 38-48
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BRICS+: Bright or Dark Perspectives of a Block of Countries in the Path to Real or Delusional Multipolarity
When last August, in the XV BRICS summit (22-24.8.2023), it was announced that the five constituent members of the Block (China, India, Russia, and Brazil, as initial members in 2006, with the addition of South Africa in 2010) agreed to admit another six (6) countries, namely Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and UAE (herewith mentioned in alphabetic order; Argentina did not make use of the offer, following the recent presidential elections), the member states ushered the world community in a new era. The groundbreaking decision will be effect January 1st 2024. The development -in and by itself- is neither good nor bad; the outcome will depend on the choices that will be made and the changes that will be implemented with respect to the nature, the status, the function, the targets, and the international role of the Block itself. In fact, right now, all options are open.
Contents
I - What BRICS is and what it is not
II - Strong points of BRICS
III - Weak points of BRICS
IV - The Expansion of BRICS
V - What next for the BRICS?
VI - Economic interests can be the basis of only loosely associated states (or a League), not a union of states
VII - Multilateral organizations of states can never be established as an opposite pole of a world power
VIII - Multipolarity: a reality or a delusion?
IX - Multipolarity tomorrow: a reality only through the isolation of the unipolar world center
What is better or more suitable? Is it wise to enlarge BRICS or to deepen the integration of this block of 11 countries? The challenges are enormous and the repercussions will be cataclysmic for the entire world. This topic has indeed been controversial for some time; Russia, India and Brazil were not enthusiastic about China's incessant suggestions for the "influx of fresh blood". In fact, the decision to invite six emerging market group countries was a compromise; several other states had expressed their wish to join, but after numerous deliberations, for various reasons they were not accepted now.
Before new members arrive, the existing partners should define what they truly want BRICS or BRICS+ to be; this issue is still perplex, diverse and vague. In this regard, it is crucial to always recall that the original concept of BRIC (for only four countries) is credited to an Englishman, namely Jim O'Neill (Baron O'Neill of Gatley), who was at the time the chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management; the idea was first expressed within very different context -quite noticeably- in November 2001.
However, the governments concerned took some time to explore and evaluate the thought before adapting it to their interests and perspectives; the first high-level meetings started in 2006, and the first formal summit (4 members) was held in Yekaterinburg in July 2009. Everyone today effortlessly understands that the world was very different at the time; meanwhile, the achievements of the 5-country block, although significant for the beneficiaries, were modest at the international level.
Consequently, before considering BRICS as the perfect counterbalance to the West (as President Putin stated openly last year), it is essential for anyone to accurately understand what BRICS is, what it is not, what it can be, and what it cannot.
I - What BRICS is and what it is not
BRICS is not an 'organization' like the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), which is a Eurasian political, economic, international security and defense organization, and the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union), which is an economic union of several post-Soviet states located in Eurasia. To be constructive and effective in his approach to this topic, an astute observer should dissociate three totally distinct issues:
a- the hitherto achievements of the 5-country block;
b- what BRICS is nowadays; and
c- what BRICS can become in the future. In this regard, what Muhammad Kamal wrote in the Egyptian daily Al Masry al Yom (« نحو عضوية «البريكس; Towards BRICS Membership) is totally inconsistent; worse, his pessimism for Egypt's adhesion to the 5-country block only reflects the wishes of the idiotic and corrupt stooges of Western embassies in Cairo. This type of thought may be disastrous for Egypt. If BRICS did not achieve 'much' in the past, this fact hinges on eventually misplaced worldviews and pointless considerations that the member states may have had. All the same, with a new approach, with an accurate perception of what an expanded BRICS can or cannot become, and with a strong commitment to the interests of these countries' populations, one can certainly mark a spectacular success.
Definitely, BRICS is not an organization; it is not an economic bloc, in spite of the numerous projects launched and materialized, such as the New Development Bank (launched in 2014-2015), the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), the BRIC Cable (the construction of which has not yet started), joint publications, and various initiatives. Under discussion are issues of paramount importance, namely a potential BRICS payment system and an eventual common currency. It becomes therefore evident that there are slow steps toward a comprehensive partnership.
Precisely because BRICS is not an organization, they don't have a proper portal, as it happens in the case of existing international bodies like the SCO, the Turkic Union or the African Union. Instead, they have a rudimentary site with basic info, and every annual meeting comes up with a separate, new site.
The rest is up to private initiatives, think tanks, research centers, online magazines, and the world's mass media.
As group of countries, BRICS is a heteroclite array of states with certain common interests, but also with very divergent economies, structures and legislations, and partly different socioeconomic visions; until now, no common long-term perspective has been envisaged – let alone agreed upon. This means that the governments of the member states have to seriously consider and scrupulously study how they will manage to set up a common economic space and how to first offer themselves the necessary tools in order to advance in that direction.
Many charts, tables, drawings and tables have been produced in order to highlight to all what BRICS really is; but this approach comprises also a drawback that can cause confusion and misjudgment. This is due to the fact that each visual representation highlights only one aspect of the reality; however one gets a complete idea of the reality, only if one goes through illustrations of all the existing aspects of the reality. One missing diagram about the BRICS is enough to obscure our understanding and confuse our perception.
II - Strong points of BRICS
As of end 2023, over 3.3 billion people lived in the BRICS countries, making more than 40% of the world population; BRICS states stretch over 30% of the world's land surface and account for 26% of the global economy. The 5-country block represents 18% of trade in goods and 25% of foreign investment. At this point, we already face some challenges in our effort to quantify the reality. Verifiable facts like the area and the population of a country are undeniable points of reference; the area of a country is measured in kilometers square, whereas the population is estimated in millions or thousands of people. However, when it comes to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country, there are two diametrically opposed methods of calculation; the end results may be very divergent.
GDP estimates published by financial and statistical institutions are calculated at market or government official exchange rates. But what is called 'Nominal GDP' is stated without taking into consideration the existing differences in the cost of living among the countries. This means that the data presented can vary enormously from one year to another due to fluctuations in the currency exchange rates; but this may be temporary and therefore irrelevant.
That is why GDP (PPP) forecast estimates are to be considered as a better reflection of the economic realities, and of the comparison between two countries; to sort this data and publish their databases, financial and statistical institutions calculate using both, market and government official exchange rates. PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) is a method of measuring that takes into consideration the relative cost of local goods, services and inflation rates of the country.
The ensuing difference can be colossal: China's nominal GDP for the year 2023 is 19.37 trillion US$, but the PPP-based GDP of China for the same year is 33 trillion US$; on the contrary, on either case, US GDP amounts to 26.85 trillion US$. As it can be surmised, PPP-based GDP is preferable for comparison; all the same, the size of an economy being also a matter of political propaganda, many Anglo-Saxon institutions deliberately show a predilection for Nominal GDP in order to occasionally show that Russia is not among the top ten economies of the world.
III - Weak points of BRICS
Be that as it may, the aforementioned impressive figures about the BRICS are not attested on other occasions; for instance, the total voting quota of the 5-country block in the IMF is only 14.7%, although in 2021 they accounted for about a third of world GDP, a fifth of world trade, about a quarter of direct investment, and their foreign exchange reserves reached 35% of the world's total. This point was highlighted by President Putin in his address to President Xi Jinping on 22nd June 2022.
On another note, in the US$ 109 trillion world stock market, BRICS represent only a small segment of the world market capitalization (around 20%), whereas the US, which is home to 39 of the 100 largest companies in the world, has more than 40% of the market and the European Union amounts to ca. 11%.
IV - The Expansion of BRICS
On the basis of the above mentioned data, one can understand that the recently admitted six (6) countries do not constitute a major expansion. When it comes to total area (in kilometers square), the six states {Argentina (2.780.400 km2), Saudi Arabia (2.149.690 km2), Iran (1.648.195 km2), Ethiopia (1.104.300 km2), Egypt (1.002.450 km2) and UAE (83.600 km2)} amount to ca. 20% (8768635 km2) of the land surface of the BRICS countries (ca. 40 million km2).
Similarly, with respect to population, the six newly accepted states {Ethiopia (107.334.000), Egypt (105.388.000), Iran (85.298.600), Argentina (46.654.581), Saudi Arabia (32.175.224) and UAE (9.282.410)} have a total population of 386.132.815 people, which is around 10% of the current population of BRICS. However, the 11-country block will be home to almost half the population of the world (46%); this marks a significant threshold indeed.
Similar conclusions we draw concerning the economic indicators of the six newly admitted states and notably their PPP-based GDP; combined the GDP of the six countries {Saudi Arabia (2.300.967 US$ million), Egypt (1.803.584 US$ million), Iran (1.691.819 US$ million), Argentina (1.274.807 US$ million), UAE (890.171 US$ million), Ethiopia (393.847 US$ million)} is around 8.350.000 US$ million; in other words, the six states produce only one seventh (1/7) of the total GDP of the current BRICS member states (56 US$ trillion).
This aspect was duly discerned also by those who are accustomed to rather take into account the nominal GDP; that's why they underscored the fact that "Saudi Arabia is the only trillion-dollar economy being added to the BRICS".
Combined the nominal GDP of the six new member states {Saudi Arabia (1.061.902 US$ million), Argentina (641.102 US$ million), UAE (498.978 US$ million), Egypt (378.110 US$ million), Iran (367.970 US$ million), Ethiopia (156.083 US$ million)} amounts to 3.1 US$ trillion; this is about one ninth (1/9) of the nominal GDP of the current BRICS member states (27.7 US$ trillion).
If we stop at this point and we do not further explore the manifold aspects of BRICS expansion, we will be left with the idea that, due to necessary compromises, the first major phase of BRICS expansion did not include several other countries, which also expressed the interest to join, notably Algeria, Belarus, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Vietnam, etc. But this will prevent us from observing a very interesting and crucial aspect of the development. As a matter of fact, this was not particularly highlighted by anyone in the world's mainstream mass media. There is indeed one economic sector in which the present stage of BRICS expansion made a significant breakthrough; this is the energy sector, and more particularly, the Oil production.
As a matter of fact, the addition of Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE will more than double BRICS' share of global oil production. With six out of the nine top oil producers being BRICS+ member states (Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, Brazil, Iran, UAE), the 11-country block represents 43% of the world oil production.
This means that, in spite of the compromises made, BRICS made a big step ahead in preparing their forthcoming transformation from an ill-defined block of countries to a well-defined organization that will change the post-WW II world drastically and irrevocably. As I already said, the concept that they will have to adopt for their alliance is that of the common economic space.
V - What next for the BRICS?
Dangling between long term strategy and everyday opportunities, the governments of the 5- or 11-country block can really make of their partnership whatever they want. They can turn it to the tool par excellence for the transformation of the present world; indeed, they can make of the BRICS+ the cornerstone in the foundation of a human world order of unity, equity, justice, lawfulness, concord, and worldwide cordiality. Reversely, they can neglect their imagination, fail to create a vision, ignore their intellect, and thus waste their time.
In this regard, it is clear that BRICS+ will be the reflection of the shared vision that the member states, the respective governments, and -above all- the civil societies will initiate. It is therefore essential to avoid extreme optimism or pessimism and to make an effort not to mix a long term perspective with any type of unnecessary political propaganda. The difference can be understood in the following examples:
Speaking about Russia’s vision of the BRICS+ format as early as February 2018, Sergey Ryabkov, a noteworthy statesman and Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister since 2008, stated: «we suggest that our partners consider BRICS+ as a platform for developing what could be termed an 'integration of integrations'».
This sounds as sheer advocacy of the 'single economic space' concept, which leads to economic union. Quite contrarily, Sergei Lavrov (Center for World Politics and Strategic Analysis) and Kirill Babaev (Director of the Institute of China and Modern Asia), both of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in their article «И вширь, и вглубь - Пути укрепления институциональной основы БРИКС» (Both in breadth and in depth - Ways to strengthen the institutional framework of BRICS / Бабаев К.В., Лавров С.В. И вширь, и вглубь // Россия в глобальной политике. 2023. Т. 21. № 5. С. 69–81)
present a far more realistic approach, opting for the 'common economic space' concept.
There are important differences between the two concepts, and it is essential to make this point clear, because the 'single economic space' concept simply cannot work in the case of BRICS, and even more so that of BRICS+. This is exactly what the authors of the aforementioned article do; the question is whether this is enough.
VI - Economic interests can be the basis of only loosely associated states (or a League), not a union of states
At this point, taking into consideration the international situation as it is evidently downgrading over the past few years, the governments of the BRICS+ member states must truly become consciously serious in their judgment, drastically bold in their action, and greatly resourceful in their vision before they are soon met with an aggravated deterioration of the world order in which their efforts will unfortunately be irrevocably meaningless.
Although BRICS+ governments are correct in their analyses and conclusions as regards the major structural problems of the world economy, they all apparently fail to understand where the world community is led to; this is due to the prevailing, very confusing, and definitely perplex situation. But the present condition of the world affairs makes of the aforementioned economic problems only a tiny sector of the very grave troubles that currently exist and impact every human across the Earth.
Consequently, in spite of the fact that the world economy is in major trouble, all its aspects cannot be tackled independently of the other, grave and thorny, issues of intellectual, academic, educational, scientific, cultural, and socio-governmental order that we are currently facing. As a matter of fact, erroneous intellectual concepts, delusional interpretations of the reality, intentional distortions of World History, ideological aberrations, and overwhelming oppression of indigenous cultures are at the origin of developments that brought the world economy to the brink of collapse. Scientific absurdities, military interventions, and corrupt governmental practices contributed to the overall deterioration, and have therefore to be also taken into consideration.
