The Blue Tiled Entrance Facade Of The Mausoleum Of Shirin Bika Aga, Timur’s Sister, Located In Shah-i-Zinda
The blue tiled entrance facade of the Mausoleum of Shirin Bika Aga, Timur’s sister, located in Shah-i-Zinda necropolis in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. 1385-86 CE
More Posts from S-afshar and Others
Here we fucking go. No space for hesitation this time, lads - we break the English connection now or never.
Mikhail Kutuzov in 1812, Sergei Shoigu in 2024, and Aleksey Kivshenko's Historical Painting of the Military Council in Fili, a suburb of Moscow
Many Russians were astounded yesterday morning, when reading in the news that during searches conducted in the residences of the former Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia Dmitry Bulgakov, who was arrested on charges of corruption on 26th of July, a small number of very bizarre frames and paintings were found.
The historically true: Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies Mikhail Kutuzov at 'the Council in Fili', 1812
The mystically allegorical: Sergei Shoigu, former Minister of Defense of Russia and currently Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation as an atemporal replica of General Kutuzov
Contents
I. Introduction
II. Brief description and possible parallels
III. Shoigu's lengthy tenure exceeded by far that of President Putin
IV. Long 'reigns' come with indulgence in corruption and extravagance
V. An attempt to inculpate or a mystical allegory?
VI. Appendices
Содержание
I. Введение
II. Краткое описание и возможные параллели
III. Длительное правление Шойгу намного превзошло президентство президента Путина
IV. Длительное «правление» сопровождается потворством коррупции и расточительству
V. Попытка инкриминировать или мистическая аллегория?
VI. Приложения
I. Introduction
The most mysterious of those paintings is based on a historical painting, which was created by the famous 19th c. Russian painter Aleksey Kivshenko (1851-1895) in 1879, and known as 'the Council in Fili'. This great masterpiece of Modern Russian Art represents the artist's impression of a historical event, namely a military council that took place (1812) in a suburb of Moscow, prior to Napoleon's temporary occupation of the Russian city (14 September – 19 October 1812). The extraordinary summit occurred immediately after the Battle of Borodino, which was a Pyrrhic victory for the French army.
Created 67 years after the event, the painting had an enormous success; Kivshenko, who was already known for his numerous, fascinating works and representations of significant historical events of the Russian past, had to repeat the painting twice, which clearly means that his artwork generated an overwhelming and exceptional enthusiasm. This situation was basically due to the primordial importance of the historical event.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, Infantry General Mikhail Golenishchev-Kutuzov had then to take a most critical decision: the orderly retreat of the Russian army from Moscow. The meeting (13 September 1812), which is known through several historical sources, started with the dilemma formulated by General Leonty Bennigsen, namely to give battle against the French army in an unfavorable position or to surrender. Kutuzov sided finally with the minority opinion and took the decision to abandon Moscow, which was finally proven correct, because Napoleon could not hold his position for long.
Then, how should we today, 212 years after the event and 145 years after the painting, interpret a bizarre painting in which a group of top Russian statesmen and military desire to be and are effectively depicted as exchanging roles with the historical personalities who saved the Russian Empire before two centuries?
In the painting found in Bulgakov's house, Sergei Shoigu, the former Minister of Defense of Russia, and now Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, is depicted as the Russian commander Mikhail Kutuzov. Shoigu's former deputy Ruslan Tsalikov plays General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly. The painting also features former deputy defense ministers Timur Ivanov, Tatyana Shevtsova and other officials.
Several other bizarre paintings were found in the arrested statesman's house, but the atemporal replica of the said historical painting raises more questions, due to the potential symbolisms or parallels that can be drawn. If the potentially allegorical but effectively incomprehensible artwork was found in 2005 or in 2012, no one would pay much attention, and the eventually innocuous representation would be taken as the result of a certainly bold, yet counterproductive, imagination of a group of top level Russian officials, eventually characterized by their narcissism.
It is clear that many Russians are -truly speaking- under terrible shock because of the revelations, and their comments about this, most weird, story are very negative. With no doubt, Kutuzov is almost a holy person for the Russians because, although he did not mark a real victory over Napoleon, he forced him to advance following Pyrrhic victories during a prolonged war of attrition which led finally to the collapse of the French Army. How a defeat at the battlefield can possibly be transformed into a victory in the long perspective is a most fatalistic turn of events for historians to possibly fathom. But it was known since the time of the Battle of Kadesh (May 1274 BCE) between the Hittite Emperor Muwatalli II and the Egyptian Pharaoh Ramesses III.
On the other hand, many of the persons depicted on the bizarre paintings have recently lost their positions or even been arrested. Bulgakov was arrested only 4-5 days ago, following allegations of bribery, but he is only the last of several similar cases.
II. Brief description and existing parallels
As the mystery of these eventually absurd but potentially meaningful pictures is beyond imagination, several friends contacted me to make some inquiries. They asked me what this meant in reality and whether this initiatory and hypothetically purposeful painting denoted a hidden desire of Shoigu to "take Putin's place".
What follows here includes parts of my responses; it is actually difficult to answer such a question because there are many parameters involved in this regard; but in general, I never thought that Sergei Shoigu would be interested in taking Putin's place. In addition, the painting does not hint at anything of the sort. Kutuzov did not imagine, even for a second, not to be loyal to the Russian czars whom he served.
First and foremost, it is essential for any non-Russian to comprehend that Russians have no conventional thought. Historically, it is very common in Russia to evaluate one man as higher and as more important than the czar, the secretary general or the president.
If one goes to Russia and speaks with the average people, one will understand that what they narrate as «History of Russia» is not what is taught in the West about this topic. By this, I don't mean discrepancies at the level of historical facts and narratives, but a totally distinct perspective of the time and a markedly different evaluation of the human deeds.
There are effectively some parallels between Kutuzov (1745-1813) and Shoigu (born in 1955).
Kutuzov served (as military officer and diplomat) three czars (Catherine II, Paul I, and Alexander I).
And Shoigu was a minister under four presidents (Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev).
Prince Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov-Smolensky (Михаил Илларионович Голенищев-Кутузов-Смоленский) belonged to an ancient noble family of German-Prussian extraction. The Golenishchev-Kutuzov branch consisted of the descendants of Gabriel, who left Prussia (1252-1263) and became the founder of the Kutuzovs.
Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu (Сергей Кужугетович Шойгу) belonged to a Turkic Tuvan family, as his father (Kuzhuget Shoigu, 1921-2010) was first Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Tuvan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Tuvan ASSR. Shoigu's mother (Alexandra Yakovlevna Shoigu, 1924–2011) was a Ukrainian-born Russian, who was detained by the German occupation forces during World War II and had a traumatic experience from this event.
Mikhail Kutuzov was a multilingual, as he was fluent in Russian, German, French and English; on later occasions he also studied Ottoman Turkish, Polish, and Swedish.
Sergei Shoigu is also a multilingual, who speaks Tuvan, Russian, and another seven languages including Chinese, Japanese, Turkish, English, etc.
III. Shoigu's lengthy tenure exceeded by far that of President Putin
All the people know that Vladimir Putin has been president since the year 2000 (with an interval of four years (2008-2012), when he served as prime minister; however, few people remember today that Shoigu was a minister since 1991. Only last May, he was removed from the position of Minister of Defense and promoted/rewarded as «Secretary of the Security Council of Russia».
This means that Shoigu was a minister for 33 years! When the positions are so important, a person creates his own small state within the state; this is normal and inevitable.
As a matter of fact, Yeltsin appointed Shoigu as Minister of Emergency Situations in April 1991. All the same, at the time, Yeltsin was only the «President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic», not the «President of the Russian Federation». This means that Yeltsin was under Gorbachev who was then the «President of the Soviet Union». In other words, Shoigu was at the very beginning a minister of USSR, not Russia! He was appointed before the August 1991 coup attempt, which failed and led to the rise of Yeltsin, resignation of Gorbachev, and demise of the USSR.
And what was Vladimir Putin at the time?
In June 1991, in (then) Leningrad, he was appointed as head of the Committee for External Relations of the Mayor's Office. So, you cannot compare.
In fact, better than any other Russian, Sergei Shoigu epitomizes the transition from the USSR to today's Russia. Consequently, although he was not a career military man but an apparatchik and part of the Soviet nomenklatura, he had progressively become a major pole of power. And because of his success, which guaranteed Putin’s success, it was surely unthinkable for anyone to remove him.
However, the uneasiness of the Russians with the ongoing fake war in Ukraine and the disclosure of several financial scandals and cases of bribery in the Russian army and the Ministry of Defense generated another environment.
IV. Long 'reigns' come with indulgence in corruption and extravagance
Last April, the Russian deputy defense minister Timur Ivanov was arrested.
This occurred only little time after Putin’s re-election.
One month after the arrest, Sergei Shoigu was removed and replaced by Andrey Belousov, who is provenly a very good economist, a well-experienced statesman, and a former First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia.
At the time, many people said that Putin placed an economist at the top of the Ministry of Defense, because he wanted to make a more effective programming of the military industrial production in view of the continuation of the war in Ukraine. It may be.
But personally, I was absolutely convinced that the reason for this appointment was the desire to effectuate an extensive control of earlier business transactions, carry out a thorough examination of past deals, identify practices of corruption, and uncover all cases of bribery that the «Shoigu establishment» allowed or tolerated or supported or covered deliberately. In the face of the collateral damages caused by the Russian military operations in Ukraine, it would be unacceptable that top officials accumulated illegal benefits.
Almost four months after the aforementioned case of Timur Ivanov, the arrest of Bulgakov rang the bell for the part of the Russian establishment that was exposed to such inexcusable weaknesses at wartime and for ministers who indulged themselves in corruption and extravagance.
and
And with the frames and paintings found in his house yesterday, we learned that Bulgakov viewed Shoigu as Kutuzov!
Of course, Kutuzov is more important than Alexander I for the Russians. Czar Alexander I acknowledged personally that Russia owed the final victory to Kutuzov. This means that, with all similarities taken together as coincidental (!!), Bulgakov and his associates, friends and subordinates viewed Shoigu like a 'god'. Several Russian friends interpret this approach as absolutely true; they even consider it as the result of extreme narcissism of all persons involved.
What follows is a selection of comments that I found in Russian social media (I translated them into English):
1. «This is blasphemy against the memory and exploits of our ancestors»!
2. «They came up with this a long time ago and are successfully stealing it»
3. «A finished script for a film. How far human stupidity and impudence go»!
4. «They are very far from Kutuzov and others; but there is plenty of time for self-admiration»
5. «A gang of thieves assembled»
6. «Where is Timur Ivanov»?
From the following web pages:
А такие портреты нашли дома у задержанного экс-замминистра обороны Дмитрия Булгакова во время обысков.
and
Минутка статистики по одному из шедевров золотой коллекции задержанного замминистра обороны Булгакова.
V. An attempt to inculpate or a mystical allegory?
As a matter of fact, it would not make sense for Shoigu and his close associates to envision that he would take Putin’s place (let alone to conspire with this target in mind); in addition, the picture says the opposite. Kutuzov was already more important than the czar.
All the same, there is another dimension too; these pictures may have been placed in Bulgakov's home after his arrest in order to inculpate him, Shoigu and others in some way. This would however seem rather to be a puerile attempt, because there can be far worse and far more effective ways to inculpate someone than the revelation of the narcissistic visions and the grandiose imaginations of a group of corrupt and not corrupt officials.
If there is a symbolism, it means that the true ruler is («was»?) Shoigu; but even in this case, it is a very unusual type of praising and self-praising for some top officials. In real terms of boastfulness, such an atemporal replica of Aleksey Kivshenko's legendary painting adds nothing on the table.
I believe that, if some people want truly to unveil a real and serious purpose in this painting, they must rather view it as a mystical allegory – not a mere symbolism. In this case, the otherwise bizarre artwork becomes meaningful.
What are the major points of an allegorical mysticism in this regard?
I will brief enumerate a few.
1- Reminiscent of the French invasion of the Russian Empire, the present war in Ukraine reveals that the Russian Federation is under attack.
It matters little whether some Western idiots believe that we have to deal with a Russian invasion of Ukraine; there was never such an event, because Ukraine is an integral part of Russian territory that criminal Anglo-Saxon gangsters brutally and illegally detached from Russia at the time of the Soviet collapse.
Yuval Harari was very correct when saying that "Gorbachev saved us from nuclear war"; but his truth ends there. What truly happened in 1989 is not the continuation of a development that started in 1985. In fact, Gorbachev was openly threatened by George Herbert Bush with imminent nuclear attack if he did not rapidly dissolve the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The truth was enveloped in thousands of lies, endless smiles, and hypocritical hand shakings, because this was beneficial for both, the US and the Soviet Union/Russia. I cannot further expand now on this topic, because I would digress.
So, as it happened in the 1810s and the 1940s, Russia has been under attack since the late 1980s.
2- Similarly with Kutuzov's ingenious strategy and tactics, the Russian state withdrew from lands for quite some time now.
The formation of the Ukrainian pseudo-nation after 1991 was an entirely orchestrated fabrication, involving the creation of a bogus-idiom named 'Ukrainian language', the pseudo-translation of thousands of toponyms and personal names into their hypothetically Ukrainian forms, the compilation of a distorted 'History of Ukraine', the diffusion of heinous anti-Russian racism, and the subtle disfigurement of the Orthodox faith of the local population into a charlatanesque form of Anti-Christian Catholicism.
3- Similarly with what happened during the French Invasion of the Russian Empire, the military proved to be the backbone of the Russian nation.
In this regard, the lengthy tenure of Sergei Shoigu reflects perfectly well the long military career of Mikhail Kutuzov.
4- The partly withdrawal from the Western Russian lands, as implemented by the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, can be mirrored in Moscow's agreement for a separate, 'independent' Ukrainian state. The concession made is very similar to the decision taken at the Military Council in Fili.
5- Sergei Shoigu's contribution to the final victory may be analogous to Kutuzov's strategy which brought the final victory after many rather insignificant defeats.
6- Last but foremost, the final defeat of Napoleon in Russia ended with the subsequent demise of his regime; the allegory is very clear as regards the combined Anglo-Saxon world that has attacked USSR-Russia since 1945 – or if you prefer 1985.
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Right wing of the 1st pylon, Temple of Isis, Philae, early 20th century.
A small terracotta cylinder recording the work on the walls of the city of Babylon by the king Nabopolassar (r. 626-605 BCE), founder of the Neo-Babylonian Empire. From Babylon, Mesopotamia, Iraq. Neo-Babylonian period, 625-605 BCE. British Museum (ID: BM 26263)
Taormina. Sicilia.
Μίθρας, Μιθραϊσμός & Μιθραϊκά Μυστήρια: Όλα τα Αρχαία Ελληνικά και Λατινικά Κείμενα που αναφέρονται στον Μίθρα και τους Μιθραϊστές
Mithras, Mithraism & Mithraic Mysteries: All Ancient Greek and Latin Texts Relating to Mithras and the Mithraists
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 7η Μαΐου 2019.
Αναδημοσίευση από το https://www.tertullian.org/ όλων των αρχαιοελληνικών και λατινικών κειμενικών αναφορών στον Μίθρα. Οι αρχαίες ιρανικές ιστορικές πηγές των αχαιμενιδικών, αρσακιδικών και σασανιδικών και οι αναφορές των Αρχαίων Ελλήνων και Ρωμαίων στον Μίθρα μας βοηθούν τόσο στην ανασύσταση της τρομερής θρησκευτικής διαπάλης των αχαιμενιδικών χρόνων (550-330) ανάμεσα στον Ζωροαστρισμό και τον Μιθραϊσμό, όσο και στην κατανόηση της μεγάλης άγνοιας των Αρχαίων Ελλήνων και Ρωμαίων σχετικά με τις θρησκείες του Ιράν. Με άλλα λόγια, οι Αρχαίοι Έλληνες και Ρωμαίοι δεν στάθηκαν ικανοί να διακρίνουν την τρομερή αντιπαλότητα των Ζωροαστριστών και Μιθραϊστών Ιρανών με τους οποίους συνδιαλέγοντο. Έτσι, η τεράστια σύγχυση σχετικά με το αχαιμενιδικό Ιράν διατηρήθηκε επί μακρόν και επέδρασε αρνητικά στις ρωμαιοϊρανικές σχέσεις κατά τα αρσακιδικά και τα σασανιδικά χρόνια. Αυτή η σύγχυση βρήκε την συνέχειά της στα χριστιανοϊσλαμικά χρόνια, όταν οι Ρωμιοί ιστορικοί δεν μπορούσαν να εννοήσουν τις θρησκευτικές, ψυχικές-πνευματικές, μυστικιστικές και θεολογικές έριδες οι οποίες εκδηλώθηκαν εντός του ισλαμικού χαλιφάτου.
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http://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/05/07/μίθρας-μιθραϊσμός-μιθραϊκά-μυστήρι/ ====================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Ύστερα από το μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον που προκλήθηκε σχετικά με την διάδοση του Μιθραϊσμού ανάμεσα στους Έλληνες, τους Ρωμαίους, την Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία και ολόκληρη την Ευρώπη εξαιτίας δύο πρώτων κειμένων μου σχετικά, δημοσιεύω σήμερα ένα πλήρη κατάλογο (στα αγγλικά) όλων των αποσπασμάτων αρχαίας ελληνικής και ρωμαϊκής γραμματείας που αναφέρονται στον Μίθρα και στους Μιθραϊστές.
Η επιστημονική εργασία αυτή δεν έχει βεβαίως γίνει από μένα, ούτε κι η ηλεκτρονική παρουσίαση του θέματος είναι δική μου. Παραθέτω τον σύνδεσμο. Είμαι όμως σίγουρος ότι όσοι ενδιαφέρονται σοβαρά θα βρουν εδώ όσα τους χρειάζονται για να κάνουν μόνοι τους την δική τους έρευνα.
Αποσπάσματα από τον Ηρόδοτο και τον Ξενοφώντα μέχρι τον Θεοφάνη και τον Φώτιο, περνώντας από τους Δίωνα Χρυσόστομο, τον Λουκιανό, τον Δίωνα Κάσσιο, τον Ψευδο-Καλλισθένη, τον Γρηγόριο Ναζιανζηνό, τον Ιουλιανό Παραβάτη, τον Ιερώνυμο, τον Κοσμά Ινδικοπλεύστη, τον Κοσμά Μελωδό, και πολλούς άλλους δείχνουν σε ποιον βαθμό είχε προχωρήσει ο πολιτισμικός εκπερσισμός των Αρχαίων Ελλήνων και των Ρωμαίων. Οι φιλολογικές μαρτυρίες παρουσιάζονται καταταγμένες χρονολογικά.
Εννοείται ότι δεν περιλαμβάνονται εδώ οι επιγραφικές μαρτυρίες: οι χιλιάδες επιγραφών σε αρχαία ελληνικά και λατινικά που έχουν ανασκαφεί κι ανευρεθεί από την Κομμαγηνή και τον Πόντο μέχρι την Γερμανία και την Βρεταννία κι από την Αλγερία και την Ιβηρική μέχρι τις στέππες της Ουκρανίας.
Επίσης δεν περιλαμβάνονται εδώ κατάλογοι αναγλύφων, αγαλμάτων, μνημείων, ναών του Μίθρα (: ‘Μιθραίων’) και γενικώτερα αρχαιολογικών χώρων που έχουν εντοπισθεί δυτικά του Ιράν και μέχρι τον Ατλαντικό, ή από την Βόρεια Ευρώπη μέχρι το Σουδάν.
Τα τρία πρότερα κείμενά μου για το θέμα βρίσκονται εδώ:
Οι Ατελείωτες Επελάσεις του Μίθρα προς την Δύση κι ο Πολιτισμικός Εξιρανισμός Ελλήνων, Ρωμαίων κι Ευρωπαίων
https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/04/29/οι-ατελείωτες-επελάσεις-του-μίθρα-προ/
(και πλέον: https://www.academia.edu/58627059/Οι_Ατελείωτες_Επελάσεις_του_Μίθρα_προς_την_Δύση_κι_ο_Πολιτισμικός_Εξιρανισμός_Ελλήνων_Ρωμαίων_κι_Ευρωπαίων)
Ταυροθυσίες και Μιθραϊκά Μυστήρια στην Κορυφή του Ολύμπου – Η Απόλυτη Επιβολή του Περσικού Πνεύματος ανάμεσα στους Έλληνες & το Τέλος της Αρχαίας Ελλάδας
https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/05/06/ταυροθυσίες-και-μιθραϊκά-μυστήρια-στ/
(και πλέον: https://www.academia.edu/62212919/Ταυροθυσίες_και_Μιθραϊκά_Μυστήρια_στην_Κορυφή_του_Ολύμπου_Η_Απόλυτη_Επιβολή_του_Περσικού_Πνεύματος_ανάμεσα_στους_Έλληνες_and_το_Τέλος_της_Αρχαίας_Ελλάδας)
και
Η Απόλυτη Κυριαρχία των Μιθραϊστών Πειρατών στο Αιγαίο, την Ελλάδα και τον Θεσσαλικό Όλυμπο στον 1ο Αιώνα π.Χ. – Τι λέει ο Πλούταρχος
http://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/05/07/η-απόλυτη-κυριαρχία-των-μιθραϊστών-πε/
(και πλέον: https://www.academia.edu/62228155/Η_Απόλυτη_Κυριαρχία_των_Μιθραϊστών_Πειρατών_στο_Αιγαίο_την_Ελλάδα_και_τον_Θεσσαλικό_Όλυμπο_στον_1ο_Αιώνα_π_Χ_Τι_λέει_ο_Πλούταρχος)
Για όσους έχουν δυσκολία στα αγγλικά, τονίζω ότι θα επανέλθω συχνά-πυκνά εστιάζοντας σε πολλά από τα παρακάτω κείμενα.
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Ο Μίθρας στο Ιράν, Ανάγλυφο του Ταγ-ε Μποστάν (Taq-e_Bostan): στέψη του Αρντασίρ Β’ 379-383 μ.Χ. (αριστερά, κραδαίνοντας το μπαρσόμ)
Ο Μίθρας στο Ιεροθέσιον Κορυφής (Νέμρουτ Νταγ) και άλλα μνημεία της Κομμαγηνής
Ο Μίθρας στην Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία και την Ευρώπη
Ο Μίθρας στην Αυτοκρατορία της Μερόης (‘Αιθιοπία’: Αρχαίο Σουδάν), Αναπαράσταση των χρόνων του βασιλέως Σορκάρορ (Shorkaror – 20-30 μ.Χ.) από το Τζέμπελ Κέιλι (Jebel Qeili), ανατολικά του Χαρτούμ
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Mithras: all the passages in Graeco-Roman literature
http://www.tertullian.org/rpearse/mithras/literary_sources.htm
This page contains a list of all the passages in Greek or Latin literature that refer to “Mithra(s)”, in English translation. This includes all the material for both the ancient Persian cult of Mitra, and the Roman cult of Mithras, as it is sometimes not clear which is intended here, and the Romans themselves tended to suppose that Mithras and Mithra were the same, and used the same word for each.
I have indicated in each case, where possible, which is intended: the Persian cult by P, the Roman one by R. and those which could be either as ?.
The material here has mainly been gathered as follows:
· Use the bibliography from Manfred Clauss The Roman cult of Mithras.
· Use Geden Select passages illustrating Mithraism
· Use Cumont, Textes et Monuments 2. A number of passages which don’t mention Mithras, or else are from late saints’ lives, are omitted.
I have tried to link to complete English translations online where possible, and to indicate where the original language text can be found using {}. In some cases where more than one translation was available to me, I give both. Dates given for the works are approximate, for the convenience of the reader.
I have excluded Persian and Armenian material, which presumably would be inaccessible in the Greek and Roman world anyway. Geden translates a small selection of this.
· Herodotus (5th c. BC) P
· Ctesias (4th c. BC) P
· Xenophon (4th c. BC) P
· Duris of Samos (4th c. BC) P
· Strabo (20 BC) P
· Pliny the Elder (ca. 50 AD) P
· Quintus Curtius (40-50 AD) P
· Plutarch (c. 100 AD) P
· Dio Chrysostom (50-120 AD) P
· Statius (80 AD) R
· Justin Martyr (150 AD) R
· Lucian (120-200 AD) P
· Zenobius the Sophist (2nd century AD) ?
· Tertullian (ca. 200 AD) R
· Cassius Dio (ca. 200 AD) P
· Origen (200-254 AD) R
· Ps.Clement (200 AD) ?
· Porphyry (ca.270 AD) R
· Commodian (3rd c. AD) R
--------------------------
· Arnobius the Elder (295 AD) ?
· P.Oxy.1802 (2-3rd c. AD) P
· Ps.Callisthenes (300 AD) P
· Greek Magical Papyri (3rd c. AD) ?
· Acts of Archelaus (Early 4th c. AD) R
· Firmicus Maternus (350 AD) R
· Gregory Nazianzen (370 AD) R
· Julian the Apostate (361-2 AD) R
· Himerius (ca. 362 AD) R
· Libanius (ca. 362 AD) R
· Epiphanius (late 4th c.)
· Jerome (ca. 400 AD) R
· Eunapius (late 4th c. AD) R
· Augustan History (late 4th c. AD) R
· Ambrose of Milan (late 4th c. AD) P
· Claudian (ca. 400 AD) P
· Prudentius (ca. 400 AD) ?
· Ps.-Paulinus of Nola / Carmen ad Antonium (ca. 400 AD) R
· Carmen ad Flavianum / contra Paganos (ca. 400 AD) R
· Augustine (early 5th c. AD) R
· Ambrosiaster (5th c. AD) R
· Dionysius the Areopagite (late 5th c. AD) P
-------------------------
· Martianus Capella (5th c. AD) ?
· Socrates Scholasticus (early 5th c. AD) R
· Sozomen (5th c. AD) R
· Proclus (5th c. AD) P
· Hesychius (ca. 400 AD) P
· Zosimus the alchemist (300 AD) ?
· Zosimus (6th c. AD) ?
· Nonnus of Panopolis (ca. 400 AD) P
· Lactantius Placidus (5th century AD) R
· John the Lydian (6th c. AD) R
· Damascius (6th c. AD) ?
· Cosmas Indicopleustes (ca. 550 AD) P
· Maximus the Confessor (7th c. AD) P
· Nonnus the Mythographer (6th or 7th c. AD) R
· John the Lydian (6th c. AD) R
· Theophylact Simocatta (ca. 600 AD) ?
· Cosmas of Jerusalem (ca. 750 AD) R
· Theophanes (650+ AD) R
· The Suda (9-10 c. AD) R
· Photius (9 c. AD) R
· Panegyrici Latini (9th c. AD) ?
================================
Herodotus (5th c. B.C.) [=Mithra] {Cumont, ii, p.16-17}
Histories, book 1, ch. 131 (Geden p.24):
Others are accustomed to ascend the hill-tops and sacrifice to Zeus, the name they give to the whole expanse of the heavens. Sacrifice is offered also to the sun and moon, to the earth and fire and water and the winds. These alone are from ancient times the objects of their worship, but they have adopted also the practice of sacrifice to Urania, which they have learned from the Assyrians and Arabians. The Assyrians give to Aphrodite the name Mylitta, the Arabians Alilat and the Persians Mitra.
Cumont notes that Ambrose of Milan also calls Mithra female.
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Ctesias (after 398 B.C.) [=Mithra] {Cumont, ii, p.10}
Quoted by Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, book 10, ch.45 (2nd c.). Geden p.25:
Ktesias reports that among the Indians it was not lawful for the king to drink to excess. Among the Persians however the king was permitted to be intoxicated on the one day on which sacrifice was offered to Mithra.
Cumont adds that the passage from Athenaeus is reproduced in part by Eustathius, Commentary on the Odyssey, XVIII, 3, p.1854; and Commentary on the Iliad, p.957.
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Xenophon (ca. 397-340 B.C.) [=Mithra] {Cumont, ii, p.51}
Oeconomicus, IV. 24. Cyrus the Younger, addressing Lysander:
Do you wonder at this, Lysander? I swear to you by Mithra that whenever I am in health I never break my fast without perspiring. (Geden)
Cyropaedia, VII. 5. Spoken by Artabazus to Cyrus the Elder.
By Mithra I could not come to you yesterday without fighting my way through many foes. (Geden)
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Duris of Samos (Mid. 4th c. B.C.) [=Mithra] {Cumont, ii, p.10}
Quoted by Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, book 10, ch.45, immediately after the quote from Ctesias above. (2nd c. A.D.) Geden p.26.
In the seventh book of his Histories Duris has preserved the following account on this subject. Only at the festival celebrated by the Persians in honour of Mithra does the Persian king become drunken and dance after the Persian manner. On this day throughout Asia all abstain from the dance. For the Persians are taught both horsemanship and dancing; and they believe that the practice of these rhythmical movements strengthens and disciplines the body.
Cumont adds that the passage from Athenaeus is reproduced in part by Eustathius, Commentary on the Odyssey, XVIII, 3, p.1854; and Commentary on the Iliad, p.957.
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Strabo (20 B.C.) [=Mithra] {Cumont, ii, p.49}
Geographica, XI. 14:
The country (i.e. Armenia) is so excellently suited to the rearing of horses, being not inferior indeed to Media, that the Nisaean steeds are raised there also of the same breed that the Persian kings were wont to use. And the satrap of Armenia used to send annually to Persia twice ten thousand colts for the Mithraic festivals. (Geden)
Geographica, XV. 3:
The Persians therefore do not erect statues and altars, but sacrifice on a high place, regarding the heaven as Zeus; and they honour also the sun, whom they call Mithra, and the moon and Aphrodite and fire and earth and the winds and water. (Geden)
Cumont notes that the second passage reproduces Herodotus.
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Pliny the Elder (23-79 A.D.) [=Mithra] {Cumont, ii, p.32}
Natural History, book 37, chapter 10: (Jewels derived from the name)
Mithrax is brought from Persia and the hill-country of the Red Sea, a stone of varied colours that reflects the light of the sun. … The Assyrians prize Eumitren the jewel of Bel their most honoured deity, of a light-green colour and employed in divination. (Geden)
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Quintus Curtius (40-50 A.D.) [=Mithra] {Cumont, ii, p.10}
Geden p.27. History of Alexander, book 4, chapter. 13. The scene is before the battle of Arbela.
The king himself with his generals and Staff passed around the ranks of the armed men, praying to the sun and Mithra and the sacred eternal fire to inspire them with courage worthy of their ancient fame and the monuments of their ancestors.
Cumont adds that there is a variant here: mithrem rather than mithram.
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Plutarch (ca. 100 A.D.) [=Mithra] {Cumont, ii, p.33-36}
De Iside et Osiride, ch. 46. Theopompus lived in the 4th c. B.C.
The following is the opinion of the great majority of learned men. By some it is maintained that there are two gods, rivals as it were, authors the one of good and the other of evil. Others confine the name of god to the good power, the other they term demon, as was done by Zoroaster the Magian, who is said to have lived to old age five thousand years before the Trojan war. He calls the one Horomazes, the other Areimanius. The former he assserts is of all natural phenomena most closely akin to the light, the latter to darkness, and that Mithra holds an intermediate position. To Mithra therefore the Persians give the name of the mediator. Moreover he taught men to offer to Horomazes worthy and unblemished sacrifices, but to Areimanius imperfect and deformed. For they bruise a kind of grass called molu in a trough, and invoke Hades and Darkness; then mixing it with the blood of a slaughtered wolf they carry it to a sunless place and throw it away. For they regard some plants as the property of the good god, and some· of the evil demon; and so also such animals as dogs and birds ,and hedgehogs belong to the good deity, and the water rat to the evil. Of these last therefore it is meritorious to kill as many as possible.
They have also many stories to relate concerning the gods, for example that Horomazes was born of the purest light, Areimanius of the darkness, and these are hostile to one another. The former created six gods, the first three deities respectively of good-will, truth, and orderliness, the others of wisdom, wealth, and a good conscience. By the latter rivals as it were to these were formed of equal number. Then Horomazes extended himself to thrice his stature as far beyond the sun as the sun is beyond the earth, and adorned the heaven with stars, appointing one star, Sirius, as guardian and watcher before all. He made also other twenty-four gods and placed them in an egg, but Areimanius produced creatures of equal number and these crushed the egg . . . wherefore evil is mingled with good.
At the appointed time however Areimanius must be utterly brought to nought and destroyed by the pestilence and famine which he has himself caused, and the earth will be cleared and made free from obstruction, the habitation of a united community of men dwelling in happiness and speaking one tongue. Theopompus further reports that according to the magi for three thousand years in succession each of the gods holds sway or is in subjection, and that there will follow on these a further period of three thousand years of war and strife, in which they mutually destroy the works of one another. Finally Hades will be overthrown, and men will be blessed, and will neither need nourishment nor cast a shadow. And the deity who has accomplished these things will then take rest and solace for a period that is not long, especially for a god, and moderate for a sleeping man. To this effect then is the legendary account given by the magi.
Life of Alexander, c. 30:
If thou art not false to the interests of the Persians, but remainest loyal to me thy lord, tell me by thy regard for the great light of Mithra, and the royal right hand ….
Life of Artaxerxes Memnon, c.4:
Presenting a pomegranate of great size a certain Omisus said to him: By Mithra you may trust this man quickly to make an insignificant city great.
Vita Pompei (Life of Pompey) c.24, 5, 632CD. (This is often quoted as if it had some connection with Mithras of the legions; but surely relates to Mithridates and Persian Mithra in Asia Minor?).
There were of these corsairs above one thousand sail, and they had taken no less than four hundred cities, committing sacrilege upon the temples of the gods, and enriching themselves with the spoils of many never violated before, such as were those of Claros, Didyma, and Samothrace; and the temple of the Earth in Hermione, and that of Aesculapius in Epidaurus, those of Neptune at the Isthmus, at Taenarus, and at Calauria; those of Apollo at Actium and Leucas, and those of Juno in Samos, at Argos, and at Lacinium. They themselves offered strange sacrifices upon Mount Olympus, and performed certain secret rites or religious mysteries, among which those of Mithras have been preserved to our own time having received their previous institution from them. (Dryden)
They were accustomed to offer strange sacrifices on Olympus and to observe certain secret rites, of which that of Mithra is maintained to the present day by those by whom it was first established. (Geden)
(Ps.Plutarch) De fluviis, XXIII. 4.
Clauss says that the story is that Mithras spilled his seed onto a rock, and the stone gave birth to a son, named Diorphos, who, worsted and killed in a duel by Ares, was turned into the mountain of the same name not far from the Armenian river Araxes.
Near it also (i.e. the Araxes) is a mountain Diorphus, so called from the giant of that name, of which this story is told: Mithra being desirous of a son, and hating the female race, entered into a certain rock; and the stone becoming pregnant after the appointed time bore a child named Diorphus. The latter when he had grown to manhood challenged Ares to a contest of valour, and was slain. The purpose of the gods was then fulfilled in his transformation into the mountain which bears his name. (Geden)
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Dio Chrysostom (ca. 50-120 A.D.) [=Mithra] {Cumont, ii, p.60-64}
Oration 36. Marked as doubtful by Cumont.
In the secret mysteries the magi relate a further marvellous tradition concerning this god (Zeus) that he was the first and faultless charioteer of the unrivalled car. For they declare that the car of the sun is more recent, but on account of its prominent course in the sky is familiar to all. Whence is derived, it would seem, the common legend adopted by almost all the leading poets who have told of the risings and settings of the sun, the yoking of the steeds, and his ascent into the car. But of the mighty and perfect car of Zeus none of our writers hitherto has worthily sung, not even Homer or Hesiod, but the story is told by Zoroaster and the descendants of the magi who have learnt from him.
Of him the Persians relate that moved by love of wisdom and righteousness he separated himself from men and lived apart on a certain mountain, that fire subsequently fell from heaven and the whole mountain was kindled into flame. The king then with the most illustrious of the Persians approached wishing to offer prayer to the god. And Zoroaster came forth from the fire unharmed and gently bade them be of good courage and offer certain sacrifices, since it was the divine sanctuary to which the king had come.
Afterwards only those distinguished for love of the truth and who were worthy to approach the god were permitted to have access, and to these the Persians gave the name of magi, as being adepts in the divine service; differing therein from the Greeks who through ignorance of the name call such men wizards. And among other sacred rites they maintain for Zeus a pair of Nisaean steeds, these being the noblest and strongest that Asia yields, but one steed only for the sun. Moreover, they recount their legend not like our poets of the Muses who with all the arts of persuasion endeavour to carry conviction, but quite simply. For without doubt the control and government of the Supreme are unique, actuated always by the highest skill and strength, and that without cessation through endless ages.
The circuits then of the sun and moon are, as I said, movements of parts, and therefore readily discernible; most men however do not understand the movement and course of the whole, but the majestic order of its succession removes it above their comprehension. The further stories which they tell concerning the steeds and their management I hesitate to relate; and indeed they fail to take into account that the nature of the symbolism they employ betrays their own character. For it may be that it would be regarded as an act of folly for me to set forth a barbarian tale by the side of the fair Greek lays.
I must however make the venture. The first of the steeds is said to surpass infinitely in beauty and size and swiftness, running as it does on the outside round of the course, sacred to Zeus himself; and it is winged. The colour also of its skin is bright, of the purest sheen. And on it the sun and the moon are emblematically represented; I understand the meaning to be that these steeds have emblems moon-shaped or other; and they are seen by us indistinctly like sparks dancing in the bright blaze of a fire, each with its own proper motion. And the other stars receive their light through it and are all under its influence; and some have the same motion and are carried round with it, and others follow different courses. And the latter have each their own name among men, but the others are grouped together, assigned to certain forms and shapes.