As far as BRICS+ member states are concerned, there is one word that terminally encapsulates the aforementioned reality in its totality: Western colonialism. What matters in this regard is that this term is not to be identified with only its military, political and economic dimensions.
Colonialism is basically a criminal and anti-human development the most crucial dimension of which is cultural; culture determines the psychology of people, nations, ruling classes and governments, and this -in turn- impacts the local economy.
In addition to the aforementioned points, there is a critical factor which must also be taken into account: only a union of loosely associated states can ever be successfully established on the basis of economic interests. This is a fundamental condition to retain. As situation, it is due to the fact that states do not exist in themselves, but constitute the receptacle of human activity related to the administration and the governance of the society.
Consequently, a number of states can form an effective organization that will impact worldwide developments only on the basis of major decisions taken by conscious peoples and statesmen genuinely representing their societies, which are known for their historically diverse values, distinct moral principles, varied cultural heritage, but shared goals and common vision. But this is much broader than an economic union.
The perfect example of failure is in this regard offered by the European Union. The debilitated union of states started before 72 years with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC; 1952), which was designed to integrate the coal and steel industries in Western Europe (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Evaluated for that purpose, ECSC was good, but it could never progress in the direction of transformation from an economic community to one nation-state.
Different peoples do not integrate into one nation-state without a unifying force; this can certainly be a faith, a cult, a worldview or even an ideology, but never economic interests. That is why BRICS+ member states, although they are forced to define how to set up a 'common economic space', have to broaden the box and try to see things as widely as they can.
VII - Multilateral organizations of states can never be established as an opposite pole of a world power
In spite of the urgency of their economic demands for new standards and rules or a new world order (as many people say), BRICS+ member states have got to approach the world affairs in a different, far broader, and definitely comprehensive manner. This imperative is due to both, their incomparably enormous size and the undeniable fact that they altogether constitute a worldwide organization with major, not only economic, interests that they have in common. Actually, the troubles that all these countries face at the level of the international trade and world economy are due to
a- political developments that took place over the last70-80 years,
b- two successive World Wars,
c- numerous earlier conflicts,
d- extreme ideological aberrations,
e- preposterous intellectual assumptions,
f- outrageous educational-academic forgeries, and
g- a 5-century long, nefarious and calamitous, colonial legacy.
In this case, BRICS+ member states cannot possibly imagine that they are able to rectify a so deeply rooted injustice and inhumanity that prevail worldwide by merely sidestepping the US dollar via
- local currency trading,
- Mbridge (a multi-central bank digital currency platform, which is shared among participating central banks and commercial banks, as it is built on distributed ledger technology in order to enable instant cross-border payments and settlement) or
- other alternative payment routes and methods of de-dollarization.
In fact, their true problem is what is accurately called 'the Collective West' in its entirety. The US dollar replaced indeed the British pound as the world’s reserve currency (in 1944 following the Bretton Woods Agreement); it ceased unilaterally to be convertible to gold (in 1971, due to the so-called Nixon shock); and it became the sole currency in which Saudi Arabia is paid for Oil (in 1974, as per the terms of the Saudi Arabia and US Agreement on Cooperation, signed June 8, that made the petrodollar possible, which also known as 'the petrocurrency effect' and 'the petrodollar recycling').
However, all these developments consist, truly speaking, in Microhistory, if viewed within a wider context. In fact, they constitute only in the latest episodes of the colonial conquest, contamination and putrefaction, which have progressively enveloped the world. That is why BRICS+ member states must see things within a macrohistorical context and shape their decision making processes accordingly.
Precisely because the aspects of the world troubles are so many, BRICS+ member states have to realize that the country, which capitalized on its monetary privilege, namely the petrodollar, did so while also defending all the other aspects of the 5-century long Western predominance, which proved to be catastrophic for the entire world, except for the West European colonial powers and their annexes.
As a matter of fact, the historically true definition of the USA is not "the country with the US dollar as national currency", but "the heir of 5-century long, colonial legacy". This is what the US stands for – not just a currency.
Indeed, the US dollar is not only the default world currency, but at the same time, the strongest currency of the Western world. All the same, people often tend to forget that the American currency was first one of the strongest in the Western world, then its strongest, and only 'recently' the world's medium of exchange. It is therefore undeniable that, also at the financial and economic level, it represents the 'Collective West'.
Due to the successive historical developments, which led the entire Mankind to the present occurrence and on which the US predominance has persistently based its delusional legitimacy, it would be foolish to believe that the US will ever accept the reduction of the systemically omnipotent Western world into merely two or three poles (EU, US, and -eventually- Japan) of a delusional multipolar system composed by them and by the rising, major BRICS+ forces. Nuclear wars of any form are far more plausible to take place than a multipolar world to be potentially formed with the participation of the EU and the US.
To put it in simple words, you can never possibly ask someone, who considers himself as extraordinarily enormous as a 'dinosaur', to condescend to accept few 'cockroaches' as equal; this metaphor does not constitute the exact representation of the reality, but it accurately reflects the mentality of the people who currently run the EU, the US, the UK and their annexes. These forces have by now carried out a fully obvious colonial agenda across the Earth; even worse, they are evidently intending to implement the next parts of the agenda, which has already been proven as inherently unacceptable to the mankind – the majority of the misfortunate inhabitants of the Collective West included. In other words, the world situation is far worse than what most of the foolish or fooled leaders of the BRICS+ member states have imagined.
VIII - Multipolarity: a reality or a delusion?
Discussing about the chances for the emergence of a multipolar world system does not hinge only on a qualitative examination of intentions and a quest for world peace and security; it is not sufficient to only scrutinize the purposes of the decayed and ailing but raucous and rancorous elites of US, Germany, France, England and Italy from one side and assess the aspirations of the ruling classes of China, India, Russia, Brazil and a nebula of several heavily populated countries, namely Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Mexico, Ethiopia, Egypt, Congo, Vietnam, Turkey, Iran, Thailand, Tanzania and South Africa.
Despite the undeniable importance of all the aforementioned parameters, there is another factor that determines even more conclusively the outcome of the present cleavage. This pertains to the process of historical developments that brought about the present state of international affairs. There are only specific procedures that allow a multipolar world community to be formed; it cannot rise anytime anywhere.
The past eighty (80) years have been characterized by a unipolar system of world governance; this was not the first time in World History in which a very large part of the Earth was under the control of one state (the Neo-Assyrian Empire, Achaemenid Iran, the Abbasid Caliphate, the Mongol Empire of Genghis Khan, the Chagatai Empire of Timur/Tamerlane, etc.) without any other state being able to challenge it.
Several political commentators often dare to portray the present period as the first time in which one country 'controlled' almost the totality of the surface of the Earth, but this is definitely a maximalist approach. In fact, as description, it is wrong. As conclusion, it has only a nominal value; this is so because the 'control' was asserted only via various layers of proxies, who were, practically speaking, unable to always govern all the territory that they claimed to possess.
It is essential not to confuse the present conjecture with the days that antedated WW II or WW I; many irrelevant historians and inconsistent intellectuals are pleased to draw parallels between 1914 and 2024 or between 1939 and 2024, but they are very wrong, confusing, and dangerously deceitful.
Parallels as regards the ensuing consequences or outcome cannot be drawn between a past circumstance and the present occurrence; this is so because people know what came next, after the past circumstance that they take as one pole of the parallel, but only assume that the other pole (namely the present occurrence) will have the same exit (namely a war).
Parallels can be drawn between a past circumstance and the present occurrence only with respect to the anteriority of both moments that are taken as parallels. In this case, we know very well that no unipolar system of world governance existed either in the period 1870-1914 or during the interval between the two world wars.
Prior to WW II, the world community revolved around six major poles, i.e. England (as the British Empire), USSR, USA, France, Japan and Germany; the six powers gradually formed two heteroclite groups of allies of which one prevailed in 1945.
Prior to WW I, the world community revolved around nine major poles, i.e. England (as the British Empire), the Russian Empire, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, the Ottoman Empire, USA, and Japan.
It is very critical at this point to comprehensively comprehend that those major poles or constituents of the world community did not seek to establish a multipolar system of world governance either in 1914 or in 1939; it is actually necessary to take into consideration the fact that the concept of 'world community' had not yet been formed or formulated as a substitute to the criminal colonial activities of England and France, which attempted to divide Africa, Western and South Asia, and Oceania among themselves.
Even worse for the silly raiders of the lost multipolarity, it is even more crucial to take into account that, if a proposal for the establishment of a multipolar system of world governance was made back in 1914, the colonial powers England and France would be the first to reject it. Actually, the criminal gangsters, who always ruled Paris and London and later hijacked Washington D.C., deliberately triggered WW I, by duly utilizing their paranoid Serbian lackeys.
Why England and France back in 1914 would vehemently oppose any proposal for the establishment of a multipolar system of world governance is easy to assess; this development would block their effort to terminally dismantle Austria Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, while also effectively carrying out cruel operations of regime change in the German and the Russian Empires.
Furthermore, we have to also reckon with the fact that, if someone advanced a proposal as regards the establishment of a multipolar system of world governance back in 1939, he would surely be resolutely reprimanded by the criminal colonial rascals of London and Paris. England and France declared war on Germany, because they did not want to establish a multipolar world community including the USSR, Japan, Germany, and Berlin's ally Italy. As we all know, regime change operations took place in the latter three states in 1945, and 40-45 years later in the (until then greatly marginalized, continually defamed, and shamelessly vilified) USSR.
So, to conclude the present assessment, we have to perceive the establishment of the so-called 'world community' and the inception of the 'international law' as mere tricks, intentional schemes, and colonial contrivance deceitfully presented but successfully elaborated by England, France and their successor, namely the US. In fact, on multiple occasions over the past 80 years, it was fully proven that there is no world community, but a perilous jungle inhabited by ferocious monsters, which are more incensed and more devilish than any wild animal, those of the Mesozoic included.
The sole reality is this: what the mankind attested for 300 years -from the Carnatic Wars (1740-1763; Anglo-French wars in India) to the end of WW II- was only the rise of the Western colonial powers to world predominance. The world impressively shifted from a multipolar system of world belligerency (with 11 poles, namely Spain, Portugal, England, France, Holland, Austria-Hungary, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Safavid-Afshar Iran, Mughal India, and Qing China) to a unipolar system of world governance, which can be conclusively described as the Western barbarism and colonial tyranny over mankind.
The above makes clear to all that the termination of a unipolar system of world governance can never happen through negotiations with the central pole of the system; in a Jurassic environment, only idiots would believe in and count on such 'negotiations'.
IX - Multipolarity tomorrow: a reality only through the isolation of the unipolar world center
It would be anything between foolish and paranoid to imagine that the forces, which controlled the Western states and elites over the past five centuries, will be ready to yield power to those whom they have been considering, for at least 350-400 years, as targets for conquest and world dominance.
BRICS+ member states stand therefore in front of a dilemma: either reject the Western unipolar dominance or capitulate. Since the latter is a non-option, it would be useful to explore the possible ways to reject the barbarian, catastrophic and heinous Western rule. However, before pondering on how the 5-century long colonial impact can be overthrown by the countries that represent ca. 90% of the world population, it would be essential for all of them, and more particularly, for the BRICS+ governments, to specify the sectors in which the rejection of the colonial rule (or unipolar system of world governance) must take place.
Because it will be partly functional and basically ineffective, if the BRICS+ member states challenge the Collective West only at the monetary, financial and economic levels, it is imperative for the respective governments to come to an agreement about launching BRICS+ commissions specializing in almost all the sectors for which there are presently fully-fledged UN Specialized Agencies, Programmes and Funds, Research and Training Institutes, Other Entities and Bodies, as well as Related Organizations. A separate commission in Decolonization and De-Westernization should be added, involving groups of study and rejection of all aspects of academic, educational, scientific, intellectual, cultural, moral, behavioral and socio-governmental colonialism.
Following a 6-month period of tense consultations, the commissions and the groups of study should come up with conclusive proposals about the restructuring of all the international bodies, their priorities, works, methods and processes. Effectively backed by a comprehensive refutation of the 5-century long Western colonial order, an overwhelming denunciation of the racist and fallacious Western version of World History, and an all-encompassing condemnation of the preposterous and biased function of the UN for 80 years, BRICS+ member states and all their allies should irrevocably withdraw from all the UN organizations, unequivocally deny any legitimacy to the fake international body, and immediately launch the All Peoples Assembly, as the sole legitimate international body. This will convene initially for an indefinite period of time and institute the fair, just, unquestionably multilateral, and solid international milieu to which all the people worldwide have long aspired. A new Internet will have to be rapidly launched for all the member states totally independently from the US-based legacy system.
This will be tantamount to complete transformation of the BRICS+ into the new international body, which has been badly missing to almost all the people across the Earth. All the employees of the new international body and its specialized agencies, institutes and related organization will have to be proportionally hired on the basis of ethnic origin, language and religion/belief. It will therefore be impossible for a group that constitutes approximately 0.2% of the 8 billion world population to literally invade key positions, promote sectarianism, and thus become the well-justified reason of its own rejection by all the rest.