The most handsome and variegated steed then is the favourite of Zeus himself, and on this account is lauded by them, receiving as is right the chief sacrifices and honours. The next to it in rank bears the name of Hera, being tractable and gentle, greatly inferior however in strength and swiftness. Its colour is naturally black, but that which is illuminated by the sun is always resplendent, while that which is in shadow during its circuit reveals the true character of the skin. The third is sacred to Poseidon, and is slower in movement than the second. His counterpart the poets say is found among men, meaning I suppose that which bears the name of Pegasus; a spring, according to the story, breaking forth in Corinth when the ground was opened.
The fourth is the strangest figure of all, fixed and motionless, not furnished with wings, named Hestia; but they do not hesitate to declare that this also is yoked to the car, remaining however in its place champing a bit of steel. And the others are on each side closely attached to it, the two nearest turning equally towards it, as though assailing it and resenting its control; but the leader on the outside circles constantly around it as though around a fixed centre post. For the most part therefore they live in peace and amity unhurt by one another, but eventually after a long time and many circuits the powerful breath of the leader descends from above and kindles into flame the proud spirit of the others, and most of all of the last.
His flaming mane then is set on fire, in which he took especial pride, and the whole universe. This calamity which they record they say that the Greeks attribute to Phaethon, for they refuse to blame Zeus’ driving of the car, and are unwilling to attach fault to the circuits of the sun … and again when in the course of further years the sacred colt of the Nymphs and Poseidon rouses itself to unaccustomed exertion, and incommoded with the sweat that pours from it drenches its own yokefellow, it gives rise to a destruction the contrary of the preceding, a flood of water. This then is the one catastrophe of which the Greeks have record owing to their recent origin and the shortness of their memory, and they relate that Deucalion reigned over them at that time before the universal destruction.
And in consequence of the ruin brought upon themselves men regard these rare occurrences as taking place neither in harmony with reason nor as a part of the general order, overlooking the fact that they occur in due course and in accordance with the will of the preserver and ruler of all. For it is just as when a charioteer chastises one of his steeds by checking it with the rein or touching it with the whip; the horse gives a start and is restless before settling down into its accustomed order. This earlier control then of the team they say is firm and the universe suffers no harm; but later a change takes place in the movement of the four, and their natures are mutually altered and interchanged, until they are all subdued by the higher power and a uniform character is imposed on all.
Nevertheless they do not hesitate to compare this movement to the conduct and driving of a car, for lack of a more impressive simile. As though a clever artificer should fashion horses out of wax, and should then smooth off the roughnesses of each, adding now to one and now to another, finally reducing all to one pattern, and forming his whole material into one shape. This however is not the case of a Creator fashioning and transforming from the outside the material substance of things without life, but the experience is that of the very substances themselves, as though they were contending for victory in a real and well-contested strife; and the crown of victory is awarded of right to the first and foremost in swiftness and strength and in every kind of virtue, to whom at the beginning of our discourse we gave the name of “chosen of Zeus.”.
For this one being the strongest and naturally fiery quickly consumed the others as though they had been really wax in a period not actually long, though to our limited reasoning it appears infinite; and absorbing into himself the entire substance of all is seen to be far greater and more glorious than before, having won the victory in the most formidable contest by no mortal or immortal aid, but by his own valour. Raised then proudly aloft and exulting in his victory, he takes possession of the widest possible domain, and yet such is his might and power that he craves further room for expansion. Having reached this conclusion they shrink from describing the nature of the living creature as the same; for that it is now no other than the soul of the charioteer and lord, or rather it has the same purpose and mind. (Geden)
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Statius (ca. 80 A.D.) [=Mithras] {Cumont, ii, p.46}
Thebaid, book 1, v.719-20:
(Mithras) ‘twists the unruly horns beneath the rocks of a Persian cave’ (Clauss)
717 …… seu te roseum Titana vocari Gentis Achaemeniae ritu, seu praestat Osirim Frugiferum, seu Persei sub rupibus antri Indignata sequi torquentem cornua Mithram.
Or:
Whether it please thee to bear the name of ruddy Titan after the manner of the Achaemenian race, or Osiris lord of the crops, or Mithra as beneath the rocks of the Persian cave he presses back the horns that resist his control. (Geden)
Geden suggests the horns must be those of the bull.
The scholia on Statius are attributed to a certain Lactantius Placidus.
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Justin Martyr (ca. 150 A.D.) [=Mithras] {Cumont, ii.20-21}
1st Apology, ch. 66
For the apostles, in the memoirs composed by them, which are called Gospels, have thus delivered unto us what was enjoined upon them; that Jesus took bread, and when He had given thanks, said, “This do ye in remembrance of Me, this is My body; “and that, after the same manner, having taken the cup and given thanks, He said, “This is My blood; “and gave it to them alone. Which the wicked devils have imitated in the mysteries of Mithras, commanding the same thing to be done. For, that bread and a cup of water are placed with certain incantations in the mystic rites of one who is being initiated, you either know or can learn. (ANF)
Dialogue with Trypho, ch. 70
70. And when those who record the mysteries of Mithras say that he was begotten of a rock, and call the place where those who believe in him are initiated a cave, do I not perceive here that the utterance of Daniel, that a stone without hands was cut out of a great mountain, has been imitated by them, and that they have attempted likewise to imitate the whole of Isaiah’s words? For they contrived that the words of righteousness be quoted also by them. But I must repeat to you the words of Isaiah referred to, in order that from them you may know that these things are so. They are these: `Hear, ye that are far off, what I have done; those that are near shall know my might.
The sinners in Zion are removed; trembling shall seize the impious. Who shall announce to you the everlasting place? The man who walks in righteousness, speaks in the right way, hates sin and unrighteousness, and keeps his hands pure from bribes, stops the ears from hearing the unjust judgment of blood closes the eyes from seeing unrighteousness: he shall dwell in the lofty cave of the strong rock. Bread shall be given to him, and his water [shall be] sure. Ye shall see the King with glory, and your eyes shall look far off. Your soul shall pursue diligently the fear of the Lord. Where is the scribe? where are the counsellors? where is he that numbers those who are nourished,-the small and great people? with whom they did not take counsel, nor knew the depth of the voices, so that they heard not.
The people who are become depreciated, and there is no understanding in him who hears.’ Now it is evident, that in this prophecy [allusion is made] to the bread which our Christ gave us to eat, in remembrance of His being made flesh for the sake of His believers, for whom also He suffered; and to the cup which He gave us to drink, in remembrance of His own blood, with giving of thanks. And this prophecy proves that we shall behold this very King with glory; and the very terms of the prophecy declare loudly, that the people foreknown to believe in Him were foreknown to pursue diligently the fear of the Lord. Moreover, these Scriptures are equally explicit in saying, that those who are reputed to know the writings of the Scriptures, and who hear the prophecies, have no understanding.
And when I hear, Trypho,” said I, “that Perseus was begotten of a virgin, I understand that the deceiving serpent counterfeited also this. (ANF)
78. … I have repeated to you,” I continued, “what Isaiah foretold about the sign which foreshadowed the cave; but for the sake of those who have come with us to-day, I shall again remind you of the passage.” Then I repeated the passage from Isaiah which I have already written, adding that, by means of those words, those who presided over the mysteries of Mithras were stirred up by the devil to say that in a place, called among them a cave, they were initiated by him. … (ANF)
Geden (p.39-40) renders these passages as:
(Apol. 1, 66) Accordingly in the mysteries of Mithra also we have heard that evil spirits practise mimicry. For at the initiatory rites bread and a cup of water are set out accompanied by certain formulae, as you know or may ascertain.
(Dial. 70) And when in the tradition of the Mithraic mysteries they relate that Mithra was born of a rock, and name the place where his followers receive initiation a cave, do I not know that they are perverting the saying of Daniel that “a stone was hewn without hands from a great mountain,” and likewise the words of Isaiah, all whose sayings also they endeavour to pervert? Noteworthy sayings too besides these they have artfully contrived to use.
(Dial. 78) According to the tradition of the Mithraic mysteries initiation takes place among them in a so-called cave, … a device of the evil one.
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Lucian (120-200 A.D.) [=?] {Cumont, ii.22}
The Gods in Council, chapter 9.
Momus. Ah; and out of consideration for him I suppose I must also abstain from any reference to the eagle, which is now a God like the rest of us, perches upon the royal sceptre, and may be expected at any moment to build his nest upon the head of Majesty?–Well, you must allow me Attis, Corybas, and 9 Sabazius: by what contrivance, now, did they get here? and that Mede there, Mithras, with the candys and tiara? why, the fellow cannot speak Greek; if you pledge him, he does not know what you mean. The consequence is, that Scythians and Goths, observing their success, snap their fingers at us, and distribute divinity and immortality right and left; that was how the slave Zamolxis’s name slipped into our register. However, let that pass. But I should just like to ask that Egyptian there–the dog-faced gentleman in the linen suit — who he is, and whether he proposes to establish his divinity by barking?
Or:
And Attis too, by heaven, and Korybas and Sabazius with what a flood have these deluged us, and your Mithra with his Assyrian cloak and crown, maintaining even their foreign tongue, so that when they give a toast no one can understand what they say. (Geden)
The Tragic Zeus, ch. 8:
There is Bendis herself and Anubis yonder and by his side Attis and Mithra and Men, all resplendent in gold, weighty and costly you may be sure.
Menippus, ch. 6:
Once as with these thoughts I was lying awake I determined to go to Babylon and there make inquiry of one of the magi, the disciples and successors of Zoroaster. I had heard that by incantations and magic rites they open the gates of Hades, and lead thither in safety whom they will, and restore him again to the upper world . . . so I arose at once, and without delay set out for Babylon.
On arrival I betook myself to a certain Chaldaean, a man skilled in the art of the diviner, grey-haired and wearing an imposing beard, whose name was Mithrobarzanes. With much trouble and importunity I won his consent, for whatever fee he liked to name, to be my guide on the way. He took me under his charge, and first for twenty-nine days from the new moon he conducted me at dawn to the Euphrates and bathed me, reciting some long invocation to the rising sun, which I did not fully understand; for like the second-rate heralds at the games he spoke in obscure and involved fashion. It was clear however that he was invoking certain deities.
Then after the invocation he spat thrice in front of me and conducted me back without looking in the face of any whom we met. For food we had acorns, and our drink was milk and honey-mead and the waters of the Choaspes, and we made our couch upon the grass in the open air. These preliminaries concluded he took me about midnight to the Tigris, cleansed and rubbed me down and purified me with resinous twigs and hyssop and many other things, reiterating at the same time the previous invocation. Then he threw spells over me and circumambulated me for my defence against the ghosts and led me back to the house, as I was, on foot; and the rest of the journey we made by boat. He himself put on some sort of a Magian robe, not unlike that of the Medes. And he further equipped me with the cap and lion’s skin and put into my hands the lyre, and bade me if I were asked my name not to answer Menippus, but to say Herakles or Odysseus or Orpheus ….
Arrived at a certain place, gloomy and desolate and overgrown with jungle, we disembarked, Mithrobarzanes leading the way, and dug a pit, and sacrificed the sheep, pouring out the blood over it. Then the Magian with lighted torch in his hand, no longer in subdued tones but exerting his voice to the utmost, invoked the whole host of demons with the Avengers and Furies, “and Hecate the queen of night and noble Persephone,” joining with them some foreign names of inordinate length. (Geden)
Cumont adds that the name of Mithras is explained in two of the scholia on Lucian. The second is similar to Hesychius. Scholia, c. 1. 1 (p.173 ed. Jacobitz), Cumont p.23. Translated by Andrew Eastbourne:
Cumont cites two scholia on Lucian which discuss Mithra(s), from the edition of Jacobitz. For a more recent edition, see Rabe, Scholia in Lucianum (1906).[1]
Scholion on Lucian, Zeus Rants / Jupiter tragoedus 8 [cf. Rabe, p. 60]
This Bendis…[2] Bendis is a Thracian goddess, and Anubis is an Egyptian [god], whom the theologoi[3] call “dog-faced.” Mithras is Persian, and Men is Phrygian. This Mithras is the same as Hephaestus, but others say [he is the same as] Helios. So then, because the barbarians would take pride[4] in wealth, they naturally also outfitted their own gods most expensively. And Attis is revered by the Phrygians…
Scholion on Lucian, The Parliament of the Gods / Deorum concilium 9 [cf. Rabe, p. 212]
Mithrês [Mithras]… Mithras is the sun [Helios], among the Persians.[5]
[1] I have noted points where Rabe’s edition differs in substance from the text printed by Cumont. Rabe’s edition is available online at http://www.archive.org/details/scholiainlucianu00rabe
[2] Lucian’s text here mentions Bendis, Anubis, Attis, Mithrês [Mithras], and Mên.
[3] The Greek term normally refers to poets who wrote about the gods, like Hesiod or Orpheus. Note that this is an emendation; the mss. read logoi (“words / discourses / accounts”), which Rabe adopts in his edition.
[4] Gk. ekômôn; lit., “wore their hair long / let their hair grow long.”
[5] Rabe’s text: “Mithras is the same as Helios, among the Persians.”
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Zenobius the Sophist (2nd century A.D.) [=?]
A Greek sophist of the reign of Hadrian. His collection of proverbs is partly extant.
Proverbia, book 5, 78 (in Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum vol. 1, p.151). Quoted in Albert de Jong, Traditions of the Magi: Zoroastrianism in Greek and Latin literature, p.309:
Evander said that the gods who rule over everything are eight: Fire, Water, Earth, Heaven, Moon, Sun, Mithras, Night.
Not in Geden or Cumont.
Clauss p.70 n.84 also mentions literary evidence of syncretism of Mithras with the Orphic creator-god Phanes (no citation). This refers to a similar list from Iranian sources appearing in Theon of Smyrna’s Exposition of mathematical ideas useful for reading Plato, ch. 47 (from Exposition des connaissances mathematiques utiles pour la lecture de platon, J. Dupuis in 1892, p.173):
47. The number eight which is the first cube composed of unity and seven. Some say that there are eight gods who are masters of the universe, and this is also what we see in the sayings of Orpheus:
By the creators of things ever immortal, Fire and water, earth and heaven, moon, And sun, the great Phanes and the dark night.
And Evander reports that in Egypt may be found on a column an inscription of King Saturn and Queen Rhea: “The most ancient of all, King Osiris, to the immortal gods, to the spirit, to heaven and earth, to night and day, to the father of all that is and all that will be, and to Love, souvenir of the magificence of his life.” Timotheus also reports the proverb, “Eight is all, because the spheres of the world which rotate around the earth are eight.” And, as Erastothenes says,
“These eight spheres harmonise together in making their revolutions around the earth.”
The real basis for identification of Mithras and Phanes is some inscriptions.
........
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Bibliography
· Manfred CLAUSS, The Roman Cult of Mithras: The God and his Mysteries. Edinburgh University Press (2000). Tr. Richard GORDON.
· Franz CUMONT, The Mysteries of Mithra. London: Kegan Paul (1910). Tr. Thomas J. McCORMACK from the second French edition.
An Image of the Tauroctony
[Museo Nazionale, Roma. Photographed by R.Pearse, February 2004]
http://www.tertullian.org/rpearse/mithras/literary_sources.htm
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Stalin in Ottoman Anatolia: his Spiritual, Religious and Historical Quests
The Mithraic Trajectory of an Unknown Transcendentalist
Сталин в Османской Анатолии: его духовные, религиозные и исторические искания
Митраистская траектория неизвестного трансценденталиста
Table of Contents
I. The erroneous perception of Stalin among most people today
II. The erroneous perception of WW II by average people today
III. The true Yalta Conference
IV. The Big Game never ended
V. Good intentions and evil purposes
VI. Roosevelt & Stalin: like Abraham Lincoln & Alexander II
VII. The real, hidden Stalin: an experienced mystic
VIII. A Turkish ambassador speaks about Stalin living in Artvin and Istanbul
IX. Stalin in Ottoman Anatolia: 1911-1912
X. Turkish statesman Rıza Nur noted that Stalin understood Turkish
XI. Stalin's cultural background: distorted & unknown to most
XII. The Mithraic Iranian cultural heritage of Georgia & Stalin
XIII. The long, heavy shadow of the Sassanids
XIV. An indelible stamp on Islam: the Iranian Intermezzo
XV. The intertwined Islamic & Christian cultural heritage of Georgia, and Shota Rustaveli
XVI. Rustaveli's Russian translations and Stalin's pseudonyms
XVII. Archaeological excavations and Orientalist discoveries prior to Stalin's sojourn in Anatolia
XVIII. Stalin's textual sources of information about Mithra and the Mithraic mysteries
XIX. Spirituality, Religion, Eschatology, Soteriology, the Extinction of the Mankind, and Stalin
XX. Major themes of Stalin's spiritual quest in Anatolia – 1. Tauroctony and Crucifixion
XXI. Major themes of Stalin's spiritual quest in Anatolia – 2. Mithraic Trinity, Christian Trinity, Spirituality and Stalin
XXII. Major themes of Stalin's spiritual quest in Anatolia – 3. Solar nature of Mithraism / Immaculate birth from the rock
XXIII. How Stalin's Mithraic meditations in Anatolia formed his decision-making
1. Pontus' King Mithridates VI's wars with Rome
2. Cilicia's Mithraic Pirates in fight with Rome, the desecration of Greece, and Stalin
3. Did Stalin travel to visit the world's greatest Mithraic monument at Nemrut Dagh?
4. Stalin's Mithraic meditations and anti-sacerdotal stance
5. The Mithraic version of the Assyrian-Babylonian Gilgamesh: Verethragna, and his association with Heracles in Nemrut Dagh
6. Mithraic Anatolian Imperial Spirituality vs. Nordic Mythology: Stalin vs. Hitler
XXIV. Rome, New Rome, the Third Rome, and Stalin
XXV. Mithraism, Christianity, Stalin and the Antichrist
The idea that most of the people around the world have about Stalin is entirely false. This is due to the fact that atheists, materialists, Marxists-Leninists, liberal socialists, socialist-democrats, evolutionists and all the trash of Anglo-Saxon and Ashkenazi Khazarian pseudo-intellectuals and bogus-academics have first perceived, then interpreted, and last analyzed/presented Stalin and his historical role through the most erroneous, Trotskyist misunderstanding/distortion of the Georgian-origin Soviet statesman. But Stalin was an unconditional transcendentalist and a remarkable mystic.
Mithraic Tauroctony from a Mithraeum in Syria (currently in the Israel museum in Jerusalem): a mythical-religious topic early conceived by evil forces as purely eschatological symbolism
Human sacrifice: dead bodies wait for cremation in Dresden after the bombardment of the 'Allied' forces.
I. The erroneous perception of Stalin among most people today
According to this irrelevant story, Stalin (1878-1953) was a resolute materialist, a convinced Darwinist, a devoted Marxist-Leninist, and a heartless dictator who decimated entire nations, before purging the old guard of Communist-Bolshevik partisans, relocating populations, and sending millions to jail. There is only little truth in all this. In fact, Stalin was as realist as Kemal Ataturk; he therefore had to appear to others in the way he did in order to succeed Lenin and eliminate Trotsky. Many may agree with the last sentence, stating that this is part of the well-known History.
But there is also the 'Other History'; the one that is unknown, because it did not happen. This is, in other words, the negative reflection of the reality. All the same, because this 'other' or 'unknown' History did not happen, this does not mean that it was not attempted. And indeed many secret and known organizations and 'societies' tried to prepare several developments which finally did not occur. It is essential for a true Historian to know well these failed attempts; in fact, he only then understands History as the Absolute Sphere that contains the outcome of all the desires, feelings, thoughts and attempts of the humans.
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The goddess Selket (with a scorpion upon her head) and queen Nefertari in the distance, depicted within the Tomb of Nefertari, Valley of the Queens.
Ισπαχάν: η Αυτοκρατορική Πρωτεύουσα των Σαφεβιδών (:των Σούφι Σάχηδων) που είναι ο Μισός Κόσμος
Esfahan: the Imperial Capital of Safavid dynasty (: the Sufi Shahs) which is already "Half the World"
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 22α Ιουνίου 2019.
Στο κείμενό του αυτό, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης παρουσιάζει τμήμα ομιλίας μου στην Νουρ-σουλτάν (πρώην Αστανά) του Καζακστάν τον Δεκέμβριο του 2018 με θέμα τις μεγάλες αυτοκρατορικές πρωτεύουσες της Ασίας και της Αφρικής, καθώς και την εμφανή κατωτερότητα και αθλιότητα των δυτικο-ευρωπαϊκών πρωτευουσών αποικιοκρατικών χωρών.
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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/06/22/ισπαχάν-η-αυτοκρατορική-πρωτεύουσα-τ/ ===============
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Όπως και στην περίπτωση της Σαμαρκάνδης, δεν υπάρχει καμμιά ευρωπαϊκή πόλη πλην της Σταμπούλ που να μπορεί να αντιπαραβληθεί με το Εσφαχάν σε αυτοκρατορικό μεγαλείο.
Μαζί με τις προαναφερμένες δύο πρωτεύουσες, καθώς και την Σαχ Τζαχάν Αμπάντ (το λεγόμενο Παλαιό Δελχί), πρωτεύουσα των Μογγόλων αυτοκρατόρων (Γκορκανιάν) της Ινδίας, και το Πεκίνο, το Εσφαχάν είναι μία από τις πέντε μεγαλύτερες και πιο εντυπωσιακές αυτοκρατορικές πόλεις και τις πέντε πιο σημαντικές πρωτεύουσες του Παγκόσμιου Πολιτισμού και της Παγκόσμιας Ιστορίας των τελευταίων δύο χιλιετιών.
Οι Ιρανοί το λένε πιο λακωνικά κι έχουν δίκιο: το Εσφαχάν είναι ο Μισός Κόσμος. Όλη η υπόλοιπη επιφάνεια της γης είναι το υπόλοιπο μισό του κόσμου.
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Το Τζαμί του Σάχη, Εσφαχάν
Το Τζαμί του Σεΐχη Λουτφολλάχ, Εσφαχάν
Ανακτορικό Περίπτερο Αλί Καπού, Εσφαχάν
Ανάκτορο των Σαράντα Κιόνων (Τσεέλ Σοτούν), Εσφαχάν
Ανάκτορο των Οκτώ Παραδείσων (Χαστ Μπεχέστ), Εσφαχάν
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Δείτε το βίντεο:
Исфахан: имперская столица сефевидов (суфийской династии Ирана) – половина мира
https://www.ok.ru/video/1416652720749
Isfahan: the Imperial Capital of the Safavid (: Sufi) Dynasty of Iran is Half of the World
https://vk.com/video434648441_456240217
Ισπαχάν: η Πρωτεύουσα των Σαφεβιδών (της Δυναστείας των Σούφι) είναι ο Μισός Κόσμος
Περισσότερα:
Στα περσικά (φαρσί) λένε “Εσφαχάν νασφ-ε Τζαχάν”, δηλαδή ότι το Ισπαχάν είναι ο μισός κόσμος. Γνωστή ως Ασπάδανα στα αρχαία ελληνικά, το Ισπαχάν ήταν μια μικρή πόλη στα αχαιαμενιδικά (550-330), αρσακιδικά (250 π.Χ. – 224 μ.Χ.) και στα σασανιδικά (224-651) χρόνια. Όταν με την ισλαμική κατάκτηση (636-642-651), το Ισπαχάν έγινε πρωτεύουσα της χαλιφατικής επαρχίας Τζεμπάλ (: βουνά) που περιλάμβανε την οροσειρά του Ζάγρου και το δυτικό ιρανικό οροπέδιο, άρχισε μία ανέλιξη που κορυφώθηκε στα σαφεβιδικά (1501-1736) χρόνια.
Το Εσφαχάν, όπως λέγεται στα περσικά, είναι μια από τις πιο εντυπωσιακές αυτοκρατορικές πρωτεύουσες του κόσμου. Επίκεντρο της σαφεβιδικής πρωτεύουσας ήταν η τεράστια πλατεία Νακς-ε Τζαχάν (εικόνα του κόσμου), όπου από το αυτοκρατορικό περίπτερο Αλί Καπού ο σάχης παρακολουθούσε τους αγώνες πόλο που λάμβαναν χώρα. Εκεί βρίσκονται και δυο από τα ωραιότερα τζαμιά του κόσμου: το Τζαμί του Σεΐχη Λουτφολάχ και το Τζαμί του Σάχη (σήμερα: ‘ταμί του ιμάμη’).
Για τους Ιρανούς από τα πρώιμα αχαιμενιδικά χρόνια ‘κήπος’ σήμαινε ‘παράδεισος’ κι όλοι οι σάχηδες των προϊσλαμικών και των ισλαμικών χρόνων οργάνωσαν εντυπωσιακούς κήπους κι έκτισαν ανάκτορα μέσα σε κήπους με λίμνες. Το ανάκτορο Τσεέλ Σοτούν (των σαράντα κιόνων) και το ανάκτορο Χαστ Μπεχέστ (των οκτώ παραδείσων) είναι τα πιο εντυπωσιακά από όσα σώζονται.
Περισσότερα: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isfahan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naqsh-e_Jahan_Square
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C4%80l%C4%AB_Q%C4%81p%C5%AB
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chehel_Sotoun
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hasht_Behesht
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikh_Lotfollah_Mosque
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shah_Mosque
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safavid_dynasty
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Исфахан
https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ισφαχάν
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Διαβάστε:
Isfahan (اصفهان), ancient province and old city in central Iran (Middle Pers. “Spahān,” New Pers. “Eṣfahān”). Isfahan city has served as one of the most important urban centers on the Iranian Plateau since ancient times and has gained, over centuries of urbanization, many significant monuments; a number of Isfahan’s monuments have been designated by UNESCO as world heritage sites. Isfahan city, the capital of Isfahan Province, is located about 420 km south of Tehran, and is Persia’s third largest city (after Tehran and Mashad) with a population of over 1.4 million in 2004.
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/isfahan
Isfahan v. Local Historiography
Isfahan is exceptional in the number and variety of works of local historiography; no other Persian city has attracted nearly as many such works. These works were written predominantly in two periods: the pre-Mongol (and in particular the pre-Saljuq) period and the 19th century; works written in the 20th century will not be dealt with extensively here. Works of local historiography about Isfahan can be classified into two distinct literary genres: the biographical dictionary and the adab-oriented local history.
Biographical dictionaries. Biographical dictionaries of local perspective were written for a large number of Persian cities in the pre-Mongol period, but only a fraction of them are extant in either the original Arabic or Persian renderings. Two biographical dictionaries about scholars from Isfahan, both written in Arabic, have come down to us. The earlier of these two, the Ṭabaqāt al-moḥaddeṯin be-Eṣfahān wa’l-wāredin ʿalayhā, by Abu’l-Šayḵ ʿAbd-Allāh b. Moḥammad (274-369/887-979), was probably written in the 350s/960s, since the latest dates mentioned do not relate to events far beyond 350 (ed. Baluši, IV, p. 230, dated 353).
The mention of dates as late as that seems to be exceptional, so they could have been added during the final stages of the process of completing the work. The second work of this genre is Ḏekr akbār Eṣfahān by the Hadith transmitter and historian Abu Noʿaym Eṣfahāni (q.v.; d. 430/1038). The latest dates in this work suggest that it was completed in the 410s/1020s.
Abu’l-Šayḵ was not necessarily the first author from Isfahan to write a biographical dictionary about the scholars who lived in, or had come to, his hometown. Among the many sources he quotes, the Hanbalite scholar Ebn Manda (d. 301/913-14) is the most prominent. On the basis of this and other later sources, it is almost certain that Ebn Manda wrote such a work. It seems that it was still known in the immediate pre-Mongol period, since the author of an analogous work on the scholars of Qazvin was apparently able to use it then (Rāfeʿi, I, p. 2).
Moreover, Abu’l-Šayḵ frequently mentions men who wrote their mašyaḵa (list of teachers with whom they studied Hadith and other Islamic sciences); thus, it would be reasonable to assume that he used a number of these in preparing his work. The transition from writing down one’s own mašyaḵa to compiling a book on the “categories” or “generations” of scholars is likely to have been a relatively smooth one.
Undoubtedly, Abu’l-Šayḵ was, in turn, one of the most important, perhaps even the single most important, source for Abu Noʿaym, who referred to him as Abu Moḥammad b. Ḥayyān. Except for a very few, all the scholars included in Abu’l-Šayḵ’s work are also mentioned by Abu Noʿaym. Abu Noʿaym did not, however, merely write a continuation (ḏayl) to Abu’l-Šayḵ’s work; rather, he used most of his material in a slightly abridged or otherwise adapted form; thus, any changes that Abu Noʿaym introduced into the text of his source can be taken to be intentional.
Other sources of comparable character were identified first by Sven Dedering in the introduction to his edition of Abu Noʿaym’s work, and have recently been discussed more comprehensively by Nur-Allāh Kasāʾi in the introduction to his Persian translation of the work. Kasāʾi also provides a detailed comparison between the respective works of Abu’l-Šayḵ and Abu Noʿaym. It is also worth mentioning that an important source for Abu Noʿaym was the (apparently lost) Ketāb Eṣfahān by Ḥamza Eṣfahāni (see below).
These two biographical dictionaries are similar in scope, but they offer a number of differences in form: Abu’l-Šayḵ arranged his entries according to the principle of ṭabaqāt (categories), whereas Abu Noʿaym adhered to alphabetical order (except for the Companions of the Prophet), using the ṭabaqāt principle only within larger groups made up of men who bore very common given names such as Aḥmad (I, pp. 77 ff.).
Both works start with an introductory chapter, that of the earlier work being much more concise. Abu Noʿaym places a perceptible stress on the good qualities of the Persians and their merits in contributing to the spread of Islam and the maintenance of its purity.
For instance, half of the section on the Companions of the Prophet is devoted to Salmān Fār(e)si (q.v.), and the stories about the Arab conquest of Isfahan provide unfavorable details about how the invaders proceeded. Both works link the early history of Isfahan back to the prophetic cycle of history by claiming that the people of Isfahan were the only ones who did not support Nimrod in his rebellion against God, but supported Abraham instead (Abu’l-Šayḵ, 1989, I, p. 150; 1987-92, I, p. 28, Abu Noʿaym, I, pp. 48 ff.).
The biographical parts of both of these works shed some light on institutions of learning and their development. The earlier work describes teaching activity taking place mainly in mosques and in private homes, whereas the later one refers to specialized institutions unknown to the earlier source, such as a “House of learning and transmission,” (bayt al-ʿlm wa’l-rewāya) mentioned in relation to someone who died in 363/973, as well as a “House of Hadith and transmission” (baytal-ḥadiṯ wa’l-rewāya )(ed. Dedering, I, pp. 156, 221).
Other matters for which contemporary scholars have found it useful to resort to using local biographical dictionaries in general, and in particular those written about Isfahan, include the office of the judge (Halm) and the spread of law schools (Melchert; Tsafrir). Scholars have also offered, on the basis of such sources, reconstructions of the rise of Sufism to a respected movement that managed to attract even some of the more prominent religious scholars (Paul, 2000a, using methods developed by Chabbi).
Both books discuss in their introductions the pleasant landscape and climate of Isfahan and its surroundings in a very similar way, thus apparently laying the foundation for further developments of the genre that treats local history and geography as closely related subjects.
Adab-oriented local historiography. Works of local historiography written in the pre-Mongol period mostly belong to the genre of biographical dictionaries. The only extant work of this genre about Isfahan is Māfarruḵi’s Maḥāsen Eṣfahān in Arabic, which was written probably some time between 464/1072 and 484/1092 (Bulliet), when Isfahan had become the capital of the Great Saljuq empire.
Māfarruḵi includes quotes from Ketāb Eṣfahān, the lost work of Ḥamza Eṣfahāni; thus it seems that in Isfahan there was something like a tradition of writing local history in both genres. It is, however, impossible to venture a reconstruction of Ḥamza’s work based on the rather short references in Abu Noʿaym and Māfarruḵi, but it seems likely that it had a part similar to a biographical dictionary (including not only scholars, but also men of letters) and another one on antiquities (Paul, 2000b).
Another such work on “the glories of Isfahan” (fi mafāḵer Eṣfahān) may have existed in the form of ʿAli b. Ḥamza b. ʿOmāra’s Qalāʾed al šaraf, which is mentioned by Mā-farruḵi (p. 27) and Yāqut (V. pp. 200 f.) but seems to be lost. Nevertheless, it is probable that there was a tradition of writing adab-oriented local histories of Isfahan as well as biographical dictionaries of scholars.
Māfarruḵi’s work was translated into Persian in the 14th century by Ḥosayn b. Moḥammad b. Abi’l-Reżā Āvi, who rearranged it by dividing the text into eight chapters and added further material in several places, in many cases poetry, as well as praise of the Il-khanid vizier who governed Isfahan in his time. Māfarruḵi’s work is a pleasantly arranged assortment of stories, including some about storytelling itself. It was written from the vantage point of the secretarial class that focuses on the rules of good governance, which are sometimes linked to the pre-Islamic past.
This is history as a means of conveying contemporary messages; the rules are set first in a distant past, and later cases are used to illustrate that they are still valid. In its historical parts, the text certainly does not aim to recount history “as it really happened,” but tells stories of a historical nature as exempla to illustrate general rules that mostly pertain to good governance. Since these rules are grounded in a common cultural code shared by the author and his audience (and, in fact, later generations as well), the work is permeated with the values that were characteristic of the author’s time and social background. This work’s overall message is that experience (tajreba) has shown time and again that successful rulers are those who heed the advice of secretaries, viziers, and even the ordinary public. It is irrelevant that some of the stories told to convey this point of view may be fictitious.
Works written in the later 19th century; No local history of Isfahan seems to have been written under the Safavids or in the period immediately following their downfall. Local historiography resumed only in the second half of the 19th century, particularly as a response to Nāṣer-al-Din Shah’s project for a general description of the regions of Persia called Merʾāt al-boldān. Thus geography, in particular historical geography, is the focus of interest in some of these works, which are a source of information about city quarters and even about individual buildings.
One of the works written for Nāṣer-al-Din Shah was Neṣf al-jahān fi taʿrif al-Eṣfahān (in classical Arabic, the name of the city did not bear the definite article) by Moḥammad-Mahdi b. Moḥammad-Reżā Eṣfahāni. The earliest extant manuscript of this work is dated 1287/1870, but additions and revisions were made, apparently, until 1303/1885. It continued the tradition of adab-oriented historiography from the earlier periods in that it also presented a mix of history and geography, as indeed would have been what the king wanted.
The historical part takes up almost half of the text, highlighting two periods. In the section dealing with early history (pp. 139-69), the author tried to link his understanding of the results of modern (Western) scholarship (archeology and research on cuneiform texts) to the Persian (Šāh-nāma) tradition. After the legendary kings of Persia and Babylon, most of ancient and medieval history is given short shrift; but the author still manages to quote Māfarruḵi a couple of times and refers to Jean Chardin (q.v.) and Engelbert Kaempfer as witnesses to the prosperity of the country under the Safavids (pp. 178-79).
The second period focuses on the conquest of Persia by the Afghans and the ensuing period of upheaval, which he pursues as far as the reign of Fatḥ-ʿAli Shah Qājār (q.v.; pp. 180 ff.). In this part, he frequently refers to European writers, among whom Sir John Malcolm’s History of Persia (1829) holds a prominent place (the references to Chardin and Kaempfer are probably also taken from here). Whenever the author has to decide whether the chronicle written by Mirzā Mahdi Khan Estrābādi (certainly the Tāriḵ-e nāderi is intended) or the English work is more reliable, he opts for the latter work.
Ḥājj Mirzā Ḥasan Khan Jāberi Anṣāri (1870-1957) wrote a history of Isfahan, which is called Tāriḵ-e Eṣfahān in the latest edition. (An earlier version, shorn of the third volume, which is a collection of biographies, is known as Tāriḵ-e Eṣfahān wa-Ray wa hama-ye jahān; the first version, called Tāriḵ-e neṣf-e jahān wa hama-ye jahān, was published in lithograph edition in Isfahan in 1914.) This is also a combination of both geography and history, and it seems particularly valuable for its detailed description of the Zāyandarud river and the system through which its waters were distributed (Lambton).
In a section consisting of biographies, dates as late as 1350/1931 are given, thus reaching far into the 20th century. The author was one of the main proponents of the constitutional movement in Isfahan, and so his perspective is also partisan. He was well informed about questions of governance and administration, since he held posts in the provincial administration under Masʿud Mirzā Ẓell-al-Solṭān for long periods, so it is not surprising that his main categoried are ʿemārat (flourishing parts) and virāni/ḵarābi (ruinous state).
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/isfahan-v-local-historiography
Isfahan vii. Safavid Period
Isfahan came under Safavid rule in 1503 following Shah Esmāʿil’s defeat of Solṭān Morād, the Āq Qoyunlu (q.v.) ruler of Erāq-e ʿAjam, near Hamadān. No contemporary source describes the conquest of the city in any detail, but we do know that it was accompanied by great brutality. In retaliation for the killing of many Shiʿite inhabitants under the Āq Qoyunlu, Shah Esmāʿil caused a bloodbath among the city’s Sunnites. The Portuguese traveler, Tenreiro, visiting Isfahan in 1524, reports seeing mounds of dirt with bones sticking out that were reportedly the remains of 5,000 people killed by the Safavids (Tenreiro, pp. 20-21).