Subsequently, BRICS+ member states and all their allies will be accepted as members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (CSO), which will turn out to be the de facto guarantee of worldwide peace and security. International relations with the NATO member states, their allies and satellites will be totally severed at all levels, commercial, educational, recreational, academic, intellectual, scientific, technological, economic, social, governmental and military.
This abrupt separation will evidently produce a tremendous international economic shock; but the BRICS+-led countries will be able to face the challenge, recover in relatively short time, and adapt in a far better environment totally void of the Western colonial barbarism, horrific criminality, heinous inhumanity, and evil delusions.
The Collective West must die and it will die; powerfully quarantined, asphyxiated within its borders, economically collapsed, socially imploded, and irreversibly poisoned by the evil delusions, sick literature, inhuman governance, rotten thoughts, insidious ideas, demented ideologies, corrupt arts, suicidal philosophies, absurd disbelief, and utter nonsense that their supposed spiritual, religious, intellectual and social leaders produced, the Western world will totally perish in the most deserved hecatomb, which will be the price they will pay for the unipolar system of world governance that they imposed and for the plans of human annihilation that they developed.
Quite unfortunately for the BRICS+ member states and their allies, there is no alternative; by totally isolating the unipolar world center (namely Canada, USA, UK, EU, Australia and New Zealand), which is what is called the 'Collective West', they will be in a position to effectively install a genuinely representative, peaceful, secure, sustainable multipolar system of world governance, which will extend covering the quasi-totality (ca. 90%) of the world population.
The only other possible transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world is nuclear; if the eventually foolish and fooled leaders of the BRICS+ member states do not truly know or do not duly expect this, it will certainly be too bad for them. If they do not act immediately according to the aforementioned description, they will inevitably offer their worst enemies the privilege of a surprise attack. This is so because the Collective West is very close to the point of no return; they reached the stage of irreparable social disintegration. Consequently, their own chance of survival is to trigger further wars abroad. This is actually what these barbarians have always done after 1492; but this time, it will surely be nuclear.
All those, who 'calmly' wait for the US presidential elections to take place and -even worse- anticipate the victory of Donald Trump, will be proven as the best, although unpaid, agents of the Collective West among the leadership of the BRICS+ member states.
And the establishment of a country, which is hit by a nuclear attack of any type, will have either to cause tremendous nuclear devastation -which involves also terrible collateral damages- or to leave in History the memory of a protracted but failed tenure. It will be a shame and an example to avoid.
Πόλο, Πόλεμος, το Τζυκανιστήριον Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, οι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού κι οι Τουρανικές – Ιρανικές Βάσεις της Ρωμιοσύνης
Polo Games, War Games, the Tzykanisterion of Constantinople, the Silk Roads, and the Turanian-Iranian Foundations of Romiosyni, i.e. today's Eastern Romans (falsely denigrated as 'Greeks')
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 4η Μαΐου 2019.
Αναπαράγοντας τμήμα ημερησίου σεμιναρίου, το οποίο είχα παρουσιάσει στο Πεκίνο τον Ιανουάριο του 2019 σχετικά με ορισμένα σύγχρονα ψευδο-έθνη της Ασίας, της Ευρώπης και της Αφρικής, τα οποία έχουν παρασκευασθεί από τους δυτικούς αποικιοκράτες, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης, στο κείμενό του αυτό, απαριθμεί μία σειρά ιστορικών θεμάτων σχετικών με την παρασκευή της ψευδέστατης ταυτότητας των δήθεν Νεο-ελλήνων και την σύσταση της ψευδοϊστορίας που διδάσκεται στην δήθεν 'Ελλάδα'. Είναι φυσικό ότι όλα αυτά τα θέματα, τα τόσο καθοριστικά για το παρελθόν και την ταυτότητα της Ρωμιοσύνης, ολοσχερώς αγνοούνται από τους σημερινούς ψευδο-Νεοέλληνες του επάρατου νοτιο-βαλκανικού κρατιδίου, επειδή αυτοί έχουν πέσει θύματα αμορφώτων και τρισαθλίων παραχαρακτών, δηλαδή των 'ελληνιστών' και των 'βυζαντινολόγων'. Έτσι, τυφλοί και άχρηστοι οι σημερινοί ψευδο-Νεοέλληνες, έχοντας απωλέσει την ρωμέικη ορθόδοξη ταυτότητά τους, βρίσκονται σε κατάσταση δουλείας ασυγκρίτως χειρότερης εκείνης της οθωμανικής περιόδου.
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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/05/04/πόλο-πόλεμος-το-τζυκανιστήριον-κωνστ/ ======================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Αμόρφωτοι κι ανιστόρητοι οι διάφοροι Νεοέλληνες εθνικιστές ή προπαγανδιστές ελληνοκεντρισμού, ελληνισμού κι αρχαιολατρείας θέλουν να ξεχνούν ότι στα χρόνια της Χριστιανικής Ρωμαϊκής Αυτοκρατορίας, οι Ρωμιοί ένοιωθαν αποστροφή για τους Ολυμπιακούς Αγώνες της Αρχαιότητας αλλά ελάτρευαν κι έπαιζαν μετά μανίας το Τζυκάνιον.
Αν θέλετε να τιμήσετε τον Κωνσταντίνο ΙΑ’ Παλαιολόγο, αν θέλετε να πιστεύετε ότι πάλι με χρόνια με καιρούς πάλι δικά μας θάναι, αν σέβεστε την θρησκεία των προγόνων σας, αν είστε Χριστιανός Ορθόδοξος, τότε πρέπει να ξέρετε ότι τζυκανιστήρια (τεράστια στάδια όπου έπαιζαν το τζυκάνιον) υπήρχαν σ’ αρκετές πόλεις της Ρωμανίας – όχι μόνον στην Κωνσταντινούπολη.
Κι’ αυτό συνέβαινε για τον πολύ απλό λόγο ότι αυτό το τουρανικής – ιρανικής καταγωγής άθλημα που από την σασανιδική ιρανική αυλή του 5ου αιώνα μεταδόθηκε στην Βασιλεύουσα του Θεοδοσίου Β’ βοηθάει πολύ στην εξάσκηση του αυτοκρατορικού ιππικού. Το τζυκάνιον είναι αυτό που λέμε σήμερα πόλο.
Οι Ακρίτες κι η ακριτική παράδοση το τίμησαν, ο Βασίλειος Α’ Μακεδών το λάτρευε, ο ‘αὐτοκράτωρ πιστὸς εὑσεβὴς βασιλεὺς’ Αλέξανδρος Γ’ που βασίλευσε 13 μήνες το 912-913 σκοτώθηκε παίζοντας τζυκάνιον, και πολλοί Ρωμιοί ιστορικοί όπως ο Ἰωάννης Κίνναμος έγραψαν γι’ αυτό. Η Άννα Κομνηνή διασώζει κι αυτή πληροφορίες για τα θρυλικά τζυκανιστήρια της αυτοκρατορίας.
Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_(Byzantine_emperor)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Kinnamos
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzykanisterion
Ενδεικτικό του πως γράφεται και ποια είναι η πραγματική Ιστορία που είναι απαγορευμένη στο νεοελληνικό ψευτοκράτος των θεόστραβων κι αργόσχολων μονιμάδων του Δημοσίου, τζυκανιστήρια αναφέρονται ότι υπήρχαν στην Σπάρτη και στην Αθήνα, πόλεις-εμβλήματα της Αρχαίας Ελλάδας που συμμετείχαν στους Ολυμπιακούς Αγώνες αλλά στα χριστιανικά χρόνια προτιμούσαν αθλήματα τουρανικής κι ιρανικής προέλευσης.
Ειρωνεία της Ιστορίας κι εκμηδενισμός των ανεγκέφαλων κι αμόρφωτων της ΕΣΤΙΑ TV κι άλλων ψευτομασωνικών, φιλοσιωνιστικών και νεο-ναζιστικών ομάδων που με τακτική Γκαίμπελς επαναλαμβάνουν το αισχρό κι αυτοκαταστροφικό ψέμμα του ‘διαχρονικού ελληνικού πολιτισμού’…..
Σε Αθήνα και Σπάρτη πριν από 1000 χρόνια, οι Ρωμιοί προτιμούσαν την τουρανική και την ιρανική πολιτισμική κληρονομιά, το αυτοκρατορικό άθλημα της θρυλικής δυναστείας των Καϋανιδών που περιγράφει ο Φερντοουσί στο Σαχναμέ, κι απολάμβαναν το τζυκάνιον μιμούμενοι τον Σιγιαβάς, θρυλικό ήρωα του Ιράν, και τον Αφρασιάμπ, μυθικό βασιλιά του Τουράν (που το όνομά του είναι το παραδοσιακό όνομα της Σαμαρκάνδης). Κι όλα αυτά για αιώνες πολλούς πριν το Μαντζικέρτ και πριν να φανούν στον ορίζοντα οι Σελτζούκοι.
Αυτό ήταν μία μόνο διάσταση των πολιτισμικών ανταλλαγών που έγιναν χάρη στους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού – ένα θέμα που οι Έλληνες ψευτο-πανεπιστημιακοί είχαν εξοστρακίσει κι απαγορεύσει από τον φόβο τους ότι η αληθινή Ιστορία θα ισοπέδωνε τα βρωμερά, ψευτο-μασωνικά, σιωνιστικά, ρατσιστικά, φασιστικά, νεο-ναζιστικά ψέμματά τους περί της τάχα ‘ανωτερότητος του αρχαίου ελληνικού πολιτισμού’ – κάτι που έμπρακτα οι απόγονοι των Αρχαίων Ελλήνων έδειξαν ότι δεν πίστευαν.
Τώρα όμως που η Κίνα επιβάλλει παγκοσμίως την θεματολογία των Δρόμων του Μεταξιού, η αληθινή Ιστορία θα σβύσει το ψέμμα του ‘ελληνισμού’ που κατέστρεψε την Ρωμιοσύνη και την Ορθοδοξία, ξεφτιλίζοντας την Ελλάδα σαν ένα ανίκανο και χρεωκοπημένο κρατίδιο.
Το πόλο λοιπόν παραπέμπει στους ιρανικούς θρύλους και συμβολισμούς, καίριο ηρωϊκό πρόσωπο των οποίων είναι ο Σιγιαβάς του οποίου το όνομα κατέληξε ως ‘σαβάς’ (Savaş) να σημαίνει στα τουρκικά ‘πόλεμος’. Ο πόλεμος μεταξύ του Σιγιαβάς, διαδόχου του θρόνου του Ιράν, και του Αφρασιάμπ, βασιλιά του Τουράν, ήταν μια τρομερή σελίδα του ιρανικού-τουρανικού θρύλου που γράφηκε με φόντο το τζυκάνιον (πόλο) και που πρέπει να ξέρουμε πολύ καλύτερα από τις ιστορίες του εμφυλίου των Αρχαίων Ελλήνων που γράφει ο Θουκυδίδης.
Γιατί οι θρύλοι είναι προτύπωση των εσχάτων με συμβολικούς όρους, ενώοι ιστορίες του παρελθόντος δεν αφορούν ούτε το παρόν ούτε το μέλλον.
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Поло в Гилгите, Северный Пакистан – Как древний имперский спорт распространился из Турана и Ирана через Великий шелковый путь
https://ok.ru/video/1357665602157
Polo at Gilgit, North Pakistan – How an Ancient Imperial Sport spread from Turan & Iran across the Silk Road
https://vk.com/video434648441_456240156
Πόλο στο Γκιλγκίτ, Πακιστάν – Διάδοση ενός Πανάρχαιου Αθλήματος πάνω στους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού
Περισσότερα:
Το πόλο – αρχικά γνωστό σε αρχαία ιρανικά κείμενα ως τσαουκάν – είναι ένα τουρανικό – ιρανικό άθλημα του οποίου οι απαρχές χάνονται στην Κεντρική Ασία της 2ης προχριστιανικής χιλιετίας. Αν η θήρα λεόντων ήταν το αυτοκρατορικό άθλημα των Ασσυρίων μοναρχών κι αν η θήρα ιπποποτάμων ήταν το βασιλικό άθλημα των Αιγυπτίων φαραώ, το κατ’ εξοχήν άθλημα των Αχαιμενιδών σάχηδων κι όλων των διαδόχων τους μέχρι τα μέσα ισλαμικά και τα νεώτερα χρόνια ήταν το πόλο (τσαουκάν σε μέσα περσικά και τσοβγάν σε νέα περσικά).
Καθώς το άθλημα αγαπήθηκε στο Θιβέτ, στην Κίνα, στην Ινδία. και στην Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία, ήταν ένα ακόμη τουρανικό – ιρανικό πολιτισμικό στοιχείο που χάρη στους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού διαδόθηκε σε όλες τις μεγάλες χώρες του προαναγεννησιακού κόσμου.
Το όνομα, με το οποίο το έμαθαν οι Άγγλοι στην Ινδία και στην συνέχεια το διέδωσαν σε άλλα μέρη του κόσμου, είναι ωστόσο όχι το τουρανικό – ιρανικό όνομά του αλλά το θιβετιανό όνομα του αθλήματος. Πούλου σημαίνει μπάλα στην θιβετιανή γλώσσα Μπαλτί που ομιλείται και στο Γκιλγκίτ, στα βόρεια άκρα του Πακιστάν.