Following the conquest, Esmāʿil appointed Dormeš Khan Šāmlu governor. Mirzā Šāh-Ḥosayn, originally a builder (bannā, meʿmār) in Isfahan, at that point started his political career by serving Dormeš Khan as vizier of the dāruḡa (“mayor”; see below and CITIES ii) of the city. He was later promoted to the post of wakil (royal deputy, the highest subject of the king) of Shah Esmāʿil, and was so influential that his enemies finally assassinated him in 1523 (Rumlu, pp. 231-32). In fact, his case is not an exception. Beginning with the reign of Shah Esmāʿil, Isfahani families occupied high positions in the Safavid administration, and at least one Safavid grand vizier, Mirzā Salmān Jāberi, appointed by Moḥammad Ḵodābanda in 1578, hailed from an Isfahani family.
Isfahan continued to be a focus of Shah Esmāʿil even as he set out to conquer other parts of the Iranian plateau. Stopping at the city from time to time, he is said to have been keen to restore the city to its pre-Mongol significance and in this regard paid particular attention to the role and function of its squares. In 1509 he ordered the enlargement of the Meydān-e Naqš-e Jahān (Royal Square) to accommodate the playing of polo, qabāq-bāzi, and other games and forms of entertainment. He used the Old Meydān (Meydān-e kohna) as the place of execution of rebels. The building of Hārun-e Welāyat, the mausoleum of a saint, at the southern end of the Old Meydān, was completed by Mirzā Šāh-Ḥosayn in 1512 (Ḵᵛāndamir, IV, p. 500; Quiring-Zoche, p. 64).
Shah Ṭahmāsb (r. 1524-76), who was born in a suburb of Isfahan in 1514, added several other buildings, mostly mosques, to the city. He incorporated Isfahan into the royal domain in 1534, and the city’s status as crown land (ḵāṣṣa) remained largely unchanged until the end of the Safavid period (Röhrborn, p. 118). The only exception is the reign of Moḥammad Ḵodābanda (1577-87), who offered Isfahan as a revenue assignment (teyul) to Ḥamza Mirzā, one of his sons and his heir.
The de-facto ruler of Isfahan, however, became his plenipotentiary (ṣāḥeb-e eḵtiār), Farhād Khan (q.v.), who did much to secure the city from the Arašlu tribe, who had taken control of the environs and were moving into the city as well. Once in power, Farhād Beg built himself a fortified residence alongside the Bāḡ-e Naqš-e Jahān (Royal Garden) and designed a new garden around it, destroying the bāḡ itself and moving its trees in the process (Afuštaʾi Naṭanzi, pp. 339-40).
During the reign of Shah Ṭahmāsb, the city twice experienced wartime disorder. The first time was during the civil war between two Qezelbāš tribal leaders, Čoḡā Solṭān Takkalu and Ḥosayn Khan Šāmlu, in 937/1530. The latter attacked Čoḡā Solṭān in a suburb of Isfahan, and Čoḡā Solṭān took refuge in the royal tent located near his camp. Ḥosayn Khan managed to kill Čoḡā Solṭān but ultimately was defeated by Takkalu reinforcements. He retreated to Isfahan and then fled to Fārs. It seems that the city itself was not thrown into disarray during this conflict (Rumlu, pp. 308-10).
The revolt of Alqās Mirzā (q.v.), Ṭahmāsb’s brother, in 1548-49 represents the second period of disorder for Isfahan. After ravaging Hamadān, Ray, and Qom, Alqās Mirzā’s troops, supported by the Ottoman Sultan Solayman, came close to Isfahan. He believed that the citizens would open the city’s gate without fighting, because no substantial Safavid force was around. Instead, the people of Isfahan, led by Šāh Taqi-al-Din Moḥammad Mir-e Mirān, a community leader (naqib), and his brother Mir Ḡiāṯ-al-Din Moḥammad, shut the city gates and put up strong resistance, strengthened in their determination by the fact that the shah had sent his own harem to Isfahan (Navidi, p. 101).
Alqās, finding it difficult to subdue Isfahan, gave up on his attempt to take the city and left for Shiraz (Rumlu, p. 434). The event became certainly the turning point of Alqās Mirzā’s revolt, which ended with his arrest and confinement in Qahqaha castle the following year (Rumlu, pp. 437-38). Although Isfahan made a great contribution to Ṭahmāsb’s cause through its fierce resistance, it does not seem to have received any royal favors in return. We only know of an order by Ṭahmāsb to abolish various taxes imposed on guilds in 1563 (Honarfar, pp. 88-90). This may simply have been part of the exemption from the tax on commerce (tamḡā), which Ṭahmāsb offered throughout the kingdom in 972/1564. The measure was apparently taken after the oracle of Ṣāḥeb-al-Amir appeared in the ruler’s dream (Qāżi Aḥmad, p. 449).
After Ḥamza Mirzā’s death in 1586, Isfahan fell to his brother, Abu Ṭāleb Mirzā. Farhād Khan lost his post and was incarcerated. Ḡolām (slave) forces loyal to him revolted, however, and managed to take hold of the city fortress with their own hostages. Long negotiations with representatives of Shah Ḵodābanda, who had meanwhile arrived in Isfahan, led to the release of the hostages but not the freeing of Farhād Khan. The ḡolāms only surrendered after royalist forces threatened to bombard the citadel.
The structure was destroyed after the rebels had left it. Shortly thereafter Moḥammad Ḵodābanda died, and Isfahan opened up its gates to the forces of the new ruler, Shah ʿAbbās I, who proceeded to grant the city and its environs to his wakil, Moršedqoli Khan, as a teyul. As city mayor he appointed Yuli Beg. The latter set out to restore the Tabarak fortress but also showed signs of autonomy. The decision of Shah ʿAbbās to visit Isfahan in 1590 led to a confrontation, with Yuli Beg retreating into the fortress with his troops.
Ultimately the shah reconciled himself with Yuli Beg, although the post of senior governor (ḥākem) went to ʿAli Beg Ostājlu (Afuštaʾi Naṭanzi, pp. 33-35, 233-38; Quiring-Zoche, pp. 80-89). Shortly thereafter, in early 1590, Isfahan was made crown land again, with the post of vizier going to Mirzā Mo-ḥammad Nišāpuri (Ḵuzāni Eṣfahāni, fol. 39b).
Isfahan as the Safavid Capital
The idea of turning Isfahan into a new capital must have come to Shah ʿAbbās shortly after his accession in 1587, for the first mention of designs for the new Isfahan occurs under 998/1588 in the Afżal al-tawāriḵ (Ḵuzāni Eṣfahāni, fol. 38v). At that early date some changes were made, among them the beginnings of the ʿĀli Qāpu palace (q.v.), but an overall new design did not come to fruition, possibly because of opposition.
The choice of Isfahan as the new administrative and cultural center was based in part on the availability of water—in the form of the Zāyandarud—but was clearly politically motivated as well. The city was located deep into the interior and thus far less exposed to the Ottoman threat than Tabriz and even Qazvin had been. It was also well positioned vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf, and thus played a pivotal role in Shah ʿAbbās’s territorial and commercial designs in that direction, which he initiated shortly after Isfahan had become the new capital (Mazzaoui).
Both Eskandar Beg Torkamān and Mollā Jalāl Monajjem tell us that the royal household moved to Isfahan and that Shah ʿAbbās proclaimed the city his capital (maqarr-e dawlat) in 1006/1597-98, giving orders for the erection of “magnificent” buildings (Eskandar Beg, tr. Savory, pp. 724; Mollā Jalāl, p. 161). Most scholars in fact consider this year as the time of transfer of the Safavid capital from Qazvin to Isfahan.
Stephen Blake’s new interpretation, which attaches crucial importance to the mentioning of the older design, is convincingly refuted by Babaie (see Blake, and the review by Babaie, pp. 478-82; for the various phases of the new design, see also Haneda, 1990). It is true that, from 1590 onward, Isfahan was often called dār al-salṭana in the sources, but we have to realize that it was not the capital in the modern sense of the word. As had always been the case among rulers of nomadic background and as would be true until the 19th century in Persia, the capital really was where the ruler happened to be.
The Dutch noted how, in the later 17th century, Isfahan’s population would swell by some 60,000 whenever the shah returned to the city. Tabriz and Qazvin were still referred to as dār al-salṭana as well, after the “transfer” of the capital, and Shah ʿAbbās stayed in Isfahan less than two months a year on average throughout his reign, less than the three months he spent in Māzandarān as of 1619.
Shah Ṣafi was absent from Isfahan for a full five years between 1631 and 1636. Still, Isfahan played a central role from the inception of Safavid rule, with members of its prominent families heavily represented in key bureaucratic positions as early as Shah Esmāʿil I’s administration (Quiring-Zoche, pp. 252-52).
That the city grew in importance throughout the 1590s is suggested by the fact that Shah ʿAbbās made the trip to and from Qazvin at least eighteen times in this period and visited Isfahan every year between 1590 and 1603 (Melville, p. 200). After it became the capital, all coronation ceremonies were held in Isfahan. The city in the course of time also gained more of a central focus as later shahs lost their appetite for campaigning. Shah ʿAbbās II was the last Safavid monarch who spent considerable time on the battlefield, as well as in the royal residence in Māzandarān.
Especially the last two rulers, Solaymān and Solṭān-Ḥosayn, rarely left the confines of their palace, and Solṭān-Ḥosayn often resided at Faraḥābād, the pleasure garden built outside Isfahan (although between 1717 and 1721 the shah was absent from Isfahan, spending time in Kāšān and Qazvin and returning to the capital just a year before the fall of the capital to the Afghans; Floor, 1998, pp. 31, 36). In sum, it may be said that Isfahan gradually acquired the status of capital (Quiring-Zoche, p. 105).
Isfahan’s newly acquired status found expression in the construction of a new governmental and commercial center southwest of the existing one, in a shift in that direction that had begun under the Saljuqs (Gaube and Wirth, pp. 47, 54). A new royal square, the Meydān-e Naqš-e Jahān, measuring 524 x 158 m, formed the fulcrum of this development. The model for the meydān seems to have been the meydān of the old city, although it has been suggested that the meydān of Kermān, laid out by Ganj-ʿAli Khan in the late 16th century, served as a model as well (Galdieri, 1974, p. 385; Gaube and Wirth, p. 55).
The outline of the meydān and the adjacent Qay-ṣariya bazaar was begun in 1001—a one-year tax relief was granted for the purpose—and the Čahār Bāḡ as well as the Shaikh Loṭf-Allāh mosque were designed in 1002 (Ḵuzāni Eṣfahāni, foll. 61v, 74). In the year 1012/1603, the shops, the caravansaries, the bathhouses, and the coffeehouses around the meydān were completed (Jonā-bādi, pp. 759-60). The same year saw the first proposal to connect the waters of the Zāyandarud with those of the Kuhrang river.
This scheme came up again in 102930/161619-20 and in the 1680s, but would only be executed in the 19th century (Mollā Jalāl, p. 244; Eskandar Beg, pp. 1170-71, 1180 see i[2], above). The Masjed-e Šāh, anchoring the southern end of the square, was begun in 1020/1611. The mosque complex was virtually completed by the end of Shah ʿAbbās I’s reign, although additions and repairs continued to be made until 1078/1667 (Blake, p. 140).
Following the completion of the royal square, the Qayṣariya bazaar, with its entry gate at the north end of the square, gradually developed into a huge covered marketplace (for its development, see Gaube and Wirth, pp. 31 ff.; Blake, pp. 101 ff.). Henceforth this part of the city would be its preeminent commercial center, even if the old center continued to play an important role in social life (see x, below).
In later years more building activity took place, mostly involving palaces. A new royal palace took shape in the Naqš-e jahān garden, adjacent to the new meydān, which had been a garden retreat for Shah Esmāʿil I. The palace grew out a series of mansions, principally one owned by Farhād Khan (q.v.), but the exact stages of its construction remain unclear (Eskandar Beg, II, p. 780; tr., II, p. 977; discussion in Blake, pp. 58 ff.).
The same is true of the building of the ʿĀli Qāpu, the five-storey audience hall overlooking the meydān, which was begun under Shah ʿAbbās but not used until the reign of Shah Ṣafi (Galdi-eri, 1979). The Ṭālār-e Ṭawila, the Āyena-Ḵāna, and the Čehel Sotun (Forty columns), too, date from this period; they were all built in the period 1635-47, under the auspices and patronage of Moḥammad Sāru Taqi (Floor, 2002; Babaie, 1994, pp. 128-29; idem, 2002, pp. 23-24).
The Čehel Sotun was constructed in 1056/1646 or 1057/1647. It was rebuilt after it burned down in 1706, and the structure as it exists today dates from that time (Blake, pp. 66-69). The Pol-e Ḵᵛāju was erected under Shah ʿAbbās II as well (see x, below).
The wall that had surrounded Isfahan for centuries and that had always marked the boundary between the inner city and the suburbs continued to exist, but by the early 17th century it had lost its significance as a defense mechanism and thus was allowed to become dilapidated (Gaube and Wirth, p. 33; Haneda, 1996, pp. 370-72).
The old city anyhow was unable to accommodate ʿAbbās I’s designs for a new capital, and much of the new development took place beyond the perimeter of the wall. Southwest of the new royal palace and the area around the square, new quarters such as ʿAbbāsābād and Ḵᵛāju were developed in the western and southern suburb. Craftsmen and merchants from all over the country were urged to come to settle in Isfahan.
Most notably, the shah resettled craftsmen from newly conquered Tabriz to ʿAbbāsābād and had Armenian merchants from Julfa settle in New Julfa (Pers. Jolfā; see JULFA), which was specially built for them at the southern bank of the Zāyandarud. In the middle of these new quarters ran the long and straight avenue of Čahārbāḡ from a gate of the old city to the Hazār Jarib garden situated at the southern hill. Beautiful gardens were built at both sides of the avenue.
With its canals and their abundant water, the greenery of its parks, its wide and straight streets and its spacious layout, the urban plan of the new city suited the elite, government officials and the rich, who came to settle down there from outside of Isfahan. Thus, the character of the new city differed substantially from that of the old city, which maintained the character of a traditional Persian city with its winding streets, small houses, and little public greenery, and where most Isfahanis continued to live.
The building activities continued until nearly the end of the Safavid rule in the 18th century. Various shahs also built pleasure gardens across the Zāyandarud. Thus Shah ʿAbbās I had ʿAbbāsābād (Hazār Jarib) constructed as an extension of the Čahārbāḡ ʿAbbās II created Saʿādatābād in 1070/1659; and Shah Solṭān-Ḥosayn had Faraḥābād laid out in 1697, making further additions and embellishments in 1711 and again in the period 1714-17 (Ḵātunā-bādi, pp. 562-63; NA, VOC 1856, 15 April 1714, fol. 714; Darhuhaniyan, p. 146; VOC 1870, 9 March 1715, foll. 614-15; VOC 1870, 25 November 1714, fol. 495; VOC 1848, 13 April 1715, fol. 2280v; VOC 1897, 3 December 1716, fol. 247; Honarfar, pp. 722-25; Blake, pp. 74-81).
The Madrasa-ye Maryam Begom was built and turned into waqf (endowment) property by Maryam Begom, Shah Solṭān-Ḥosayn’s great aunt, in 1703 (Honarfar, pp. 662-67). The Madrasa-ye Čahārbāḡ, the blue, lofty dome of which can be seen from anywhere in Isfahan, was also built under the reign of Solṭān-Ḥosayn, begun in 1704-05 and finished in 1706-07 (Ḵātunābādi, p. 556; Herdeg). Isfahan and its buildings are always associated with the name of Shah ʿAbbās I. In reality, however, they are the cooperative work of many people, royal, religious, military and civil, throughout the Safavid period (see x, below).
Various Western observers claimed that 17th-century Isfahan was the largest city in all of Safavid Persia (Schillinger, p. 228). According to Jean Chardin (q.v.), Isfahan had 162 mosques, 48 madrasas, 1,802 caravansaries, 273 public baths, and 12 cemeteries within its walls (for an overview of the city’s caravansaries, see Vademecum of Caravanserais in Isfahan). The exact number of its population is not known, but clearly grew over time, especially after the city gained the status of capital.
Don Juan of Persia for the 1590s estimated 80,000 households and 360,000 inhabitants (Don Juan, p. 39). Thomas Herbert (q.v.), visiting in 1627-29, calculated 70,000 households and a total of 200,000 people (Herbert, p. 126). Adam Olearius in 1637 gives a figure of 500,000 inhabitants (Olearius, p. 553).
Chardin confirms this by suggesting that in the late 17th century the population of Isfahan was almost as numerous as that of London, then the biggest city in Europe with an estimated population of 500,000. Three-quarters of the population may have lived within the city walls, and one-quarter outside of them (Blake, p. 38). This would have made late Safavid Isfahan one of the biggest cities in the world, besides London, Istanbul, Šāhjahānābād (Delhi), Beijing, and Edo (Tokyo).
Administration
The post of ḥākem as the local governor of Isfahan goes back to the period before the Safavids. In the 16th century, the ḥākem was often an individual of high rank in the larger administration. Thus two of the ḥokkām were also preceptors of rulers, Durmiš Khan for Sām Mirzā, and Mohammad Khan for the young Moḥammad Ḵodā-banda. In the early reign of Shah ʿAbbās I, Farhād Khan served as ḥākem (Quiring-Zoche, p. 138). Another one of Isfahan’s principal administrators was the dāruḡa. In the 16th century the dāruḡa may have been appointed by the ḥākem, but later on it was the shah who appointed him, something that is reflected in the rather frequent mention of the position in the Persian chronicles.
In the European sources, the dāruḡa is often equated with the post of mayor (Chardin, X, p. 28; Fryer, III, p. 23; Kaempfer, p. 110). The jurisdiction is not always clear, but it seems that, as a rule, the dāruḡa was not in charge of fiscal matters. Initially the function may have had a military aspect, but, as it evolved in the 17th century, the dāruḡa mostly dealt with issues of law and public security (Fryer, III, p. 23; Minorsky, pp. 82, 149; Floor, 2001, p. 118). The association of the function of dāruḡa with crown domain (Floor, 2001, pp. 116-17) is not fully borne out by the evidence. Already in the 15th century we hear of a dāruḡa in Isfahan (Quiring-Zoche, pp. 130, 134).
In the Safavid period we have Mirzā Jān Beg, who was appointed dāruḡa in 1530-31, three or four years before the conversion of Isfahan to crown land (Haneda, p. 80). The appointment of Georgians to the post also goes back further than 1620, for Bižan Beg Gorji acceded to the post in 998/1590 and Kostandil (Constantine), the son of the Georgian King Alexander II, was appointed dāruḡa in 1602-03 (Ḵuzāni Eṣfahāni, foll. 40b, 148; Maeda, pp. 261-62). Still, several non-Georgians were appointed in later years, for instance, Tahtā Khan Beg and Bektāš Beg Ostājlu, and only in 1620 did the post become the prerogative of a son of the governor of Georgia, in an arrangement made by Shah ʿAbbās (Della Valle, II, p. 176; Chardin, X, p. 29; Kaempfer, pp. 110-11).