Το θιβετιανό όνομα του αθλήματος διέδωσαν στην Ινδία Τούρκοι και Μογγόλοι που συχνά από στρατιώτες και στρατηγοί έγιναν αυτοκράτορες στο Δελχί. Ένας απ’ αυτούς μάλιστα σκοτώθηκε σε αγώνα πόλο – ο Κουτμπουντίν Αϊμπάκ που βασίλεψε ως σουλτάνος στο Δελχί από το 1206 μέχρι το 1210.
Το πόλο έγινε αυτοκρατορικό άθλημα επίσης στην Κίνα ήδη από την εποχή της δυναστείας Τανγκ (7ος – 10ος αι) και σε αυτοκρατορικούς τάφους βρίσκονται αγαλματίδια αθλητών πόλο είτε ανδρών είτε γυναικών. Συνέβαλε στην διάδοση του πόλο στην Κίνα η παρουσία των εκεί καταφυγόντων μελών της ιρανικής σασανιδικής δυναστείας που δεν αποδέχθηκαν την κατάκτηση του Ιράν από τους πρώιμους μουσουλμάνους στρατιώτες.
Στην Κωνσταντινούπολη το πόλο διαδόθηκε αρκετά νωρίς και στα χρόνια του Θεοδοσίου Β’ (408-450) αναγέρθηκε ολόκληρο Τζυκανιστήριο ώστε να παίζουν οι ευγενείς Ρωμιοί το … Τζυκάνιον (παραφθορά του περσικού τσαουκάν). Τζυκανιστήρια υπήρχαν επίσης στην Τραπεζούντα, την Έφεσο και αλλού. Ο λόγος που το άθλημα λατρεύθηκε από αριστοκρατίες και αυλές είναι απλός: αποτελεί εξαιρετική εκπαίδευση και προετοιμασία για το αυτοκρατορικό ιππικό μιας χώρας.
Ωστόσο, πουθενά αλλού το άθλημα δεν λατρεύτηκε περισσότερο από όσο ανάμεσα στους Πέρσες του Ιράν και τους Τουρανούς της Κεντρικής Ασίας. Ο λόγος είναι απλός: οι καταβολές του είναι από εκεί κι ανάμεσα σε Τουρανούς κι Ιρανούς το πόλο έγινε αντικείμενο μακροσκελέστατων επικών συνθέσεων. Ο εθνικός ποιητής του Ισλαμικού Ιράν Φερντοουσί κάνει λόγο για το πόλο που έπαιζε ένας από τα πιο σημαντικά πρόσωπα του ιρανικού θρύλου: ο Σιγιαβάς, γιος του Σάχη Κεϊκαούς.
Η ιστορία του Σιγιαβάς, Ιρανού διαδόχου του θρόνου που για να αποδείξει την αθωότητά του πρέπει να καταφύγει στον Αφρασιάμπ, βασιλιά του Τουράν, είναι από τα σημαντικώτερα σημεία του Σαχναμέ,του τεράστιου επικού ποιήματος του Φερντοουσί.
Ωστόσο οι εναλλαγές κι οι αντικατοπτρισμοί είναι έντονοι και το Καλό και το Κακό παίζουν περίεργα παιχνίδια ενοχής κι αθωότητας για τους ήρωες της Καϋανικής Δυναστείας που μέσα στο έργο του Φερντοουσί προηγείται της Αρσακιδικής Δυναστείας (Ασκανιάν) αλλά δεν μπορεί να ταυτιστεί με την ιστορική δυναστεία των Αχαιμενιδών που όντως στην Ιστορία προηγήθηκαν των Αρσακιδών. Ο συμβολικός χρόνος στο έργο του Φερντοουσί έχει τελείως άλλη υπόσταση και χρησιμεύει ώστε να περιγράφονται αποκαλυπτικά κι εσχατολογικά στοιχεία ως υπόθεση του παρελθόντος αν και ανήκουν ουσιαστικά στο μέλλον.
Έτσι ο Αφρασιάμπ σκοτώνει τον Σιγιαβάς του οποίου το όνομα αρχικά σήμαινε κυριολεκτικά “αυτός με το μαύρο άλογο” αλλά κατέληξε ως ‘σαβάς’ (Savaş) να σημαίνει στα τουρκικά ‘πόλεμος’.
Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siyâvash
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afrasiab
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kay_K%C4%81vus
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kay_Khosrow
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Η ιστορία του Αρχαίου Αθλήματος Τσαουκάν – Τζικάνιον:
The game first played in Persia (Iran) at dates given from the 5th century BC, or much earlier, to the 1st century AD and originated there, polo was at first a training game for cavalry units, usually the king’s guard or other elite troops. To the warlike tribesmen, who played it with as many as 100 to a side, it was a miniature battle. In time polo became an Iranian national sport played normally by the nobility.
Women as well as men played the game, as indicated by references to the queen and her ladies engaging King Khosrow II Parviz and his courtiers in the 6th century AD. Certainly Persian literature and art give us the richest accounts of polo in antiquity. Ferdowsi, the famed Iranian poet-historian, gives a number of accounts of royal polo tournaments in his 9th century epic, Shahnameh (the Epic of Kings). In the earliest account, Ferdowsi romanticizes an international match between Turanian force and the followers of Siyâvash, a legendary Iranian prince from the earliest centuries of the Empire; the poet is eloquent in his praise of Siyâvash’s skills on the polo field.
Ferdowsi also tells of Emperor Shapur II of the Sassanid dynasty of the 4th century who learned to play polo when he was only seven years old. Naqsh-i Jahan Square in Isfahan is in fact a polo field which was built by king Abbas I in 17th century. Naqsh-e Jahan Square in Isfahan is the site of a medieval royal polo field.
Sultan Qutb-ud-din Aibak, the Turkic Emperor of North India, ruled as an emperor for only four years, from 1206 to 1210 but died accidentally in 1210 playing polo. While he was playing a game of polo on horseback (also called chougan in Persia), his horse fell and Aibak was impaled on the pommel of his saddle. He was buried near the Anarkali bazaar in Lahore (which is now in Pakistan). Aibak’s son Aram, died in 1211 CE [2], so Shams-ud-din Iltutmish, another ex-slave of Turkic ancestry who was married to Aibak’s daughter, succeeded him as Sultan of Delhi.
From Persia, in medieval times polo spread to the Byzantines (who called it tzykanion), and after the Muslim conquests to the Ayyubid and Mameluke dynasties of Egypt and the Levant, whose elites favored it above all other sports. Notable sultans such as Saladin and Baybars were known to play it and encourage it in their court. Polo sticks were features on the Mameluke precursor to modern day playing cards.
A Persian miniature from the poem Guy-o Chawgân (“the Ball and the Polo-mallet”) during Safavid dynasty of Persia, which shows Persian courtiers on horseback playing a game of polo, 1546 AD
Later on Polo was passed from Persia to other parts of Asia including the Indian subcontinent and China, where it was very popular during the Tang Dynasty and frequently depicted in paintings and statues. Valuable for training cavalry, the game was played from Constantinople to Japan by the Middle Ages, known in the East as the Game of Kings. The name polo is said to have been derived from the Tibetan word “pulu”, meaning ball. https://royalpoloclubrasnov.ro/history-of-polo/
Επίσης:
https://irandoostan.com/polo-or-chogan-the-unesco-intangible-cultural-heritage-of-persia/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polo#Origins
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chovgan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzykanisterion
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Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/ss-250620160
https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/polo_games_war_games_the_tzykanisterion_of_const
https://vk.com/doc429864789_620278896
https://www.docdroid.net/LUrtK69/polo-polemos-to-tzikanistirion-konstantinoypoleos-oi-dromoi-toy-metaksiou-ki-oi-toyranikes-iranikes-baseis-tis-romiosynis-pdf
Ζαζά Κιζιλμπάσηδες της Τουρκίας: ενάντια σε Ερντογάν, Ισλαμιστές, Κουρμάντζι (‘Κούρδους’) και όλους τους Δυτικούς
Turkey's Zaza Qizilbash: against Erdogan, the Islamists, the Kurmanji (the so-called Kurds), and all the Westerners
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 27 Σεπτεμβρίου 2019.
Αναπαράγοντας τμήματα σχετικών ομιλιών μου και στοιχεία από συζητήσεις μας, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης παρουσιάζει ένα καλά κρυμμένο, απροσέγγιστο από δυτικές μυστικές υπηρεσίες, και συνεπώς άγνωστο, εντελώς αστάθμητο παράγοντα της Τουρκίας και του ισλαμικού κόσμου: τους Ζαζά Αλεβίδες Κιζιλμπάσηδες. Προσθέτει μάλιστα βίντεο, φωτογραφίες και χρήσιμη, επιστημονική (αλλά σε ορισμένα σημεία ιδιαίτερα μεροληπτική) βιβλιογραφία για το θέμα αυτό, το οποίο θα απασχολήσει ιδιαίτερα τον κόσμο λίαν προσεχώς.
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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/09/27/ζαζά-κιζιλμπάσηδες-της-τουρκίας-ενάν/ ==================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Σε πολλά κείμενά μου έχω αναφερθεί στην σημερινή Τουρκία κι έχω τονίσει πόσο τεράστια άγνοια της εκεί πραγματικότητας χαρακτηρίζει τους ψευτο-επιστήμονες της Ελλάδας, τους τιποτένιους κι αμόρφωτους ψευτο-καθηγητές, τους τάχα γεωπολιτικούς αναλυτές, τους ΚΥΠατζήδες, και τους δημοσιογράφους.
Αυτοί οι εγκληματίες θέλουν κατακρεούργηση χωρίς δίκη από τα πλήθη των εξαπατηθέντων και κοροϊδευμένων επί δεκαετίες Ελλήνων. Εξαιτίας τους ο μέσος Έλληνας δεν έχει ιδέα για το τι ακριβώς συμβαίνει στην Τουρκία και το τι είναι ενδεχόμενο να συμβεί από την εκεί σύγκρουση πολλών αντιθέτων κι αντιπάλων κοινοτήτων και ομάδων που επιμένουν να δείχνουν προσήλωση στην εθνική, θρησκευτική και γλωσσική ταυτότητά τους.
Τα σχέδια καταστροφής της Τουρκίας από τις εχθρικές προς αυτήν δυτικές χώρες (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, Ισραήλ, ΗΠΑ) εκλαμβάνονται από τους αμόρφωτους Έλληνες ψευτο-πανεπιστημιακούς, δημοσιογράφους και πολιτικούς ως εφικτά κι αυτή η ηλίθια αντίληψη οφείλεται τόσο στην εθελοδουλεία του ελληνικού κατεστημένου προς την Δύση όσο και στην παντελή άγνοια που έχουν όλοι τους για την Τουρκία.
Έχω ήδη τονίσει ότι δεν υπάρχουν Κούρδοι κι ότι δυτικοί διπλωμάτες, οριενταλιστές και στρατιωτικοί παράγοντες έχουν παρασκευάσει στα χαρτιά ένα ψευτο-έθνος το οποίο δεν είναι ένα αλλά αποτελείται από πολλά διαφορετικά έθνη με διαφορετικές θρησκείες και γλώσσες που, αν όλα τους υποχρεωθούν να μπουν μέσα στα σύνορα ενός κράτους, θα κατασφαχθούν μεταξύ τους για το ποιος θα κυριαρχήσει.
“Κουρδιστάν” είναι το ισοδύναμο του να πει κάποιος “Ευρώπη” και να βάλει μέσα στο νεόκοπο αυτό κράτος Ρώσσους, Τούρκους, Ουκρανούς, Έλληνες, Ιταλούς, Πολωνούς, Γερμανούς, Γάλλους, Άγγλους και πολλούς άλλους, και να τους αφήσει να …. κυβερνηθούν.
Απλώς θα σκοτωθούν.
Αλεβίδες Ζαζά Κιζιλμπάσηδες χορεύουν τον θρησκευτικό χορό των Αλεβίδων Σεμά σε μια πλατεία στο Αντίγιαμαν.
Στην Τουρκία δεν υπάρχουν “Κούρδοι” πολύ απλά γιατί Κούρδοι δεν υπάρχουν πουθενά.
Αν συγκεκριμένα αναφερθεί κάποιος στις σημερινές εθνο-γλωσσο-θρησκευτικές ενότητες της Τουρκίας, θα διακρίνει:
1- Τούρκους Σουνίτες
2- Τούρκους Αλεβίδες
3- Ζαζά – οι οποίοι είναι Αλεβίδες (: Σιίτες)
4- Κουρμάντζι (αυτοί μόνον είναι οι ‘Κούρδοι’) οι οποίοι είναι Σουνίτες (τα Κουρμάντζι είναι τόσο διαφορετικά από τα Ζαζάκι όσο τα ισπανικά από τα τουρκμενικά)
5- Αραμαίοι Χριστιανοί
6- Αραμαίοι Μουσουλμάνοι αραβόφωνοι
7- Γιαζίντι – οι οποίοι μιλούν Κουρμάντζι αλλά δεν δέχονται να έχουν καμμιά σχέση με τους Σουνίτες Κουρμάντζι, και
8- μικρότερα έθνη (Αρμένιοι, Έλληνες) ή έθνη που έχουν αφομοιωθεί μέσα στους Τούρκους, όπως σε μεγάλο βαθμό οι Λαζοί.
Οι Αλεβίδες Ζαζά αντιδρούν στην επιχειρούμενη από τις δυτικές μυστικές υπηρεσίες ‘κουρμαντζο-ποίηση’ (ή ‘κουρδοποίηση’) και απορρίπτουν και την όποια συνεργασία με τους Κουρμάντζι.
Παράλληλα, απορρίπτουν την πολιτική των ισλαμιστικών κυβερνήσεων της Τουρκίας, συμμετέχουν ενεργά μέσα στα κόμματα της κεμαλικής αντιπολίτευσης, και έχουν συνδεθεί πολύ έντονα με τους Τούρκους Αλεβίδες.
Μέσα στους Αλεβίδες Ζαζά το μυστικό κίνημα των Κιζιλμπάσηδων αναβιώνει την θρησκευτική πίστη και οργάνωση του θρησκευτικού τάγματος των Μπεκτασήδων, έτσι τραβώντας αμετάκλητα τους Αλεβίδες Ζαζά μακριά από τους Κουρμάντζι, τον Ερντογάν και τις μυστικές υπηρεσίες των δυτικών χωρών.
Δείτε το βίντεο για να καταλάβετε πως έχουν τα πράγματα στην σημερινή Τουρκία.
Περισσότερα θα βρείτε στο εισαγωγικό σημείωμα (σε ρωσσικά, αγγλικά κι ελληνικά) και σε ένα άρθρο για τους Ζαζά, οι οποίοι στην γλώσσα τους ονομάζονται Ντιμλί.
Ο όροι ‘Αλεβί’ (: Αλεβίδες) και ‘Κούρδοι’ δηλώνουν τα εξής:
‘Αλεβί’ (δηλαδή Σιίτες της Τουρκίας) είναι εθνικά είτε Τούρκοι, είτε Ζαζά.
‘Κούρδοι’ σημαίνει Κουρμάντζι. Όλοι οι Κουρμάντζι είναι Σουνίτες.
Η αντιπαράθεση Αλεβίδων και Σουνιτών δεν συνεπάγεται εμπλοκή όλων των πληθυσμών: οι Σουνίτες κεμαλιστές Τούρκοι είναι θρησκευτικά αδιάφοροι.
Αντίθετα, οι Αλεβίδες κεμαλιστές Τούρκοι και οι Αλεβίδες κεμαλιστές Ζαζά δείχνουν ένα μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον για την θρησκεία και τις παραδόσεις τους.
Έτσι, στην σημερινή Τουρκία, διαμορφώνονται πέντε μεγάλα εθνο-γλωσσο-θρησκευτικο-πολιτικά σύνολα:
1. Κεμαλιστές, χωρίς θρησκευτικά ενδιαφέροντα – κυρίως Τούρκοι Σουνίτες
2. Αλεβίδες – Τούρκοι και Ζαζά, αμφότεροι φιλο-κεμαλιστές
3. Σουνίτες Ισλαμιστές – κυρίως Τούρκοι Σουνίτες και αρκετοί Κουρμάντζι που αρνούνται την ‘κουρδική’ τους ταυτότητα, και υποστηρίζουν τον Ερντογάν και μια ισλαμική σουνιτική Τουρκία
4. Σουνίτες Παντουρανιστές – μόνον Τούρκοι με άλλους από αυτούς να τείνουν προς τον κεμαλισμό και άλλους να τείνουν προς τον ισλαμισμό. Δεν υπάρχουν Αλεβίδες Τούρκοι Παντουρανιστές.
5. Κουρμάντζι αντι-ισλαμιστές και αντι-κεμαλιστές
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Кызылбаши Зазаки танцуют религиозный алевитский танец Семах на публике: Адыяман, Юго-Восточная Турция
https://www.ok.ru/video/1518627523181
Περισσότερα:
Это скорее вопрос исторической иронии – видеть людей, которые изображены на больших рекламных щитах в здании за площадью, где Кызылбаши Зазаки танцуют семах, религиозный танец в Адиямане, ЮВ Турции! Смотрите эту часть: 10:22 – 10:31
Справа налево вы можете увидеть:
1- Али: первый имам и четвертый халиф ислама, центральная персона шиитов
2- Хаджи Бекташ: 13 в. Исламский философ, мистик, основатель ордена Бекташи
3- Кемаль Ататюрк
4- Государственный флаг Турции
5- реклама организации или мероприятия, и
6- Сейид Риза (в Зазаки: Pîr Sey Riza): родился в Тунджели (ранее известный как Дерсим) в 1863 году, он был приговорен к смертной казни и повешен в Элазиге в 1937 году. Он был религиозным лидером Бекташи в Заза и начал восстание против Кемала Ататюрка.
Это посмертное сосуществование Кемала Ататюрка и Сейида Ризы на рекламном щите, созданном Зазаки Кызылбаши, несколько иронично. На самом деле, после смерти Ататюрка, все Зазаки приняли светское государство, которое он установил; раньше они голосовали в основном за левоцентристские политические партии. Они предпочитали современное светское общество, а не религиозное суннитское государство.
И они ближе к алевским туркам, чем к суннитским Керманджи («курды»). Таким образом, Зазаки бросают вызов Эрдогану, исламистам, западным спецслужбам и дипломатам, которые таким образом не смогут сфабриковать так называемый «Курдистан». Больше:
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Али_ибн_Абу_Талиб
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Хаджи_Бекташ
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Бекташи
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Дерсимская_резня
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Qizilbash Zaza dance the Semah, a religious Alevi dance, in public: Adiyaman, SE Turkey
https://vk.com/video434648441_456240310
Περισσότερα:
It is rather a matter of historical irony to notice those depicted on the big billboards in the building behind the square where Qizilbash Zaza dance the Semah, a religious dance in Adiyaman, SE Turkey! Watch this part: 10:22 – 10:31
From the right to the left, you can see:
1- Ali: first imam and fourth caliph of Islam, central person for the Shiites
2- Haji Bektash: 13th c. Islamic philosopher, mystic, founder of the Bektashi Order
3- Kemal Ataturk
4- The national flag of Turkey
5- The advertisement of an organization or event, and
6- Seyid Riza (in Zazaki: Pîr Sey Riza): born in Tunceli (previously known as Dersim) in 1863, he was condemned to death and hanged in Elazig in 1937. He was a Bektashi religious leader of the Zazas and started the rebellion against Kemal Ataturk.
This posthumous coexistence of Kemal Ataturk and Seyid Riza on a billboard set up by Zaza Qizilbash is somewhat ironical. As a matter of fact, after Ataturk’s death, Zazas accepted the secular state that he had established; they used to vote mainly for center-left political parties. They preferred the modern secular society instead of a religious Sunni state. And they are closer to Alevi Turks than to Sunni Kermanji (: ‘Kurds’), thus defying altogether Erdogan, the Islamists, and the Western secret services and diplomats who will thus fail to fabricate a so-called ‘Kurdistan’.
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Ζαζά Κιζιλμπάσηδες χορεύουν δημόσια Σεμά (Semah – Θρησκευτικό Χορό): Αντίγιαμαν (Adıyaman), Ανατολική Τουρκία
Περισσότερα:
Όλη η ειρωνεία της Ιστορίας βρίσκεται στο 10:22 – 10:31 του μικρού αυτού αποσπάσματος από ένα χορό που μπορεί να διαρκέσει πάνω από μια ώρα.
Στην δημόσια εκδήλωση αυτή, κρέμασαν μάλιστα οι Ζαζά Αλεβίδες Κιζιλμπάσηδες μεγάλα πόστερς στα κτήρια απέναντι από την πλατεία του Αντίγιαμαν της νοτιοανατολικής Τουρκίας όπου χόρευαν τον παραδοσιακό, θρησκευτικό χορό Σαμάα (Σεμά στα τουρκικά). Τα πόστερς αυτά είναι η ειρωνεία της Ιστορίας γιατί φέρνουν μαζί και κάνουν να συνυπάρχουν τα εξής ιστορικά πρόσωπα (από τα δεξιά προς τα αριστερά όπως βλέπουμε):
1- Αλί (601-661: Αλί Ιμπν Αμπί Τάλεμπ), ξάδερφος και γαμπρός του Μωάμεθ, πρώτος ιμάμης και τέταρτος χαλίφης, κεντρικό πρόσωπο της πίστης όλων των Σιιτών του Ιράν, των Αλεβιτών της Συρίας και των Αλεβίδων της Τουρκίας. Εννοείται ότι κάθε δημόσια απεικόνιση του Αλί είναι μια θρησκευτική πράξη που παλιότερα απαγορευόταν στο κοσμικό – λαϊκό (secular – laic) κράτος του Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ. Στο κάτω μέρος της αφίσας βλέπετε γραμμένο Hz. Ali, δηλαδή Hazrat Ali που η πιο κοντινή απόδοση στα ελληνικά είναι ‘Ιερός Αλί’. Αρχικά, η λέξη, προφερμένη χαντράτ στα αραβικά (και έπειτα χαζράτ σε φαρσί, τουρκικά και ουρντού) σήμαινε ‘παρουσία’ και σε περίπτωση θείας παρουσίας ‘επιφάνεια’. Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hadrat
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prophets_and_messengers_in_Islam
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali
2- Με ιδαίτερο καπέλλο εμφανίζεται ο Χατζή Μπεκτάς (1209-1271), ιδρυτής του θρησκευτικού τάγματος των Μπεκτασήδων στους οποίους ανήκαν Τούρκοι Αλεβίδες.
Οι Μπεκτασήδες κι οι Μεβλεβήδες ήταν τα πιο σημαντικά θρησκευτικά τάγματα στην Οθωμανικη Αυτοκρατορία, αλλά από ένα σημείο και μετά οι Μπεκτασήδες καταδιώχθηκαν.
Οι Μπεκτασήδες δεν ταυτίζονται με τους Κιζιλμπάσηδες,οι οποίοι ήταν ένα στρατιωτικό τάγμα, και συχνά μεσολαβούσαν στον Οθωμανό Σουλτάνο υπέρ των Κιζιλμπάσηδων.
Οι Μεβλεβήδες ήταν Τούρκοι Σουνίτες και το τάγμα τους ιδρύθηκε από τον Τζελαλεντίν Ρουμί (1207-1273).
Αμφότεροι, Χατζή Μπεκτάς και Τζελαλεντίν Ρουμί, προέρχονται από την ίδια μακρινή από την Ανατολία περιοχή: το σημερινό βορειοανατολικό Ιράν και βόρειο Αφγανιστάν.
Ο θρησκευτικός χορός των Μεβλεβήδων Δερβίσηδων (σεμά) απέκτησε μεγαλύτερη φήμη αλλά και οι Μπεκτασήδες αφοσιώνονταν στον θρησκευτικό χορό με σκοπό την ενεργοποίηση της σύνδεσης σώματος και ψυχής και την υπέρβαση. Υπάρχουν διάφοροι τύποι σεμά.
Όλα τα τάγματα είχαν καταργηθεί επί Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ και κανένας δεν μπορούσε δημόσια να δείξει μια φωτογραφία, πόσο μάλλον να αναρτήσει μια αφίσα, του Χατζή Μπεκτάς. Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haji_Bektash_Veli
https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Μπεκτασήδες
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bektashi_Order
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sama_(Sufism)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhikr
3- Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ
4- Τουρκική σημαία
5- Αφίσα μιας πολιτιστικής-θρησκευτικής εκδήλωσης, και
6- Σεγίτ Ρεζά (Seyit Rıza, στα ζαζάκι: Pîr Sey Riza / γεννημένος στο Τούντζελι, πρώην Ντέρσιμ, το 1863, καταδικάστηκε και κρεμάστηκε στο Ελάζιγ το 1937) ο οποίος ως μπεκτασής θρησκευτικός αρχηγός των Ζαζά οργάνωσε την εξέγερση κατά του Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ το 1937-1938 .
Η εξέγερση εκείνη ψευδώς παρουσιάζεται από τα εχθρικά προς την Τουρκία κράτη της Δύσης (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, ΗΠΑ, Ισραήλ) ως τάχα ‘κουρδική’ σε μια άθλια φαλκίδευση της Ιστορίας.
Στην πραγματικότητα ήταν μια αντι-κουρδική, αντ-εθνική, θρησκευτική εξέγερση εναντίον του κοσμικού – λαϊκού κράτους του Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ.
Κανένας Κουρμάντζι (: Κούρδος) δεν είχε συμμετάσχει κι η εξέγερση καταπνίγηκε στο αίμα. Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dersim_rebellion
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seyid_Riza
Είναι λοιπόν ειρωνεία της Ιστορίας να παρουσιάζονται δίπλα – δίπλα ο Ατατούρκ και ο Σεγίτ Ρεζά, έστω κι αν οι δύο ηγέτες είχαν συναντηθεί και συνομιλήσει.
Ωστόσο, οι αφίσες αυτές αντανακλούν και την πραγματική κατάσταση της σημερινής Τουρκίας την οποία τα ελληνικά, δυτικο-ευρωπαϊκά και βορειο-αμερικανικά ΜΜΕ αλλοιώνουν και παραποιούν οικτρά με σκοπό να κάνουν τις ευρύτερες μάζες να έχουν ολότελα στρεβλή εικόνα της κατάστασης. Αυτή έχει περίπου ως εξής:
Οι Ζαζά στην Τουρκία βαθμιαία αποδέχθηκαν το κοσμικό – λαϊκό κράτος του Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ στις δεκαετίες 1950 -1980. Αυτό συνέβη επειδή το κράτος αυτό αντιστοιχούσε περισσότερο στον τρόπο ζωής και στις παραδόσεις τους από όσο ένα θρησκευτικό σουνιτικό κράτος.