From that moment until the end of Safavid rule, the dāruḡa was always a Georgian. From the moment Isfahan turned into crown domain, a vizier was appointed as well (Quiring-Zoche, p. 145). Typically a ḡolām, this official was assigned to the divān-e ḵāṣṣa (office of the crown lands) and as such charged with the fiscal administration of the town. The vizier also had a judicial function in that, once a week, he had petitions read to him from people with grievances (Pacifique de Provins, p. 393).
However, the position was fluid. Thus in 1046/1636 the post of vizier was combined with that of the wazir-e mawqufāt (minister of property endowments) in the person of Moḥammad-ʿAli Beg Eṣfahāni, but the two were divided again two years later, when Mirzā Taqi Dawlatābādi became vizier and Mir Ṣafi-al-Din Mo-ḥammad was appointed wazir-e mawqufāt (Eskandar Beg, 1938, p. 296).
The kalāntar was another city official. He may have taken over from the raʾis in the 16th century as a representative of the local population, as part of a development whereby local notables made room for centrally appointed bureaucratic officials, who were often outsiders. He should not be confused with the Armenian kalāntar of New Jolfā. Although appointed by the shah, he was chosen in consultation with the people and served as an intermediary between them and the authorities.
One of his tasks was to defend the populace against tyranny, including the tyranny of unscrupulous vendors, examine their complaints and the grievances of merchants. He also acted as a mediator with the guilds, and appointed the heads of city wards, the kadḵodās. Collecting rent and taxes appears to have been among his responsibilities as well (Minorsky, p. 82; Rafiʿā, p. 73; Thevenot, p. 103; Fryer, III, p. 24; Sanson, p. 29; Quiring-Zoche, pp. 162-67; Aubin, p. 37; Floor, 2000, p. 46).
A Multi-lingual, Multi-ethnic City
In the course of Shah ʿAbbās I’s reign Isfahan developed into a lively, cosmopolitan city, home to Muslims, Armenians, Georgians, and Jews, Indians, as well as representatives of European religious orders and agents of trading companies. The center of town, the Meydān-e Naqš-e Jahān, was frequently the scene of popular games such as polo and qabāq-andāzi, an archery game; and there ram fighting, bull fighting, wolf baiting, and other forms of entertainment were performed (examples in Della Valle, I, pp. 709-10, 713-14; Chick, p. 184; Fi-gueroa, II, pp. 58 f.; Gaudereau, pp. 71-72).
Following a military victory, on holidays, and on the occasion of visits by important foreign envoys, the Meydān and the bazaar were illuminated and performances of jugglers and rope dancers staged (Jonābādi, pp. 805, 829-31; Della Valle, I, pp. 821, 829; II, pp. 7-8, 36; Chardin, IX, pp. 329-30). People mingled in the coffeehouses that flanked the square, lined the Čahār-bāḡ, and were also spread around various other neighborhoods, or sought oblivion in the many establishments concentrated around the Old Meydān that served an opium drink called kuknār (Matthee, 2005, p. 108). Seventeenth-century Isfahan was also home to reportedly 12,000 prostitutes, who occupied the porticos around the Meydān-e Naqš-e Jahān and also served their clientele in an area between the Madrasa-ye Ṣafaviya and the Fatḥ-Allāh mosque (Matthee, 2000).
By the middle of the 17th century, most people in Isfahan had become Shiʿite Muslim as a result of Safavid Shiʿite propaganda policy. They occupied without doubt the most important part of the urban society. There were two kinds of Shiʿite Muslims: Persian speakers and Turkic speakers.
People living in the old city of Isfahan were mostly Persian-speaking. Government officials and their servants, merchants, artisans and their apprentices, professors and students, all spoke Persian. Business and preaching were usually done in Persian. Persian was without doubt the most popular language in the city.
Turkic-speaking people were mainly found at the royal court. Even in the 17th century, when the influence of the turcophone Qezelbāš had diminished considerably, people at the court continued to speak in Turkic. In the 16th century, the wives and mothers of the king had usually been of Turkish origin. Therefore it is not surprising that people spoke Turkic there in and around the royal palace. However, in the 17th century, as most women in the harem were of Georgian origin, they still retained the habit of speaking in Turkic.
In the city itself, the use of Turkic must have been very limited. However, in caravansaries visited by people from Azerbaijan, for example, the common language was Turkic. Members of Turkish tribes coming to the city for commerce would have spoken Turkic as well. Thus, Turkic would have been the second popular language. It was, however, only a colloquial language and never was used as a literary language.
Isfahan was home to many Armenians as well. The city’s Armenians became concentrated in Jolfā as part of a resettlement under Shah ʿAbbās II. Jolfā had an estimated 20,000 inhabitants in the mid-17th century, a number that may have gone up to 30,000 by the end of the century (Herzig, p. 81). These spoke Armenian and for the most part belonged to the Armenian Orthodox church. Most of them were merchants engaged in the trade of Persian silk and precious metals. They had their own networks with compatriots in Europe and India. In their dealings with other merchants in Isfahan they must have spoken Persian.
Further, many of the city’s inhabitants were of Georgian, Circassian, and Daghistani descent. Engelbert Kaempfer, who was in Persia in 1684-85, estimated their number at 20,000 (Kaempfer, p. 204). Following an agreement between Shah ʿAbbās I and Taimuraz Khan, Georgia’s last independent ruler, whereby the latter submitted to Safavid rule in exchange for being allowed to rule as the region’s wāli and for having his son serve as dāruḡa of Isfahan in perpetuity, a Georgian prince converted to Islam served as governor (Chardin, X, p. 29; Kaempfer, pp. 110-11).
He was accompanied by a certain number of soldiers, and they spoke in Georgian among themselves. There must also have been some Georgian Orthodox Christians. The royal court had a great number of Georgian ḡolāms as well as Georgian women. Although they spoke Persian or Turkic, their mother tongue was Georgian.
Isfahan was home to a large Indian community as well. Their presence was particularly important from the commercial point of view. There were two kinds of Indians, Muslim and Hindu. Indians formed a large ethnic community in Isfahan, and their numbers is given as between ten and fifteen thousand (Tavernier, I, pp. 421-22; Thevenot, p. 217). Merchants were engaged in the trade of various Indian goods, such as textiles, indigo (a dyestuff, q.v.), sugar, and tobacco.
Hindu moneylenders had a good business, because Islamic law prohibits Muslims from lending money for interest. The moneylending business was almost an Indian monopoly. They spoke various languages, including Urdu (q.v. at iranica.com), Hindi, and Gujarati (q.v.). Insofar as commerce in Isfahan was concerned though, they certainly spoke in Persian. Hindus often served European companies as interpreters and as brokers (Dale, pp. 70 ff.).
Besides these large groups, there were small communities of Persian-speaking Zoroastrians and Jews. Catholics and Protestants, monks, merchants, and court artisans, were present in small numbers, too. Most of them came from Europe and returned there after several years. There were, however, several monks like Raphael du Mans of the Capuchin order, who lived in Isfahan almost fifty years and died there.
Social divisions were expressed in the distinction between the elite and the common people, but also found expression in traditional rivalries in the old city, where two groups, the Ḥaydari and Neʿmati (q.v.), representing the two quarters of the old city, Dardašt and Jubāra, periodically engaged in communal fighting (Chardin, VII, pp. 289-93; Perry, pp. 107-18).
Isfahan in Crisis
Isfahan’s population is said to have grown by one-fifth or even one-fourth between 1645 and 1665 (Richard, ed., II, p. 262). But thereafter, conditions grew worse for the city as part of an overall deterioration in political management and economic wellbeing in Safavid territory in the second half of the 17th century. In 1662, the city was struck by famine, causing people to assemble in front of the dawlat-ḵāna demanding measures against hoarding (Waḥid Qazvini, p. 307). In 1668-69, famine struck again.
Its main cause was a drought, but hoarding by bakers and grain merchants exacerbated the misery of Isfahan’s residents, and the situation got even worse when, following Shah Solaymān’s coronation, the court and its huge entourage returned to the city before adequate provisioning measures were taken (Chardin, IX, p. 571; X, pp. 2-4; NA, VOC 1266, 8 November 1668, foll. 155, 923v, 941; IOR, G/36/105, 14 August 1668, fol. 36). In the latter part of the 1670s the high cost of living and growing deprivation caused a bread riot in the city, with people pelting political officials with rocks. From early 1678 until mid-1679 in Isfahan alone, more than 70,000 people are said to have died from a terrible famine. In 1678 the common people of the city rose in revolt against inflation and famine (Matthee, 1999, p. 177).
In the second half of the 17th century, the position of religious minorities in the city also worsened. Clerically inspired campaigns put pressure on Jews to convert to Islam; the authorities took various measures to curb wine-drinking and vices associated with coffeehouses, and several decrees were issued restricting the activities of Armenian merchants and Catholic missionaries (Moreen; Matthee, 2006a, pp. 84-94; idem, 2006b). The local Armenian population was made more vulnerable to political and religious pressure by internal splits in the community between Catholics and Schismatics (Ghougassian, passim; Baghdiantz-McCabe, passim).
A new crisis hit Isfahan at the beginning of the 18th century as part of a deepening malaise that affected all of Persia. In 1713 the Isfahan region was made unsafe by Baḵtiāri and Lor brigands, so that no caravans could leave or enter the city unless accompanied by large contingent of soldiers (NA, VOC 1856, 9 October 1713, foll. 494-95). Too years later, famine struck again. Exacerbated by a grain monopoly by harem eunuchs and high-ranking clerics, this crisis pushed bread prices in the city so high that it caused people to riot on 20 February 1715. Cursing the shah and his ministers, the rioters threw rocks at the ʿĀli Qāpu and damaged the gate of the royal kitchen. They also assailed the residence of chief cleric Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer Majlesi.
The shah (Solṭān-Ḥosayn) thereupon dismissed the current city dāruḡa, Qurčišāh Beg, who combined his function with that of supervisor of the city’s victuals (moḥtaseb), and appointed Emāmqoli Khan Zangana, the amirāḵor-bāši and a son of grand vizier Šāhqoli Khan, in his stead. The monarch also had officials dispatched to the residence of Mir Moḥammad-Bāqer to order him to offer a large volume of grain on the royal square. This did not quell the unrest, however.
On 16 June 1715 the people forced the shah, who intended to leave Isfahan, to stay in the city, and the next day they crowded together in front of the royal palace and threatened to plunder and set fire to it (Floor, pp. 26-27; Matthee, 2004, pp. 187-88). From that moment until the fall of the city to the Afghans, the post of moḥtaseb was rotated with increasing speed, but to little avail. Food prices remained sky-high, and the misery in the city continued, with theft, burglaries, and murder becoming common (NA, VOC 1897, 14 November 1716, fol. 237; ibid., 3 December 1716, fol. 268). Beggars were said to be ubiquitous in the city and poverty had reached such levels that the poor would quickly strip the flesh of any dead camel, mule, or horse left out on the street (Worm, p. 293).
The Afghans arrived in Golnābād on 8 March 1722 and defeated the Persian army, which, at about 40,000 men and an additional 30,000 infantry troops, was at least twice as large as that of the Afghans. The Georgian contingent, the only one to fight, was decimated. Losing some 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers on the battlefield, the remainder of the Safavid army sought refuge in the city (Lockhart, pp. 130-43; Floor, 1998, p. 87).
Maḥmud Ḡilzāi with his Afghan tribal forces then moved to Faraḥābād, which he took without meeting any resistance. He next seized Julfa, where the inhabitants welcomed him with food and wine and accepted him as their new ruler. After a few days of panic in which the Afghans could have taken Isfahan proper, the inhabitants quickly reinforced the defenses, and a long siege ensued. The city soon ran out of food, and, especially toward the end of the summer, the misery grew to the point at which people first took to eating tree bark, leaves, and dried excrement and eventually resorted to cannibalism.
After a six-month siege, the city fell to Maḥmud on 23 October 1722 (IOR, G/29/15, 20 October 1722, fol. 80; 30 November 1722, fol. 83; diary of the siege in Floor, 1998, pp. 83-176). Isfahan suffered greatly during the assault and the ensuing occupation. It lost a large part of its population, many of its buildings lay in ruins, and its economy was destroyed. The city survived but its revival would take until the 19th century, and it never regained its former importance.
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/isfahan-vii-safavid-period
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Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/ss-250750290
https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/esfahan.docx
https://vk.com/doc429864789_622448190
https://www.docdroid.net/EP63uxd/ispakhan-i-autokratoriki-proteuoysa-ton-safevidwn-docx
Αφρο-Ευρασιατική Γεωπολιτική, οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού, το Ινδο-Ειρηνικό Σύμπλεγμα, η Διάλυση της Δύσης και το Τέλος της Ψευτο-Ιστορίας του ‘Ελληνο-Ρωμαϊκού Πολιτισμού’
Afro-Eurasiatic Geopolitics, the New Silk Roads, the Indo-Pacific Region, the Collapse of the West, and the End of the Fake History of ‘Greco-Roman Civilization’
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 30 Αυγούστου 2019.
Στο κείμενό του αυτό, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης παρουσιάζει ορισμένα από τα δεδομένα τα οποία παρουσίασα σε μια ομιλία μου στο Πεκίνο τον Ιανουάριο του 2019. Κατά την ομιλία μου περιέγραψα τρόπους αντι-αποικιοκρατικής συνεργασίας των εθνών της Αφρο-Ευρασίας και του Ινδο-Ειρηνικού Συμπλέγματος πάνω στην κοινή τους πολιτισμική κληρονομιά και πολιτιστική παράδοση. Αυτές βρίσκονται στους αντίποδες εκείνων των αποικιοκρατικών χωρών (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, Ολλανδία, ΗΠΑ, Αυστραλία) και αντιστρατεύονται τα ρατσιστικά δόγματα και τις ιστορικές διαστρεβλώσεις που οι εν λόγω χώρες χρησιμοποιούν ως εργαλεία διαφθοράς και εξάρτησης. Επίσης, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης προσθέτει πολλά ενδιαφέροντα στοιχεία για το Eastern Economic Forum 2019, το οποίο είναι ένα εξαιρετικό βήμα ανταλλαγής γνωμών, αναλύσεων και προοπτικών ανάμεσα σε αρχηγούς κρατών, στελέχη κυβερνήσεων, επιχειρηματίες, στρατιωτικούς, βουλευτές, ακαδημαϊκούς και δημοσιογράφους από τις χώρες της Ασίας και του Ινδο-Ειρηνικού συμπλέγματος.
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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/αφρο-ευρασιατική-γεωπολιτική-οι-νέοι/ ===================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Τίποτα δεν υπογραμμίζει καλύτερα την αποδυνάμωση και αποσύνθεση του δυτικού κόσμου καλύτερα από την οικτρή εικόνα της τελευταίας συνάντησης των αρχηγών κρατών μελών της οργάνωσης G-7 στο Μπιαρίτς της Γαλλίας. Το 45ο G7 summit αναφέρθηκε στο ενδεχόμενο επιστροφής της Ρωσσίας στην οργάνωση και συνεπώς μετατροπής της και πάλι σε G -8, αλλά την καλύτερη απάντηση σ’ αυτή την ιδέα έδωσε το ρωσσικό think tank Valdai Club που πρόσκειται στον Ρώσσο πρόεδρο.
Σημειώνοντας ότι το G-7 δεν έχει πλέον την σημασία που είχε προ 20 ετών, το εν λόγω ίδρυμα σε σχετική δημοσίευσή του (δείτε παρακάτω) αναρωτήθηκε τι έχει πλέον σημασία, το G-7 ή το G-20!
Λεπτομέρειες υπάρχουν πολλές (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/45th_G7_summit), αλλά η πραγματικότητα φαίνεται σε λίγους μόνον αριθμούς:
Οι χώρες του G-7 (ΗΠΑ, Ιαπωνία, Γερμανία, Αγγλία, Γαλλία, Ιταλία και Καναδάς) με 766 εκ. πληθυσμό διαθέτουν μαζί το 30.1% του παγκοσμίου ΑΕΠ (σε αντιστοιχία αγοραστικής δύναμης / purchasing power parity).
Αλλά οι πέντε χώρες των BRICS (Κίνα, Ινδία, Ρωσσία, Βραζιλία, Νοτιοαφρικανική Ένωση) με 3165 εκ. εκπροσωπούν το 32.7% του παγκοσμίου ΑΕΠ, όντας έτσι πιο σημαντικές από το G-7, το οποίο είναι πολιτικά διαιρεμένο και οικονομικά κλυδωνιζόμενο.
Από την άλλη πλευρά, οι υπόλοιπες 7 χώρες του G-20 (το οποίο αποτελείται από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και 19 χώρες, οι οποίες απαρτίζονται από τους BRICS, το G-7 και άλλες 7 χώρες), ήτοι Ινδονησία, Μεξικό, Τουρκία, Νότια Κορέα, Αργεντινή, Σαουδική Αραβία, και Αυστραλία, με 633 εκ. πληθυσμό έχουν το 10.8% του παγκοσμίου ΑΕΠ.
Με άλλα λόγια το G- 20 εκπροσωπεί το 75% της παγκόσμιας οικονομίας, μη αφήνοντας εκτός καμμιά παγκοσμίως σημαντική χώρα.
Αλλά το πολύ εντυπωσιακό δεδομένο (συγκριτικά με τον κόσμο προ 20 ή 30 ετών) είναι ότι μαζί οι Ινδονησία, Μεξικό, Τουρκία, Νότια Κορέα, Αργεντινή, Σαουδική Αραβία, και Αυστραλία διαθέτουν ήδη περισσότερο από το 1/3 του ΑΕΠ των χωρών μελών του G-7. Αυτό από μόνο του δείχνει πόση ισχύς έχει χαθεί από τις παλιές μεγάλες οικονομίες της Δυτικής Ευρώπης, Βόρειας Αμερικής, και Ιαπωνίας (που κάποτε απεκαλούντο ‘ο πρώτος κόσμος’). Για το G- 20 θα βρείτε λεπτομέρειες εδώ:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G20
Αν στα παραπάνω συνυπολογιστούν η δυναμική της οικονομίας των εκτός του G-7 χωρών, το δημογραφικό πρόβλημα (το οποίο είτε είναι πολύ σοβαρό είτε προξενεί πολιτικές αναταραχές στην αντιμετώπισή του) και ο εκπαιδευτικός – επιστημονικός – μορφωτικός παράγοντας, τότε συμπεραίνουμε ότι η καταβαράθρωση της Δύσης θα είναι γρήγορη και απόλυτη. Αυτή η διάλυση θα είναι μάλιστα γενική και όχι μόνον οικονομική-πολιτική. Μαζί με την Δύση, θα βουλιάξει όλο το ιδεολόγημα που προέκυψε από την Αναγεννησιακή Ευρώπη και έφθασε στις μέρες μας.