Οι Ζαζά συμμετείχαν ενεργά στην τουρκική πολιτική ζωή της Τουρκίας και ανήκαν σε κεντροαριστερά κόμματα. Σ’ αυτό συμπαρέσυραν και τους Κουρμάντζι (: Κούρδους) που μένουν σε ακόμη πιο νοτιοανατολικές περιοχές.
Η θρησκευτική όμως διαφορά των Ζαζά (που είναι Αλεβίδες) από τους Κουρμάντζι (που είναι Σουνίτες στην πλειοψηφία τους) έφερε τους πρώτους πιο κοντά στους Τούρκους Αλεβίδες. Το κίνημα των Κιζιλμπάσηδων εκμεταλλεύθηκε την πολιτική των τουρκικών κυβερνήσεων των τελευταίων 15 ετών και προξένησε ανάμεσα σε Τούρκους και τους Ζαζά της Κεντρικής κι Ανατολικής Τουρκίας μια αναβίωση του μπεκτασικού τάγματος.
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Διαβάστε:
Dimlī
Dimlī (or Zāzā), the indigenous name of an Iranian people living mainly in eastern Anatolia, in the Dersim region (present-day Tunceli) between Erzincan in the north and the Muratsu (Morādsū, Arm. Aracani) in the south, the far western part of historical Upper Armenia (Barjr Haykʿ).
They are also found in Bingöl, Muş, and the province of Bitlis, as well as around Diyarbekir (Dīārbakr), Siverek, and Sivas (for details, see Lerch, p. xxi; Haykuni, p. 84; Andranik, pp. 111-16; Hadank, pp. 8-9; Erevanian, pp. 1-20; Halajian, 1973, pp. 9-100; Gasparian, p. 195; Bruinessen, 1978, p. 30). About 300,000 Dimlīs live in western Europe, mainly in Germany. Some of them are political refugees. The total population of Dimlīs at present is unknown, but it can be estimated at 3-4 million.
The people call themselves Dimlī or Dīmla, apparently derived from Deylam (Andranik, p. 161 n. 1; Hadank, pp. 2, 11-12; Minorsky, 1932, p. 17; idem, 1965, p. 159 n. 21), as appears from Armenian delmik, dlmik, and the like (Yuzbashian, pp. 146-51), which must be derived from *dēlmīk “Deylamite.” The Deylamite origin of the Dimlīs is also indicated by the linguistic position of Dimlī (see below).
Among their neighbors the Dimlī are known mainly as Zāzā, literally “stutterer,” a pejorative perhaps owing to the relative abundance of sibilants and affricates in their language (Hadank, p. 1; MacKenzie, p. 164; cf. zāzˊā “dumb” in Arm. dialects of the Vaspurakan area).
Armenians also call them Delmik, Dlmik, Dmlik (see below), Zaza (Alevi) Kʿrder, Čʿarkʿəčʿikʿ(Halajian, Dersimi azgagrakan nyutʿer [DAN], passim; Mkrtčʿian, pp. 54-55), and Dužik or Dužik Kʿrder, the last after the name of a mountain in Dersim (Spiegel, II, p. 65).
The Armenian term Kʿrder, literally “Kurds,” in this context denotes social status or mode of life, rather than nationality. Even those Armenian authors who use the term Kʿrder explicitly distinguish the Dimlī from the ethnic Kurds (Halajian, DAN, p. 242; for similar use of the term in the Middle Ages, see Minorsky, 1943, p. 75). In Turkish the Dimlī are known as Dersimli and Qezelbāš (i.e., Shiʿite).
The appearance of the Dimlī in the areas they now inhabit seems to have been connected, as their name suggests, with waves of migration of Deylamites ii from the highlands of Gīlān during the 10th-12th centuries. Unlike the Kurds, the Dimlīs are mainly sedentary cultivators, though animal husbandry occupies a considerable place in their economic activities. They are especially renowned as horticulturists.
Dimlī society is tribal, a sociopolitical, territorial, and economic unit organized according to genuine or putative patrilineage and kinship, with a characteristic internal structure. It encompasses forty-five subtribes, each divided into smaller units. The most prominent are Ābāsān, Āḡāǰān, Ālān, Bāmāsūr(ān), Baḵtīār(lī), Dǖīk, Davrēš-Gulābān, Davrēš-Jamālān, Hay-darān(lī), Hasanān(lī), Korēšān, Mamikī, and Yūsufān.
The names of some small subtribes consist of patronymics combined with the Turkish word uşak (servant), for example, Ā(r)slānušāḡī, Ābāsušāḡī, Farhādušāḡī, Šāmušāḡī, Tōpūzušāḡī, and Ḵōčušāḡī (Spiegel, I, p. 758; Andranik, pp. 156-57; Molyneux-Seel, p. 68; Dersimi, pp. 18-19, 24-28). The chiefs of the most important subtribes, called seyīds (sayyeds), are both religious and secular clan leaders and thus exercise considerable influence upon the tribesmen.
Religion
As the names Alevi (ʿAlawī) and Qezelbāš imply, most Dimlīs are Shiʿites, often considered extremist, though some are Sunnis. The religious beliefs of the majority, in common with those of most Shiʿite extremist groups, are characterized by great variety.
They venerate ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭāleb as the most important incarnation of God, but they also profess an admixture of indigenous primitive and some Christian beliefs. Within this framework the cult practice of the Dimlī inhabitants of each individual region displays specific features, reflecting the absence of a centralized religious institution, like those in Christianity and Islam, that might standardize cult practice and dogma.
God is known as Hū/ŭmāy, Hōmā, and Haq (Adontz, pp. 11-12; Tēr Minasian, p. 22; Asatrian, 1991, p. 10; idem and Gevorgian, p. 502).
The Dimlīs themselves call their religion by the Turkish term yōl-ušāḡī “followers of the [true] path” (Molyneux-Seel, p. 64), a designation with mystical overtones. The influence of folk Sufism on Dimlī religious beliefs is so thoroughly blended with indigenous elements as to permit no definite identification.
It may be reflected, however, in the hierarchy of the priesthood, the structure of the community, and the cult of Xizir (Ḵāżer, Ḵeżr) Īlyās; in the last, however, elements of the Armenian Surb Sargis (Saint Sergius) are also recognizable. The feast of Ḵizir, considered an incarnation of ʿAlī/God, coincides with ʿAli-bayrami (the feast of ʿAlī), also known as Aḡa-bayrami (God’s feast) among the Qezelbāš of the Mākū region, as well as with the Armenian feast of Surb Sargis (Asatrian and Gevorgian, p. 503 n. 25; Müller, pp. 29-30; see also Abeghian, pp. 95-97).
It is usually celebrated in February. Christian elements are assimilated to Shiʿite conceptions (as in the example of Xizir) or have been adopted directly from the Armenian population of Dersim, for example, the rites of communion, baptism, and worship at Christian shrines and churches (e.g., the Sūrb Kārāpēt monastery, Hālvōrī vānk in the Dǖīkbābā mountains, and Dēr Ōvā [Arm. Tēr Ohan, Saint John] monastery near Sēlpūs/zdāḡ).
There are also perceptible remnants of “nature worship,” including worship of mountains (e.g., Mūnzūrdāḡ, Dǖīkbābā, Sēlpūs/z, Sēl), rocks, springs (e.g., Kānīyē Hazratē Xizirī“the spring of Ḵeżr” on the slopes of Dǖīkbābā and Kānīyē ānmāhūtyan “the spring of immortality” at the foot of Sēlpūs), trees (mainly oaks), and animals (snakes, rabbits, etc.). The cult of the snake, considered a holy creature, is most distinctive.
It has been symbolized by a stick called čūē haqī (God’s stick), the top of which is carved in the form of a snake’s head. It is preserved in a green cloth bag suspended from a wooden pillar (ērkyan) in the sanctuary of the village of Kiştim near Dersim. The stick is believed to be a piece of the rod of Moses and the bag a copy of the one carried by St. John the Baptist (Halajian, DAN, pp. 475-80; Molyneux-Seel, p. 67).
The čūē haqī is used in cult ceremonies on the feast of Xizir Īlyās, which is celebrated after a three-day fast, during which, according to some reports (Mkrtčʿian, p. 51), even cattle and other livestock are not fed. On this day thousands of pilgrims gather in the village to gaze upon the holy staff (ēvlīyā keštīmī “the saint of Kiştim”; for details, see Dersimi, pp. 97-98; Halajian, DAN, pp. 475-80; Haykuni, p. 133; Erevanian, p. 79; Müller, pp. 27-28; Asatrian and Gevorgian, p. 508).
One noteworthy trait of Dimlī religious rituals is the equal participation of women, which has often served as an excuse for accusing them of ritual promiscuity and calling them by derogatory names (e.g., čirāḡ-kušān, čirāḡ-sōndurān, mūm-sōndurān, ḵurōs-kušān “candle extinguishers”) suggesting participation in orgies (e.g., Fontanier, p. 168; Mkrtčʿian, p. 51).
The Dimlīs’ profound hatred of the Turks, in contrast to their mild and friendly attitude toward Armenians, may partly reflect the fact that they, like the Ahl-e Ḥaqq and Yazīdīs, rigorously deny that they are Muslims and stress their claim to follow a distinct religion (Bruinessen, 1991, p. 12; Molyneux-Seel, p. 64).
Antagonism to the Turks has also acquired a clear nationalistic character, which is currently being expressed in the powerful upsurge of a Dimlī separatist movement in Turkey (Taławarian, p. 79; Asatrian, 1992a, pp. 104-05; idem, 1992b, pp. 8-9; idem, 1993, p. 7).
Beside special public places for performing their religious ceremonies (tekke), the Dimlīs, like the Yazīdīs, also worship in private houses, including those of their religious leaders (Taławarian, p. 64; Müller, p. 228; Asatrian, 1992a, p. 105). They are mostly monogamous, though, according to some authors, polygamy, limited to no more than four wives, is also exercised. Divorce is strictly forbidden.
Dimlīs do not practice circumcision (Trowbridge, p. 348; Müller, p. 25; Asatrian, 1992a, p. 106; Mkrtčʿian, p. 55).
Four clans (Āḡāǰān, Bāmāsūrān, Kurēšān, and Davrēš-Jamālān) are the traditional custodians of Dimlī religious doctrine. Religious offices are hereditary. The highest, that of pīrī-pīrān (cf. Pers. pīr-e pīrān, elder of elders) may also be conferred by ordination within the hereditary line.
Successively lower levels are pīr, seyīd, dede, muršīd, and rayvar (cf. Pers. rahbar). Such terms as “mulla” and ulem (Ar. and Pers. ʿālem) are never used in non-Sunni Dimlī religious affairs. The pīrī-pīrān is the theocratic head of the community. His wife (ana) enjoys almost equal rights in managing family affairs (Halajian, DAN, pp. 464-65).
Dedes and seyīds, who never shave or have their hair cut, perform wedding and funeral rites (Haykuni, p. 86). Rayvars, the lowest class of clergy, have the social status of ordinary laymen (ṭālebs). They are not paid for their services, which include visiting members of the congregation, performing daily religious rites, and ensuring that the religious and ethical norms of the community are observed.
They can punish the guilty but are not allowed to show clemency. Only the pīrī-pīrān, upon the application of the supreme council (jamāʿat), a mixed secular and clerical body, may forgive sins. The nonreligious affairs of the rayvars are attended to by their families or lay volunteers (Halajian, pp. 463 ff.). A curious social aspect of the Dimlī community is the institution of moṣāḥeb (perhaps “holy brotherhood”).
Similar institutions, called birē āxiratē and xūškā āxiratē (brotherhood and sisterhood of the next world), and šarṭ-e eqrār exist also among the Yazīdīs and Ahl-e Ḥaqq respectively (Asatrian, 1985; idem and Gevorgian, p. 507).
Language
Dimlī (Zāzā) belongs to the Northwest Iranian language group (Windfuhr). It is known from several dialects, Sīvērēk, Kōsā, Čabāḵčūr, Kiḡī, Bujāq, Ōvāǰīḡ, and others, which, however, do not differ greatly.
Phonology
The Dimlī phonological system is the same in all dialects, with only slight variations. The vowel system consists of eight phonemes and two diphthongs (Cabolov), which are transcribed variously in the recorded texts (Chart 1).
The long vowel phonemes have no significant allophones, whereas the range of allophones of the short vowels and diphthongs is quite wide:/a/:[a, i, ē/ĕ]; /i/:[ī/ĭ, a, e]; /u/: [o, ü], etc.; /au/: [au, aū, ou, eu]; /ai/: [ai, ēi, aī], etc.
The Dimlī consonant phonemes are shown in Chart 2. The affricates c, j, and cʿ and the aspirated series pʿ, tʿ-, kʿ are found mainly in northern dialects (Erzincan, Dersim). Armenian influence is the most likely explanation of the existence of these phonemes, which are not otherwise found in modern West-Iranian languages (Vahman and Asatrian, p. 268). The /čá/ represents a mediopalatal surd affricate (= -tš-, Arm. č, Kurmānjī čˊ), which is apparently common to all Dimlī dialects.
Historically Dimili j corresponds to Middle Iranian ǰ, while čá, c, and cʿ all continue Middle Iranian č; for instance, jau “barley” (< *MIr. *ǰau), c/cʿim “eye” (< *čehm < *čašm), and cʿilā “lamp, candle” (< *čirāḡ); cīcag “flower” < *čīčag, cf. Turk. çiçek, etc.).