Άλλωστε, η Γερμανία είναι η Γερμανία του αφηγήματος του ‘ελληνορωμαϊκού ή ιουδαιοχριστιανικού πολιτισμού’, όσο παραμένει πληθυσμιακά όπως την ξέρουμε μέχρι σήμερα. Το ίδιο κι η Γαλλία, η Ιταλία ή η Αγγλία. Αλλά μια Γερμανία κατακλυσμένη από Τούρκους, Ιρανούς, Αφγανούς, Τουρκμένους κι Ιρακινούς αναγκαστικά χρειάζεται άλλο αφήγημα – κάτι που να την φέρνει κοντά στον Ταμερλάνο, στην Χρυσή Ορδή και στον Χουλάγκου Χαν.
Όλα αυτά φαίνονται ήδη πολύ καθαρά από τους κινητήριους μοχλούς σκέψης, τις γενικώτερες θεωρήσεις της Παγκόσμιας Ιστορίας, τις μεγάλες αναζητήσεις, και τις βασικές κατευθυντήριες γραμμές των κυριωτέρων σχεδίων που υλοποιούν οι εκτός του G-7 μεγάλες δυνάμεις. Η ανάδειξη της Κίνας σε πρώτη υπερδύναμη βγάζει αυτόματα τον Περικλή, τον Θουκυδίδη και τον Ιούλιο Καίσαρα από το επίκεντρο της Ιστορίας και εκεί τοποθετεί τον Κινέζο αυτοκράτορα Σουζόν (Suzong), ο οποίος έγραψε στον χαλίφη της Βαγδάτης ζητώντας του βοήθεια και στρατό για να καταστείλει την επανάσταση Αν Λουσάν ή τον ιδρυτή της δυναστείας Μιν αυτοκράτορα Χουνβού (Hongwu), ο οποίος το 1368 έγραψε ένα ποίημα 100 λέξεων για να εξυμνήσει τον Μωάμεθ Προφήτη του Ισλάμ.
Δεν είναι θέμα καν επιλογής ανάμεσα σε μια αλήθεια κι ένα ψέμμα. Είναι κάτι πολύ πιο μακριά από αυτό. Είναι θέμα ότι ‘αυτό’ ήταν η δική ‘σου’ αλήθεια και ‘εκείνο’ ήταν η δική ‘του’ αλήθεια, και τελικά αποδεικνύεται ότι η δική ‘σου’ αλήθεια (ακόμη κι αν είναι αληθινή) δεν είναι η πιο σημαντική, ή η πιο καθοριστική.
Πάρτε για παράδειγμα την βασική γεωπολιτική της Κίνας! Η Ευρώπη, ιδωμένη από το Πεκίνο, γίνεται νοητή ως μία χερσόνησος της Ασίας, δηλαδή κάτι σαν μια άλλη Ινδία, ενώ η Ασία κι η Αφρική νοούνται ως μία ενότητα γης της οποίας τα πολλά τμήματα είναι αλληλεξαρτώμενα, αλληλοσυνδεόμενα και αλληλοσυνεργαζόμενα, καθώς αποτελούν μια ενότητα. Και ακριβώς αυτή την θεώρηση αλλά και μέθοδο έρευνας κι ερμηνείας της Ιστορίας υλοποιεί το μεγαλόπνοο σχέδιο της Κίνας που εν συντομία αποκαλείται Νέος Δρόμος του Μεταξιού {Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ή One Belt One Road (OBOR); Один пояс и один путь; 一带一路}. Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative
https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/一带一路
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Один_пояс_и_один_путь
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Belt,_One_Road
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRACECA
Η ιστορική επιστροφή στους – κατά ξηράν, έρημον και θάλασσαν – Δρόμους του Μεταξιού ντε φάκτο συνενώνει την αφρο-ευρασιατική γήινη έκταση, σβύννοντας ψεύτικες κι αναθεωρητικές γραμμές που είχαν επιβάλει οι διάφοροι αποικιοκράτες και οριενταλιστές. Ψευτο-γεωπολιτικές παρουσιάσεις που χωρίζουν την Αφρο-Ευρασία πετιούνται εκ των πραγμάτων στα σκουπίδια ως ιστορικά ανυπόστατες και ως οικονομικά – πολιτικά άχρηστες και βλαβερές. Η Ενδιάμεση Περιοχή του Δημήτρη Κιτσίκη δεν υπάρχει: ήταν μια στρεβλή κι άχρηστη επινόησή του.
Το ίδιο έχει να κάνει και με το ρατσιστικό αφήγημα των αποικιοκρατών του 18ου και του 19ου αιώνα. Άγγλοι και Γάλλοι αποικιοκράτες, ακριβώς για να επιβάλλουν την αποικιοκρατία τους, επιχείρησαν να αναθεωρήσουν την Ιστορία και να αρνηθούν το τι μέχρι τότε είχε συμβεί.
Η αναθεώρηση της Ιστορίας που οι Αγγλογάλλοι ελληνιστές, λατινιστές κι οριενταλιστές επέβαλαν είχε να κάνει με
α. μια παρά φύσιν και ψεύτικη διαίρεση του κόσμου σε Ανατολή και Δύση,
β. μια ανιστόρητη κι αυθαίρετη ταύτιση της Δύσης με πολιτισμό και πρόοδο και της Ανατολής με βαρβαρότητα κι ‘απολυταρχία’ (λες κι η ‘απολυταρχία’ είναι κάτι το οπωσδήποτε κακό!),
γ. μια παρανοϊκή κι εξωπραγματική αναγωγή του λεγόμενου ‘ελληνορωμαϊκού πολιτισμού’ σε επίκεντρο της Παγκόσμιας Ιστορίας, κάτι που αντιστρατευόταν τις ίδιες τις ιστορικές πηγές, και
δ. μια ολότελα αφελή ταύτιση των νεώτερων Ευρωπαίων με τους αρχαίους Ρωμαίους, Έλληνες και ακόμη τους Μυκηναίους και τους Μινωΐτες της 2ης προχριστιανικής χιλιετίας σε μια οικτρά ρατσιστική απόπειρα να παρουσιασθεί το παρελθόν των Ευρωπαίων αποικιοκρατών ως ‘ανώτερο’ και ‘αρχαιότερο’ εκείνου των εθνών των αγγλικών και γαλλικών αποικιών.
Όλα αυτά τα ψευδή, αυθαίρετα κι ανιστόρητα ‘αξιώματα’ επιβλήθηκαν με τυραννικές μεθόδους στην Ασία, την Αφρική κι ακόμη την Ευρώπη, αλλά εις μάτην.
Με την αναφορά στην αλήθεια των Ιστορικών Δρόμων του Μεταξιού, η Ιστορία επιστρέφει, οι αναθεωρητικές και ρατσιστικές απόψεις των νεώτερων Ευρωπαίων για ‘ελληνορωμαϊκό’ ή ‘ιουδαιοχριστιανικό’ πολιτισμό σβύννονται, και η ισότιμη συμμετοχή όλων των εθνών στο μελλοντικό γίγνεσθαι στηρίζεται στην πραγματική Ιστορία, την έρευνά της, την εκμάθησή της, την διάδοσή της, χωρίς τους εθνοκεντρικούς και ιδεολογικούς, παραποιητικούς φακούς.
Ποια ήταν λοιπόν η Ιστορική Αλήθεια των Δρόμων του Μεταξιού που επιστρέφει για να γίνει κτήμα όλων όσων θα συμμετέχουν στην εξέλιξη της Ανθρωπότητας;
Ένα πλήθος εθνών συμμετείχαν στις εμπορικές, μορφωτικές, θρησκευτικές και γενικώτερα πολιτισμικές ανταλλαγές μεταξύ Ρώμης, Συρίας Αλεξάνδρειας, Ανατολικής Αφρικής, Ινδίας, Ινδοκίνας-Ινδονησίας, Μεσοποταμίας, Ιράν, Κεντρικής Ασίας, Σιβηρίας και Κίνας.
Έλληνες, Ρωμαίοι και γενικώτερα οι ευρωπαϊκοί λαοί επηρεάστηκαν κατακλυσμικά από ανατολικές λατρείες, μυστικισμούς, θρησκείες, θεουργίες, τέχνες, τρόπους ζωής και πολιτισμούς, και μάλιστα είχαν συνείδηση αυτού του συμβάντος.
Η αυτοκρατορική Ρώμη ήταν μια ασιατική πρωτεύουσα, ένα αντίγραφο της Περσέπολης, της Βαβυλώνας, ή ακόμη της Νινευή. Κάθε αρχαιοελληνική ‘επίδραση’ στην Ρώμη είχε πλέον ολότελα σβυσθεί.
Αν και μεγάλο κράτος, η Ρώμη πολύ περισσότερο επηρεάστηκε παρά επηρέασε άλλα έθνη πάνω στους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού, των Μπαχαρικών και των Αρωμάτων (Λιβανωτών). Έθνη που έπαιξαν καθοριστικό ρόλο στην ανάπτυξη αυτού του ιστορικού φαινομένου ήταν οι Ιρανοί, οι Αραμαίοι, οι Τουρανοί, οι Σογδιανοί, κι οι Υεμενίτες.
Οι Έλληνες αποδέχθηκαν τον Μιθραϊσμό, τις Ισιακές Λατρείες, Μυστήρια και Θεολογία, τον Μανιχεϊσμό, την Χριστιανωσύνη, και άλλα ανατολικά θρησκευτικά συστήματα.
Κανένας Αιγύπτιος, Βαβυλώνιος, Αραμαίος, Ιρανός ή Τουρανός δεν ενδιαφέρθηκε να μεταφράσει τα έπη του Ομήρου ή τους πλατωνικούς διαλόγους στα προχριστιανικά χρόνια.
Και κανένας Αιγύπτιος Βαβυλώνιος, Αραμαίος, Ιρανός ή Τουρανός δεν ελάτρευσε τον Ποσειδώνα ή την Αθηνά.
Αλλά η αποικιοκρατική και ρατσιστική, ευρωπαϊκή ακαδημαϊκή τάξη του 19ου και του 20ου αιώνα, αντί να αποκαλέσει την περίοδο από τον Αλέξανδρο έως τον Οκταβιανό ‘ανατολιστικά χρόνια’ (επειδή τότε σημειώθηκαν ανατολικές επιδράσεις πάνω σε Έλληνες, Ρωμαίους κι άλλους Ευρωπαίους), την ονόμασε ‘ελληνιστικά χρόνια’ (επειδή ορισμένοι ασιατικοί λαοί, όπως οι Φρύγες, οι Λυδοί, οι Κάρες, οι Λύκιοι κι οι Καππαδόκες εξελληνίστηκαν γλωσσικά).
Οι Ευρωπαίοι αποικιοκράτες έβλεπαν εαυτούς στην Ασία ως συνεχιστές εκείνων από τους Έλληνες στρατιώτες του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου που έμειναν σε διάφορα σημεία της Ασίας, ανήγειραν πόλεις, διατήρησαν την τέχνη τους.
Αλλά αυτό ήταν μια αυθαίρετη ασυναρτησία που δεν δημιουργεί Ιστορία.
Αντίθετα από την ρατσιστική, εθνοκεντρική διαστροφή της Ιστορίας που ήταν το επακόλουθο του αποικιοκρατικού αφηγήματος, η νέα αφρο-ευρασιατική γεωπολιτική πραγματικότητα και οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού δεν αφήνουν κανένα περιθώριο – ειμή μόνον τον εξευτελισμό – σε όσους επιμένουν να μιλάνε εθνοκεντρικά και να βλέπουν μια ‘ιστορική ανωτερότητα’ για τους προγόνους τους.
Όσοι άθλιοι κι αμόρφωτοι στην Ελλάδα μιλάνε υποτιμητικά για Μογγόλους μόνο γελοιοποιούν την Ελλάδα και δείχνουν ότι η χώρα είναι ένα άχρηστο σκουπίδι μιας περασμένης εποχής.
Άλλωστε οι πρόγονοι αυτών των σημερινών αμορρφώτων Ελλήνων πήγαιναν πριν από 600 χρόνια στην Κεντρική Ασία για να σπουδάσουν σε αστεροσκοπεία με Μογγόλους καθηγητές.
Όταν υλοποιείται ένα τόσο σημαντικό, κοσμοϊστορικό σχέδιο, όπως οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού, ισχυρές χώρες προσπαθούν να βρουν καλύτερους τρόπους να ενταχθούν σ’ αυτό και προς τούτο η ιστορία κι η γεωγραφία μελετούνται υπό διαφορετικά πρίσματα, αναπτύσσονται νέες συνθέσεις, και επινοούνται συμπληρωματικές ερμηνείες και προσεγγίσεις.
Το Ινδο-Ειρηνικό Σύμπλεγμα είναι μια καθαρά ινδική θέση που επινοήθηκε για να ενισχύσει την θέση της Ινδίας μέσα στους Νέους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού.
Ιστορικά στηρίζεται στους τεκμηριωμένους θαλάσσιους εμπορικούς δρόμους, οι οποίοι κυρίως χρησίμευαν για την μετακίνηση μπαχαρικών, λιβανωτών και άλλων προϊόντων και είχαν φέρει κοντά την Ανατολική Αφρική, την Ινδία, την Ινδοκίνα και την Ινδονησία.
Στα σύγχρονα πλαίσια, μια τέτοια προσέγγιση συμφέρει την Ινδία, επειδή το Δελχί, βάζοντας έτσι στο αφρο-ευρασιατικό παιχνίδι σημαντικές οικονομίες όπως η Ινδονησία κι η Αυστραλία αλλά κι η Ανατολική Αφρική, λειτουργεί εξισορροπητικά απέναντι στην εμφανή κυριαρχία της Κίνας στο καθαρά ηπειρωτικό ευρασιατικό επίπεδο.
Αυτό είναι μια πολύ γνωστή τακτική στις διεθνείς σχέσεις: διευρύνεις το πεδίο ανταγωνισμού, όταν σε πιο ‘στενά’ όρια γίνεσαι ουραγός. Αλλά δείχνει ότι η Ινδία καταλαβαίνει ότι οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού είναι μονόδρομος των παγκοσμίων εξελίξεων. Και όπως είναι εύκολο να καταλάβει ο οποιοσδήποτε, είτε μουσουλμάνοι είτε ινδουϊστές, οι Ινδοί περιμένουν ανυπόμονα την ημέρα που οι παλιές αποικιοκρατικές δυνάμεις Γαλλία κι Αγγλία θα έχουν απομείνει με τόση ισχύ διεθνώς όση και η Σρι Λάνκα ή η Μαλαισία.
Αντίθετα, το σύνολο του αμόρφωτου, άρρωστου και ουσιαστικά σάπιου ελληνικού πολιτικού, πανεπιστημιακού και δημοσιογραφικού κατεστημένου εξακολουθεί να νομίζει ότι η Ελλάδα μπορεί να επιβιώσει μέσα στον σημερινό κόσμο είτε με προσήλωση στις παλιές συμμαχίες (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, ΕΕ, ΗΠΑ, ΝΑΤΟ), είτε με ελπίδες στηριγμένες στην ξεκάρφωτη, έωλη κι ανυπόστατη συμμαχία με το Ισραήλ και την Αίγυπτο.
Η αλήθεια είναι ότι η Ιστορία θα κτυπήσει τραγικά το νεώτερο αναθεωρητικό ψευτοκράτος Ελλάδα, όταν οι δημιουργοί του (Γαλλία, Αγγλία) παύσουν να υφίστανται.
Τόσο θα καταλάβουν όλοι οι Ρωμιοί ότι η Ελλάδα, αποσχισμένη από την Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία, στερημένη από τη ρωμέικη ορθόδοξη ταυτότητά της, κι εκμαυλισμένη λόγω εκδυτικισμού, πίστευε για δική της μια ‘ελληνοκεντρική’ ψευτοϊστορία τόσο ψεύτικη όσο και το κρατίδιο του Όθωνα.
Με τον επερχόμενο θάνατο και διάλυση των δημιουργών του ψευτοκράτους, θα σβύσουν και τα ρατσιστικά αποικιοκρατικά αφηγήματα για την τάχα σημασία του αρχαίου ελληνικού πολιτισμού, την δήθεν κοσμοϊστορική απήχησή του, και την υποτιθέμενη επίδρασή του σε άλλα έθνη.
Δηλαδή, κοντά είναι η μέρα που, αν κάποιοι κομπλεξικοί, υστερικοί και διεστραμμένοι σκατόψυχοι ισχυριστούν ότι υπήρχαν Έλληνες στην Αρχαία Κίνα, ότι η επαρχία Γιουν-νάν της Κίνας είναι ελληνική (επειδή οι Έλληνες λέγονται ‘Γιουνάν’ στα αραβικά!!!!!), κι ότι τα αγάλματα (από τερακότα) του κινεζικού στρατού στο Σιάν (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terracotta_Army) είναι φτειαγμένα από Έλληνες, θα τρώνε κι ένα σκεπάρνι στο κεφάλι για να ξεμπερδέψουμε μια και καλή από τους ψευτομασώνους της κακιάς ώρας.
Στην προώθηση κι εμπέδωση των μακρόπνοων σχεδίων της αφρο-ευρασιατικής επανασύνδεσης συμμετέχει με ιδιαίτερη έμφαση και η Ρωσσία, επειδή έχει καταλάβει ότι αυτή η εξέλιξη συμφέρει και στην Μόσχα.
Το Eastern Economic Forum-2019, το οποίο λαμβάνει χώρα σε λίγες μέρες στο Βλαδιβοστόκ, είναι μια κορυφαία εκδήλωση απ’ αυτή την άποψη.
Ως μείζον γεγονός φέρνει μαζί αρχηγούς κρατών, υπουργούς, βουλευτές, διευθυντές κρατικών οργανισμών, εκπροσώπους της ιδιωτικής πρωτοβουλίας και του επιχειρηματικού κόσμου, πανεπιστημιακούς, ειδικευμένους επιστήμονες, και δημοσιογράφους οι οποίοι εξετάζουν δυνατότητες και παρουσιάζουν προτάσεις για την υλοποίηση του φιλόδοξου προγράμματος των Νέων Δρόμων του Μεταξιού.
Είναι μια κοσμογονία που στην Ελλάδα δυστυχώς θα μείνει ολότελα άγνωστη και δεν θα καλυφθεί από τα διαπλεκόμενα ΜΜΕ και τα social media των κρετίνων αρχαιολατρών κι ελληνο-αυνανιστών.
Παράλληλα και εντός των πλαισίων της οργάνωσης του Eastern Economic Forum-2019, κορυφαία think tanks οργανώνουν ιδιαίτερα σεμινάρια και συζητήσεις που φωτίζουν όψεις της αφρο-ευρασιατικής αναγέννησης.
Στην συνέχεια θα βρείτε μια σειρά από παρουσιάσεις εκ μέρους του ρωσσικού think tank Valdai Club το οποίο συμμετέχει επίσης στο γεγονός.