The opposition between a rolled ṟ and a simple flap r is found also in Kurmānjī. The marginal phonemes /ʿ/ and /ḥ/ occur in some dialects under the influence of Kurmānjī Kurdish.
In certain dialects older š is commonly represented by s, for example, sit or šit “milk” (cf. Parth. šift), gōs or gōš “ear” (cf. Pers. gūš), hū/ŭsk “dry” (cf. Pers. ḵošk, Kurdish hišk), mask(a) “churning bag” (cf. OPers. maškā-, NPer. mašk); sim- “drink” (probably from MIr. *šām- from older *čyāma-, cf. NPers. ā-šām-, Khotanese tsām- “to digest”); and sōn- or šōn- “flow” (possibly from *xšaudna-). Conversely š also replaces original s, for example, šīr “garlic” (cf. NPers., Kurdish sīr).
There is also worth mentioning the initial s- in sol(a), “salt,” which is probably also from š- (cf. Parth. šwryn “salt[y],” NPers. šūr); one, however, cannot exclude the possibility of its original character (cf. Mid. Pers. sōr, Baḵtīārī, sūr, Balūčī sōr, Brahui sōr; see Henning, 1947, p. 55). Of more uncertain interpretation is ša “black,” whose š may be from *sy (cf. Sogd. šʾw but Parth. syʾw, NPers sīāh), and ṟāšt or ṟāst “right” (cf. Parth. rʾšt but NPers. rāst, Kurdish ṟāst).
A similar situation is seen in the language of those Armenians of Dersim who belong to the so-called Mirakʿian tribe, in which Armenian š has become s, for instance, sun “dog” < šun and us “late” < uš. In this dialect Armenian ǰ, č, čʿ have become j, c, cʿ (e.g., jur “water” < ǰur, cut “chicken” < čut, and cʿor “dry” < čʿor).
In the dialect of northern Dersim the voiceless and voiced stops k-, g- are sometimes palatalized in initial position, for instance, čē or kē, kaya “house, home” (cf. NPers. kada, Ṭālešī ka), čanā, čayna, čēnakʿ or kʿaynakʿ “girl, maiden” (cf. Av. kainiiā-, Mid. Pers. kanīg), and ǰī “excrement” (from MIr. *gūh, cf. Pers. goh, Kurdish gū).
Morphology
Nouns and pronouns
Two grammatical genders are clearly distinguished in substantives, adjectives, pronouns, and verbal forms. The nominative singular masculine is unmarked; the feminine usually takes the ending short unstressed -i. The plural endings are -(ā)n, -ī, and -ē for both genders. There are two cases, direct and oblique, which are distinguished in the singular: masculine -ī/-Ø, feminine -ē/-i/-Ø, but not in the plural. The eżāfa is masculine singular -ē/ĕ/, -ō/, -dē/, -di/, -dō and feminine singular -(y)ā/ă, -dā/ă(y). The plural form for both genders is usually -ē, as in nē pʿōstālē min “these my shoes.”
The two cases are distinguished in the personal pronouns, as well (Table 32). In addition, the third person pronouns have a possessive form derived from Old Iranian *haca “from” plus the oblique form of the pronoun.
To be compared with the possessive forms are Kurdish žē, Aftarī ǰūn, Tākistānī ǰā, ǰanā, Ṭālešī čay, čavōn, Semnāni masc. žo, fem. žin, and the like.
Verbs
The verbal system is based on two stems, present and past, which correspond to the older present stem and past (passive) participle. The present tense is formed from the present stem plus the formant -an-/ -(i)n- derived from the Old Iranian present participle in *ant(a)- (cf. Pers. -anda) for instance, barm-an- “weep, cry” (Parth. bram-).
If the stem ends in r this is assimilated to the following n: kar- but kan-an- “do,” *yar- but yan-n- “come.” The present stem without -an- occurs in the subjunctive (aorist) and imperative, for instance, karō “may he be.” Some verbs take the preverb bi- in the subjunctive and imperative, for instance, bērī “come!” The imperfect is made from the present stem plus the suffix -ā/ănī or -inī without personal endings, for example, ti āgayrā-ynī “you were walking.”
The endings of the present tense (gender marked only in the singular) are shown in Chart 3. The endings of the past tense are regular. Occasionally the feminine third-person singular of intransitive verbs takes the feminine ending -i (masc. -Ø). The past tense of the transitive verbs takes the so-called “(split) ergative” construction, in which the (logical) direct object is in the direct case and the agent in the oblique case, for example, tʿō az ašt-ā(n) “you have left me,” literally, “by-you I left-am” (cf. Kurmānjī ta az kuštim “you have killed me”).
A secondary (regular) conjugation is formed by affixing -ā- to the present stem, past stem -āy-, for example, ṟāmā “he ran away.”
The passive of transitive verbs is expressed either by periphrastic constructions or by a secondary conjugation (as in Gūrānī and Mokrī Kurdish) formed with the passive morpheme -ya-: present stem in -(y)ēn-, past stem in -(i)yā-. This passive is conjugated as an intransitive verb and is used only when the agent is not expressed or is unknown.
Both the infinitive and the active (present!) participle are formed from the past stem. The infinitive ends in -ʿī/ĭš from Middle Iranian -išn (only exceptionally used with past stems) and the participle in -ōγ, -ōx, probably borrowed from the Armenian suffix for the noun of agent -oł/-oγ, as intervocalic k does not become x or γ in Dimlī (cf. Asatrian, 1987, p. 160).
Examples or the infinitive: āmāyīš “to come” (cf. Mid. Pers. āmadišn), kardī/ĭš “to do,” ṟāmāyīš “to run away,” ṟōtiš “to sell,” wandī/ĭš “to read,” wātiš “to say.” Examples of the present participle: ṟāmāyōx “runner,” ṟōtōx “seller, vendor,” kardōγ “doer, maker,” wandōγ “reader.”
A characteristic feature of Dimlī is the use of postposition -rī, -rā to form the ablative, as in harzanī-ri “from Harzand” (cf. Kurdish where -rā expresses the instrumental).
Linguistic position of Dimlī
After their migration in the Middle Ages, for almost a millennium the Dimlīs had no direct contact with their closest linguistic relatives. Nevertheless, their language has preserved numerous isoglosses with the dialects of the southern Caspian region, and its place in the Caspian dialect group of Northwest Iranian is clear.
The Caspian dialects comprise Ṭālešī, Harzan(d)ī, Gūrānī, Gīlakī, Māzandarānī, and some dialects in Tātī-speaking areas and in the area around Semnān. Historically the Caspian dialects belong to the “Northwest Iranian group of languages” and are related to Parthian (see Windfuhr). The isoglosses are of historical phonetic, morphological, and lexical order.
The typically North Iranian and Northwest Iranian phonetic features found in Dimlī include the developments of Indo-European *ḱ and (Indo-Iranian) *ts to *s, *ḱw to *sp, *ǵ(h) to *z, *dw- to b- and the preservation of *θr from Indo-European *tr. Examples of *s from Indo-European *ḱ and Indo-Iranian *ts include saṟa “year” (cf. Parth. srd, Pers. sāl), pas (cf. Av. pasu-), dis or dus “kind, form” (cf. Mid. Pers. dēs), māsī “fish” (cf. Skt. matsya-, Av. masiia-, Pers. māhī).
Examples of *-sp- from Indo-European *ḱw include aspār “horseman” (OIr. *aspa-bāra-, cf. OPers. asa-bāra, Pers. savār, Kurdish siyār), āspiǰ/ža “louse” (cf. Av. *spiš-, Pers. šepeš). Examples of *z from Indo-European *ǵ(h) include zāmā “son-in-law” (cf. Ṭālešī zāmā, Kurdish zawā, Pers. dāmād), zān- “know” (cf. Av. zanā-, Pers. dān-), zaṟn “gold” (cf. Av. zaraniia-, Pers. zarr); az “I” (cf. Av. azəm), dēs and dēz “wall” (cf. Av. daēza-), barz “high” (cf. Av. bərəzaṇt-, Pers. boland).
Examples of b- from Old Iranian *dw- include bar “door” (Parth. br, but Pers. dar), bīn “other, this” (cf. Parth. byd, but Mid. Pers. did, Pers. dīgar).
Old Iranian *θr further became *hr, which in initial position acquired a supporting vowel in the modern languages, as in hī/ĭra/ē/i “three” (cf. Parth. hry, Av. θrāiiō, versus Pers. se < *çaiiah), but between vowels became r, for instance, mār(i) “mother” (cf. Av. māθrō, gen. of mātar-), āwrā/ă (cf. Av. apuθrā- < *ā-puθra-, but Kurdish āvis, Pers. ābestan < *āpuçā-).
Other typical early Northwest Iranian phonetic features include: Preservation in initial position of Old Iranian *č and *ǰ (as ǰ or j [dz]), which in other positions became ǰ and ž or z, respectively, for example, *č: či “what” (cf. Pers. če), čarx “wheel”; pōnj or pōnǰ “five” (cf. Pers. panj), ṟōǰ “day” (cf. Av. raocah-, Pers. rūz), vāǰ- “say” (cf. Parth. wāž-), (a)ǰēr “downward, below” (cf. Kurdish žēr, Pers. zīr); (a)ǰōr “upward, above” (cf. Kurdish žōr, Mid. Pers. azabar); lōǰina “flue, aperture” (cf. Mid. Pers. rōzan); ǰana or ǰiina “woman, wife” (cf. Av. jaini-, Kurdish žin, Pers. zan), daž/z “ache, pain” (from OIr. *daǰi-?).
Dimlī gōn(i) “blood” corresponds exactly to Parthian gwxn, the relation of which to Old Iranian *wahuni- (Gūrānī winī, wun, Pers. ḵūn = Kurdish, all from *xwaun-, a transformation of OIr. *wahuni-) is uncertain.
The phonetic isoglosses of Dimlī in modern times overlap to varying degree with those of the Caspian dialects, Kurdish, Persian, the Central dialects, and the like (see Henning, 1954, pp. 174-76; Windfuhr).
The most characteristic are the following. Initial *x- became h- or was lost, as in Gūrānī, for example Old Iranian initial *x- became h- or was lost, as in har “donkey” (Av. xara-, Gūrānī, Lorī har, versus Kurdish kʿar, Pers. ḵar, etc.), yānī “spring, well” for *hānī (Mid. Pers. and Parth. xānīg, Gūrānī hāna, versus Kurdish kānī). Initial *xw- became w-, as in the Kandūlāyī dialect of Gūrānī, for example, wala “ash” (versus Kurdish xwalī “soil”), wā/ă(y) “sister” (versus Pers. ḵᵛāhar), war- “eat” (versus Pers. ḵordan).
Initial *fr- became *hr-, which either received a supporting vowel, as in harā “wide, far” (versus Pers. farāḵ), or became ṟ-, as in ṟōtiš “sell” (also in the Central dialects, versus Pers. forūḵt)
Survey of typical phonetic developments
Dimlī has preserved the Middle Iranian maǰhūl vowels ō, ē (cf. gōs/š “ear,” bō(y) “smell,” gēs “hair,” etc.). The corresponding diphthongs are secondary, however; au is from older *-aw-, *-ap-, *-ab-, *-ag-, or *-af-, whereas ai is the result of phonetic combinatory changes.
The Old Iranian voiceless stops *p, *t, *k remained in initial position or became the apirates pʿ, tʿ, kʿ; *t and *k also remained after s and š, but became d and g after r. Examples of *p include pas “lamb, ram” (see above) and pʿīza “belly” (cf. Av. *pāzah- “chest,” Parth. pʾzʾh “in front”). Examples of *t include t’au “fever” (cf. Pers. tab), t’ars “fear” (Cf. Pers. tars), kʿārd(i) “knife” (cf. Pers. kārd), pʿōrd “bridge” (also pʿird influenced by Kurdish; cf. Kormānjī pʿir, Southern Kurdish pird; Pers. pol); ā/ăstik, ā/ăsta “bone” (cf. Av. ast-); ā/ăstāra “star” (cf. Pers. setāra).
Examples of *k include kʿār “work” (cf. Pers. kār); čē, kaya “home”(see above); kū/ŭtik “dog” (cf. Sogd. ʾkwty /əkuti/, Oss. kuj, Kurdish kūčˊ/čik, etc.), hū/ŭs/šk “dry” (see above), varg “wolf” (cf. Av. vəhrka-, Pers. gorg); exceptionally k remained in hāk “egg” (Fārs dialects hāg, Ḵūrī xeik).
Between vowels *p became -u-/-w-, and *t became y or was lost. Examples of *p include āu “water” (cf. Pers. āb); āwrā/ă “pregnant” (see above); šau “night” (cf. Pers. šab); ārya, āyra “mill” (from OIr. *ār-θry-? cf. Kurdish āš, NPers. ās-yāb< *āç-); kawtiš “fall down” (cf. Mid. Pers. kaft).
Examples of *t include čē, kaya “house” (from *kata-, see above) and wā(y) “wind” (cf. NPers. bād). Exceptionally we find d, as in ǰidā “separated, different” (cf. Kurdish ǰihē, Pers. jodā). Note the secondary -t- in the group sr > str in astiri, ī/ĭštrī “horn,” as in Kurdish strī, from Old Iranian *srū-.
The Old Iranian voiced stops *b and *d are preserved only in initial position, *g in initial position and in the group *rg. The group *rd became ṟ. Between vowels the voiced stops were mostly lost. On the palatalization of g to ǰ, see above. Examples of *b- include bō(y) “smell” (cf. Pers. bū), biz/ža “goat” (cf. Pers. boz), b(i)raw(i) “eyelash” (< *bruwa-; cf. Pers. abrū), aspār “horseman” (OIr. *aspa-bāra-). Examples of *d include darg “long” (cf. Av. darəγa-, Pers. dīr), pāī “foot” (cf. Av. pāδ-, Pers. pā), saṟa (see above), var(a) or val(a) “neck” (but NPers. galū, Baḵtīārī gyēl, Māzandarāni and Gīlakī gē/ĕl); zaṟa “heart” (cf. Av. zərəδaiia-, but Gūrānī zil, Pers. del), gara or gaṟa “complaint” (but Pers. gela, Kurdish gilī), kʿōl(i) “hornless (goat)” (from OIr. *kṛdu-?).
It should be noted that Dimlī words with -i- before r/l, as in ādir “fire,” mil “neck,” vil “flower,” are likely to be loanwords from other Iranian dialects (cf. mol and vel in Fārs dialects). Examples of *g- include gōs/š “ear” (cf. Pers. gūš), gā(w) “cow” (cf. Pers. gāv), but ǰī or gī “excrement” (see above); darg “long” (see above); ṟau “swift” (cf. Av. *raγu-).
The Old Iranian spirants, *f, *θ, *x, developed variously. The *f was lost in the cluster *-ft- in s/šit “milk” (cf. Parth. šyft). On *fr, see above. The group *-θn- became -sn- in ārāsna, ārisna “elbow” (cf. Avestan araθni-, but OPers. arašni-, Pers. araš). Similarly *x was lost in the cluster *xš-, as in šau “night” (see above), but remained in words such as čarx (from Persian?). On initial *x- and *xw- , ee above.
On Old Iranian *s and *z, as well as the interchange of s- and š, see above. The Old Iranian groups *-st-, * -sn-, and *-sr- are preserved (on *sp, see above), as in ā/ăsnāwi “swimming” (versus Pers. šenā); hars(i) “tear” (cf. Av. asru-, Pers. ašk from *asruka-), askaft “cave” (from *skā/ăfta-, versus Pers. šekāft). Old Iranian *š remained in Dimlī, as opposed to Kurdish, where intervocalic š regularly became h. Example include goš or gōs “ear” (Kurdish guh), šaš “six” (= Pers.), pāšna “heel” (= Pers., but Kurdish pa(h)nī), pānušna, ṟōš/s(a)yā “light, illumination” (cf. Pers. rowšanāʾī, but Kurdish ṟō(h)nāyī), tayšan “thirsty” (cf. Pers. tešna, but Kurdish tʿī(h)n).
Old Iranian *y- became ǰ-, as in Persian, but *w became v (rather than b- or g-, as in Kurdish, Persian, etc.). Examples of *y include ǰau or jau “barley” (cf. Av. yauua-, Pers. ǰou, Kurdish ǰa, but Gūrānī yaw, yaya), ǰidā (see above). Examples of *w include vazd (cf. Av. vazdah-, but Kurdish baz), vayšān or vaysān “hungry” (but Kurdish birčī, Pers. gošna for gorosna), vāris “rain” (but Pers. bāreš), vā(y) (see above), vayva “bride” (cf. Kurdish būk, Judeo-Pers. bayōg), varg “wolf” (see above), vinī “lose, waste” (cf. Mid. Pers. wanī), vāz- “run” (cf. Pers. vazīdan “to blow” of the wind), vā/ăš/s “grass” (cf. Parth. wʾš, Av. vāstra-? “fodder”). Where b- occurs instead of v- it may be assumed to be a borrowing from Kurdish or Persian, for instance, bar “stone” (cf. Kurdish, Lorī bard) and gumān “doubt, surmise” and guna “sin” from New Persian via Kurdish.
Old Iranian *m was preserved in all positions in Dimlī but not in Kurdish, where it became v between vowels; examples include maḡwā/ă “fruit” (cf. Pers. mīva), dām(i) “trap” (Pers. dām, but Kurdish dāw), āmōr “counting” (cf. Pers. āmār), ām(i)nān “summer” (cf. Mid. Pers. hāmīn, but Kurdish hāvīn), (h)arma(y) “shoulder, forearm” (cf. Av. arəma-), mīr “dough” (cf. Pers./Ar. ḵamīr, but Kurdish havīr).
Στο Μορφωτικό Κέντρο αυτό μπορείτε να πάρετε μαθήματα θρησκευτικού χορού Σεμά στο Αντίγιαμαν.
Morphological isoglosses
The most important morphological isoglosses which link Dimlī with the Caspian dialects are the pronominal possessive forms from *hača plus the pronoun and the formation of the present indicative from the old present participle in *-ant(a)-. The past stem of the secondary conjugation ends in -ā from *-ād, as in Parthian. Exclusive to Dimlī are the infinitive ending -ī/ĭš from *-išn and the ablative use of postposition -rī/ā (Asatrian, 1990, p. 162; idem, 1992c, p. 26).
Lexical isoglosses
These isoglosses include Old Iranian *arma- “forearm” (Dimlī (h)arma(y), Ṭālešī ām, cf. Oss. ā/ărm, versus *bāzu- in Pers. bāzū, etc.); Middle Persian āyišm “moon” (Dimlī ā/ăš/smā/ă, āsmi, Tatī ušmā, Ṭālesī ovšim, Harzanī öšma); Dimlī baurān “dove” (Oss. bälon “domestic dove”; cf. Lithuanian balañdis “dove”); Old Iranian *bram- “weep, cry” (Parth. bram-, Dimlī barm-, Māzandarānī barm-, Harzanī beram “weeping,” Ṭālešī bāme, Tātī berām, Gīlakī barmā, Aftarī burme; cf. in the Central dialects Nāʾīnī biremba; versus Pers. gerya, etc.).
Old Iranian *kanya- “woman, girl” (Dimlī kʿaynakʿ, čanā, Harzanī kīna, Ṭālešī kīna, Tatī kīna, Galīnqaya kina, čina, versus Pers. ḵāna; marginal lexeme in Pers. kanīz and Kurdish kinik); Old Iranian *kata- “home, house” (Dimlī kaya, čē, Ṭālešī ka, Gūrānī ka, Tatī kā, Galīnqaya kar, Harzanī kar, čār, Aftarī kiye; cf. in the Central dialects Ḵūnsārī kī(y)a, Nāʾīnī kiya; marginal lexeme in Pers. kade and Kurdish kadīkirin “to domesticate (animals)”); Old Iranian *ragu- “quick, swift” (Parth. raγ, Dimlī ṟau, Harzanī rav, Ṭālešī ra, Tatī rav, Semnānī rayk, cf. Oss. räw, rog “light,” versus Pers. zūd); Old Iranian *uz-ayara- “yesterday” (Av. uzaiiara- “afternoon,” Dimlī vīžēr(ī), vīžēr, Gūrānī uzera, Harzanī, Tātī zīr, Tākistānī, Ṭālešī azīra, Aftarī yezze, versus Pers. dī-rūz); Old Iranian *waxš- “burn” (Parth. wxšyndg “blazing,” Dimlī vaš or viš-, Harzanī vaš-, Ṭālešī vaš-, Tatī vaš-, versus *sauc- in Pers. sūḵtan, etc.); Old Iranian and common Northwest Middle Iranian *xšwipta- “milk” (Av. xšuuipta-, Parth. šift, Dimlī š/sit, Gūrānī šit, šifta, Ṭālešī šit, Harzanī, Aftarī šet, Tātī še(r)t, versus Pers., Kurdish šīr < *xšīra-); Old Iranian *upa-sar(a)daka- “spring(time)” (Mid. Pers. ābsālān, Dimlī ūsāṟ(ō), vazārī, Ṭālešī āvāsōr, Harzanī āvāsōr, classical Pers. ābsālān); Avestan vazdah- “fat” (Dimlī vazd “fat, oil”; cf. Kurdish baz); and Parthian wāš “fodder” (Dimlī vā/ăš/s, Ṭālešī, Māzandarānī vāš, Aftarī vāšt, Semnānī voš, versus Parthian gwyʾw, Pers., Kurdish giyāh, gīhā).
Also to be noted is Dimlī ṟīz, ṟēs “rice” (*wrī/ĭzna-; cf. Sogd. ryz-, versus Pers., Kurdish, etc., berenǰ < *wrī/ĭnza-). Relatives of the negative particle Dimlī činyō/ā “no, not” are found in Harzanī čini(ya) and Āẕarī čī/ĭnī/ĭ.
Words found only in Dimlī include angāz, hangāž “plough handle” (< *han-gāza- < *gāza- “take, accept” found in Sogd. ptγʾz-, Khotanese pajāys-, etc.; it cannot be from Armenian; see Vahman and Asatrian, p. 272); āz “generation, offspring” (Man. Mid. Pers. āzn(ān), Arm. lw. < Parth. azn “people, generation,” azniw “noble”); āz(i) “branch” (Mid.Pers. azg, Arm. loanword from Parthian azg “race, kind, nation”); ask(i) “goat” (Avestan aza-, Mid. Pers. az(ag); different from Kurdish āsk “deer” from *āsuka-, cf. Mid. Pers. āhūg, Pers. āhū); gauš “weak, coward, greedy” and gaušakay “weakness, cowardice” (possibly related to Sogd. γβs- “to be fatigued”); haw(i) or hiw(i) “laughter,” hawāyīšʾ present stem hwī/ĭn- “to laugh” (cf. Oss. xūdln); kay “play, game” (Mid. Pers kadag “game, joke,” Sogd. kʾtʾk-, Arm. lw. < Parth. katak “joke”; cf. Jowšaqānī koy “game”); sīr-, in present stem sīn(a)n- “I love” (< OIr. *srīra-; cf. Av. srīra- “beautiful,” Sogd. šyr’kk “good,” Parth. šīr-gāmag “friend”; probably not from Arm. sēr, sir- “love”; see Asatrian, 1987, pp. 166-67); and vistiš and fīnāyīš (or finā-) “to throw,” fīnyāyīš “to be thrown” (Mid. Pers. wistan “to shoot,” present stem from *wid-na-) with ṟā-vistiš “to spread, lay, put” (Galīnqaya fest-, fesn- “to throw, spread”), cf. Lorī bistan “to put down, to cast a foal” (before time).
Dimlī words without clear Iranian etymologies include diǰn(i) or dižn(i) “rain” (< OIr. *danǰa-? cf. IE *dhengṷo-); for “rain” vāris, vārān and Turkish yāḡmūr are also used in Dimlī.
Of the numerous borrowings from Armenian (exceeding perhaps those from Kurdish or even Turkish) the following may be mentioned: aks/cʾīg “woman, girl,” āvilīk “broom,” bōč, pōč “tail,” būǰūr “small,” gāb “Rheum L.,” hārs “bride,” hēsān “whetstone,” čirtʿān “waterpipe,” gōǰā/ăg(i) “button,” gōm(a) “cattle shed,” hāst “hard, rigid,” hāgōs(i) “furrow,” hīm “root, base,” hēǰ “cross” (Arm. xačʿ), hōllik “hut, shack,” hūrā/ăkʿ “hatchet, ax,” ǰāγ/x(i) “wire mesh,” kʿa/irōn “beam, girder,” kāl “thrashing floor,” kālān(i) “scabbard, sheath,” kʿalandī “scythe,” kiray “lime,” kirya, kirē “Sunday,” kiṟīk “neck,” kōra/ēk “a kind of lentil,” kʿušna/i “rye,” ōzōr “branch,” pāč “pod, grain,” pʿanǰār “vegetable,” pʿūrt “wool,” sāvār “pearl barley, spelt,” sēmiga “threshold,” sūnk/g “mushroom,” xēγ(ō), xīntʿ “mad, insane,” xōr “deep,” xōnj, xōz “pig,” zīl(ik) “sprout.”
Literature in Dimlī
The earliest surviving literary works in the Dimlī language are two poems with identical titles, Mawlūd (Genesis), dating from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The earlier, consisting of 756 eleven-syllable verses, is by Malā Ahmedē Ḵāsī, the other by ʿOṯmān Efendī, mufti of Siverek. There is also a minstrel tradition going back to the medieval period; a number of Dimlī bards have composed both in their mother tongue and in Turkish, for example, Daymī, Dāvūt Solārī, Pīr Solṭān, ʿAlī-Akbar Čīčak, Yāvūz Tōp, Arif Sāḡ, Sulaymān Yildiz, and Rahmī Sāltok (Zilfi, p. 6).
Nevertheless, Dimlī has attained genuine literary status only in recent decades, owing to the activities of a number of writers, poets, and political leaders (e.g., Eulbekir Pamukçu, Ališan Karsan, Hesen Dewran, Zilfi, Malmisanic, K. Astare, Reme Bir, Hesen Uşen, Heyder, Usḵan), who now live abroad, mainly in western Europe. At present numerous newspapers, magazines, and bulletins are being published in Dimlī (e.g., Piya [formerly Ayre], Raştiye, Ware, Raya Zazaistani), and the number is increasing.
Την βιβλιογραφία και παραπομπές θα βρείτε εδώ:
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/dimli
Επιπλέον:
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/gurani
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/alawi-the-nesba
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