Στο τέλος, σύνδεσμοι σας παραπέμπουν στο σάιτ του Eastern Economic Forum. Επίσης επισυνάπτω μια έκδοση του Valdai Club για το Μέλλον του Πολέμου (The Future of War) για να δείτε πόσο διαφορετική μορφή θα έχουν οι αυριανοί πόλεμοι: κανένας στρατός δεν θα μπορεί να τους αντιμετωπίσει και μόνον οι επί τούτω οργανωμένες ιδιωτικές στρατιωτικές εταιρείες θα είναι ικανές να τους διεξαγάγουν επιτυχώς.
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Valdai Club at the Eastern Economic Forum-2019
This year, the Valdai Club will take part in the Eastern Economic Forum for a fourth time. On September 4, at 10:00 the Club will hold a session titled “The Asian Mirror: The Pivot to the East Through the Eyes of our Asian Partners” and on the same day, at 14:30, it is due to present a book titled “Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East”.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/own/valdai-club-at-the-eastern-economic-forum-2019/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
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Valdai Club at the EEF-2019: The Asian Mirror: The Pivot to the East Through the Eyes of Our Asian Partners. Special Session
This year, the Valdai Discussion Club will take part in the Eastern Economic Forum for the fourth time. On September 4, at 10:00 the Club will hold a session titled “The Asian Mirror: The Pivot East Through the Eyes of Our Asian Partners”.
Logically and thematically, the session is a continuation of a series of events dedicated to the key focus of the Club’s work in 2019 – Russian politics in the East.
Our interest in the topic is due to the strengthening of Russia’s position in the East, the ambition of the country’s leaders to enhance the Eastern aspect of foreign policy, and the geopolitical events in the region, which have had an effect on the entire world.
The Valdai session’s main goal won’t be to discuss plans for the development of the Far East and its integration in the Asia-Pacific Region, but rather the things that have already been achieved. Russia’s turn to the East is gaining momentum.
The time has come to summarise its interim results and to hear the position of our Asian partners on how successful Russian policy has been, from their point of view.
The session will feature prominent experts and public opinion leaders from Russia and several Asian countries.
Together, they will answer: how do they regard the results of Russia’s turn to the East? What has it managed to do? What role does Asia want Russia to play?
Speakers:
To Anh Dung, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam
Fan Weiguo, Chief of Eurasian Bureau of Xinhua News Agency
Lee Jae-Young, President, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Michael Tay, Founder and Director of the Foundation for the Arts and Social Enterprise, Ambassador of Singapore to Russia (2002-2008); Founder of the Russia-Singapore Business Forum
Andrey Bystritskiy, Chairman of the Board of the Foundation for the Development and Support of the International Valdai Discussion Club
Apurva Sanghi, Lead Economist, World Bank in Russia
Moderator:
Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE
Working languages: Russian, English.
Venue: Vladivostok, Far Eastern Federal University, Building B, Conference Hall 6.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/announcements/valdai-club-at-the-eef-2019-the-asian-mirror-the-pivot-to-the-east/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
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Valdai Club at the EEF-2019: Presentation of a Book ‘Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East’
On September 4, at 14:30, in the framework of Eastern Economic Forum-2019, the Valdai Discussion Club is going to present a book titled “Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East”.
For years, the Valdai Discussion Club has been Russia’s leading analytical centre for discussing and developing the agenda for Russia’s turn to the East. Since 2013, when Russia’s leaders proclaimed that the development of the Far East is “a national task for the 21st century”, this project has become the most important engine of the country’s foreign and domestic policy.
Since 2012, the Club has published six analytic papers under the general title “Toward the Great Ocean”, which refers to the credo used by Russian pioneers from the 16th century until the early 20th century. The papers aim to both summarise the achievements and challenges of Russia’s turn to the East, and make suggestions for its development.
“Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East” is a collection of all the six analytic papers (2012–2018), as well as detailed comments by project manager Sergei Karaganov on each of its parts, as well as essays on the topic, delivered by prominent Asian scholars.
During the presentation of the book, attendees will also learn about the research work carried out by the Valdai Club and its plans for future publications.
Speakers:
Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE
Andrey Bystritskiy, Chairman of the Board of the Foundation for the Development and Support of the International Valdai Discussion Club
Sergei Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University Higher School of Economics; Honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy
Thomas Graham, Senior Director, Kissinger Associates
Moderator:
Victoria Panova, Vice-President for International Affairs, Far Eastern Federal University
Working languages: Russian, English.
Venue: Vladivostok, Far Eastern Federal University, Roscongress & Governors ’Club, Building A, Level 4.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/announcements/valdai-club-at-eef-2019-presentation-of-a-book-toward-the-great-ocean/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
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The Indo-Pacific Concept First Hand: Indian Foreign Minister Speaks at Valdai Club
On Tuesday, August 27, Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met with the Valdai Discussion Club’s experts. During the open part of the meeting, he spoke about the concept of the Indo-Pacific, as New Delhi sees it, about the key trends in modern international relations and the prospects for bilateral cooperation.
The day before, Mr. Jaishankar had arrived in Russia on his first visit as Minister of External Affairs in preparation for the Eastern Economic Forum, whose main foreign guest will be Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It is worth noting that the professional career of Subrahmanyam Jaishankar took him to Moscow almost forty years ago: for two years he worked at the Embassy of India as the third, and then the second secretary. At the beginning of the meeting at the Valdai Club, the Minister optimistically said that much has changed in the world over the years, but the Russian-Indian relations remain one of the stable factors in international life.
According to the minister, the most important trend in international relations is a movement towards multi-polarity. This is due to the weakening of US dominance, established after the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of new centres of power. “We believe that economic, political and technological power is more distributed around the world than ever before in history after 1945,” he said.
“Now there are more sources of influence in the world order, and the idea that one country can play a decisive role is out-dated.” This process is accompanied by the weakening of established rules and the growth of uncertainty. According to Mr. Jaishankar, the world goes from a system of alliances to a system of convergences, when countries join forces to solve common problems without entering into formal alliances.
As one example of such convergence, he named the concept of the Indo-Pacific region, which has become the hallmark of Indian foreign policy in recent years.
According to the minister, the connection between the regions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans have existed for centuries: five hundred years ago, India’s cultural, political and economic presence was felt in Southeast Asia and on the coast of China, and the policy of the British, who made India the centre of their colonial empire in Asia, can be described as Indo-Pacific project.
Everything changed after the Second World War, when the United States, which became the hegemon in the region, shifted its focus to the Pacific Ocean and made Northeast Asia the centre of gravity. Mr. Jaishankar believes that the concept of the Indo-Pacific region has allowed for the restoration of the artificially-broken connection between the regions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
The minister welcomed the fact, that the problems of the Indo-Pacific are beginning to be discussed more and more widely in Russia. According to him, it would be good if Russia formulates its own vision toward the Indo-Pacific region. “India is a strong power in the Indian Ocean with a serious interest in the Pacific Ocean, Russia is a strong Pacific power with an interest in the Indian Ocean,” he said.
‘How can we harmonize these interests – that’s the matter. We have such experience in the Eurasian space. It is important today to see where our interests in maritime cooperation can be translated into real interaction.”
Mr. Jaishankar emphasized that the concept of the Indo-Pacific is not directed against any countries, particularly China. According to him, the opinion that this concept is being promoted by Washington to contain Beijing’s influence is out-dated and reflects the Cold War paradigm. “India views the Indo-Pacific region in a more comprehensive manner,” he said.
Presentation of the Valdai Discussion Club’s Analytical Report “The Future of War”
On August 27, at 11.00, the Valdai Discussion Club hosted a presentation of Club’s new analytical report titled “The Future of War”.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/own/presentation-of-report-the-future-of-war/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
The Big Seven: The West Can No Longer Solve All Problems Alone
What is the “West”? Does the West still exist as such – in light of Britain’s exit from the EU and the US drift towards unilateral approaches? This question concerns many people now – mainly in Old Europe, writes Arnaud Dubien, head of the Observo Franco-Russian Analytical Centre.
Today, the G7 is going through difficult times – and even, perhaps, suffering a real existential crisis. This is due to at least two factors.
First, there is the presence in this club of an element that contrasts itself with the rest of the member countries – this, of course, is the United States. Since the US is the largest Western power, it has made the work of the organisation problematic: many experts say that on many issues it’s incorrect to think of the group as the G7, but rather “six plus one”.
Second, the weight and legitimacy of the Seven has been called into question, not only in connection with the absence or possible return of Russia to the group, but also because it is impossible to seriously discuss the fate of the world without China, India and other major world powers.
It would be more appropriate here to return to the idea of another French president – Giscard d’Estaing, who launched this project in the 1970s and saw what would become the “seven” as an informal conversation among Western democracies.
Now it better resembles something between the old “seven” and the current G20 with a joint agenda, which does not contribute to a better understanding of the group’s current tasks.
Even though, in order to avoid disagreements, the leaders of the G7 didn’t attempt to publish a joint communique, the benefits of the Biarritz summit were more than expected. Emmanuel Macron showed considerable energy and a lot of questions were brought up for discussion – these not only concerned the fate of the West, but also trade wars and Brazil’s fires.
As for Macron’s discussions about the future of the West and the role the G7, one can see here that the development of those thoughts surrounded his meeting with Vladimir Putin: the French president understands that the West can no longer solve all problems alone and that its influence is diminishing, although this does not need to be overestimated.
On the other hand, what is the “West”? Is there still the West as such – in light of Britain’s exit from the EU and the US drift towards unilateral approaches? This question is of concern to many now – mainly in Old Europe. If initially the European Union was created out of fear of the USSR, now it has to dissociate itself from the United States. If Europe, as Macron says, wants to be sovereign, it will have to assert itself and go against the ideas that have dominated for sixty years. Therefore, this process is becoming harder.
Whether negotiations with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif following his somewhat unexpected appearance at the summit have succeeded in influencing the fate of the JCPOA is not known, and one can only hope for that. However, in general, this once again shows that even within the G7, the United States has adopted an isolated stance on this issue.
Although this initiative originally belonged to Macron, it seems to have been supported by all other countries in Europe and even Japan. In other words, this is an attempt to show that Europe, at least on this issue, can assert its identity, take a unified position and force the United States to talk, and maybe even make concessions.
As for the question of Russia’s return, Moscow has little interest in re-creating the G8, because it never felt comfortable there; on the contrary, it often found itself alone against everyone else.
However, the very fact that this issue is being discussed, that new watersheds have appeared and frictions have arisen, is positive for Russia: this means that the topic is big and important for discussion in a club where Moscow does not represent itself.
This confirms Macron’s thesis that without Russia, serious global problems cannot be solved. For Moscow, at this stage, this is the most positive development.
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-west-can-no-longer-solve-all-problems/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
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G7 Summit in Biarritz: The End of Westernization
Biarritz was, if we must believe the French media, the centre of the world, on the occasion of the G7 summit this weekend (24th – 26th August). It was a summit that was dedicated, officially, to fighting inequality, but one where contentious topics were discussed: the GAFA tax, which had the unusual effect of uniting the French and the British against the Americans, the environment, the trade dispute between the United States and China, and the question of Iran, regarding which the US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA agreement has been widely criticised among European countries.
But this G7 summit, despite communications operations – like the arrival, presented as a “surprise,” by the Iranian Foreign Minister – could well turn out to be a failure. The member countries have taken action so that national policies and bilateral relations now outweigh multilateralism. In addition, it should be added that we are no longer where we found ourselves during the 1980s or 1990s. The G7, which claims to be the “club” of the richest and most powerful countries, has today been overtaken by the BRICS. In fact, it is the G20 that is increasingly emerging as the legitimate institution for dealing with the interweaving of economic, financial and strategic affairs.
The G7, official and unofficial agenda
Officially, therefore, the expected decisions concerned the reduction of inequality, an important topic in a world torn apart by inequalities. However, it is a subject on which we can expect a lot of beautiful words and very little concrete action. The issue of the environment has taken some urgency because of the devastating forest fires ravaging the Amazon.
This is obviously an important question, but also an issue where there is a lot of hypocrisy. This is because the Amazon isn’t just burning in Brazil (fires have also ravaged Bolivia, Paraguay and other countries), and also because the Amazon is not the only major forest to burn: forest fires that today rage in Africa are equally important, but no one speaks of it.
Similarly, this summer’s fires, which are certainly disastrous, are only slightly more numerous than those of 2016: 75,336 fires versus 69,310. It is true that the problem of deforestation, induced by the pressure of livestock and the cultivation of soybeans, is a major issue today in the Amazon. But it was, perhaps, an even more pressing problem twenty years ago.
Source:
https://rainforests.mongabay.com/amazon/deforestation_calculations.html#content
The issue of trade negotiations and the role of multilateralism were also discussed. The United States and other countries differ on this point in important ways. We can also note that some issues which were not explicitly on the agenda were addressed: the instrumentalisation of trade in dollars for political purposes by the United States is a major problem, as well as the growing risks of recession and global crisis.
The United States has clearly expressed dissatisfaction with multilateral negotiations. The countries of the European Union are, rightly or wrongly, more attached to it. The membership of the United States in the WTO has therefore been called into question; it is indeed a central issue. If the US government were to decide to walk out of the WTO, it would probably sound the death toll for the organisation.
The question of Iran was also raised at the summit. The European countries have denounced the US decision to walk away from the agreement with Iran on nuclear weapons and technology. They have also denounced the US sanctions policy, which is hurting the European countries much more than Iran. The arrival of the Iranian Foreign Minister testifies to Emmanuel Macron’s willingness to restart negotiations at this point.
The challenges of this summit
Emmanuel Macron, who happens to be the President of the G7 this year, was playing a high-stakes game with this meeting. A clear failure, as in 2018 in Canada, would have lastingly compromised his claims to present himself as a great negotiator. He is also aware that the influence of the G7 has greatly diminished over the last ten years. The G7 is the distant heir of the G5, which was formed to try to coordinate the monetary policies of the major Western powers following the dissolution in 1973 of the Bretton Woods agreements.
Originally, the G7 was the brainchild of French President Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981). The G7 has been tasked with coordinating currency movements as exchange rates have become flexible. Called first informally the G5, then provisionally the G6 when it was formally established in 1975, and later the G7 with Canada’s integration in 1976, its influence soon spread to other aspects of the economy, beyond mere monetary policy problems.
The G7 nations still had, at the end of the twentieth century, a dominant role in the world economy. This is no longer the case today. The process of the emergence of new economies has clearly changed the whole ball game. The expulsion of Russia from the G8 in 2014, an expulsion that is now regretted by both the Japanese and Italian leaders as well as Donald Trump, has certainly hastened its decline. Moreover, if we calculate in purchasing power parity terms, the G7’s share of global GDP is today lower than that of the BRICS, a forum which brings together five emerging market countries.
It is obvious that Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to invite other countries, such as Australia, India, South Africa and Chile, is a recognition of this state of affairs. However, it must be noted here that China and Russia were not invited, despite the major role they play. The invitations that were made were therefore intended to mask the G7’s loss of influence and prestige in comparison with the G20.
G7 or G20?
It is clear today that any closed club of rich countries no longer has any legitimacy making decisions on behalf of the emerging market countries or even just proposing them. The United States, for its part, has understood that it would like to re-invite Russia to participate in the G7, according to a statement mirroring one made by the Japanese prime minister. But it is unlikely that Russia would really be moved by such a proposal. It knows full well that the G7 is an institution that is nearing the end of its life. The G7 is thus being overtaken by the BRICS not only in terms of its percentage of world PPP-adjusted GDP, but also in terms of the proportion of investment being made worldwide.
This reflects not only the rise of investments being made in China, India and Russia, both internally and worldwide, but also the significant slowdown in investments made in the G7 countries, whether they be German or US investments. Again, it can be seen that until 2000, the G7 countries accounted for about 60% of global investment. The turning point therefore dates from the 21st century. Emerging market countries have significantly increased their share of investment. They caught up with the G7 countries in 2009, and they overtook them.
In fact, a comparison of the G20 with the G7 shows that the first group has taken precedence over the second. It is the G20 that has become the global forum that really counts. And this is true when you compare the weight of the G7 with that of the G20.
The G20 currently accounts for 73.6% of global GDP. The group is comprised of the G7 nations, the European Union, the BRICS and six other countries. It is this set of countries (along with the EU) that is most economically relevant.
What are final results of this summit?
The record that we can draw today from this summit is very mixed. Clearly, we have not gone beyond rhetoric in addressing the question of inequality or the environmental emergency. It could not have been otherwise, given the significant differences among the G7 countries.
The trade dispute between China and the United States, meanwhile, is more beautiful. On Friday, August 23rd, China re-launched the escalation of the trade war, with further tariff increases on products imported from the United States. The US administration immediately responded by increasing duties on products imported from China.
All this has been observed, by the European G7 countries, which have not reacted. Germany, in particular, fears being dragged into this trade war, as its economy is on the verge of a recession. Regarding the GAFA tax, which both the French and British governments are pushing for, an agreement could possibly be reached, but at the probable price of making a mockery of the very idea of taxing Internet giants.
With respect to the Iranian issue, it is clear that the discussions will continue. Both the United States and Iran want to find a way out of the current crisis. It is perhaps on this issue that progress is possible.
However, this summit has rammed home an important lesson. So we are witnessing the end of the Westernisation of the world, a process that took place between the late eighteenth century and the end of the twentieth century. We must make note of this. It is why Russia does not particularly want to return to the G7, even though it has been pleased to hear Donald Trump’s statements about its possible return.
The centre of gravity of the global economy is indeed no longer the Atlantic Ocean. It has moved to Asia with the rise of China, the world’s second largest economy (and even first if we calculate in Purchasing Power Parity terms) and a direct interlocutor of the United States. And this is not to mention India, which is also gaining strength and is now in 5th place, ahead of France. This is why the meeting of the G7 in Biarritz was no longer able to decide for the world, whatever the major French media and its journalists think.
The G7 countries, since the summit held in Canada in 2018, have measured what it would be like to show off their differences. At the same time, never have the latter been so important, and above all, seemed irremediable and irreconcilable. So, we cannot exclude the notion that the group is witnessing open failure. However, it is more likely that diplomats will find some beautiful hollow formulas that proclaim that the “club” still works even though it is patently acknowledged that the group is paralyzed and, above all, that it no longer has the importance it had 20 years ago.
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/g7-summit/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
Goodbye Pacific Rim, Hello Indo-Pacific?
THE EASTERN PERSPECTIVE
01.07.2019
By Anton Bespalov
In recent years, the term “Indo-Pacific” has been used more and more frequently. According to some analysts, it is replacing the well-established concept of the Asia-Pacific region, reflecting a new balance of power in Asia. Beijing is suspicious of the fact that the Indo-Pacific concept is being actively promoted by Washington, believing that its ultimate goal is to contain China.
We are investigating whether or not this is so – and whether Russia should be wary of the emergence of a new regional construct.
“Indo-Pacific” appeared for the first time as a geostrategic concept in a January 2007 article by analyst Gurprit Khurana for the magazine Strategic Analysis. The author, an Indian naval captain, postulates that for India, the safety of sea routes has become more and more important, since almost all of its foreign trade, including the import of energy resources, is by sea. Japan is in a similar situation – and therefore, in his opinion, the interests of the two countries will increasingly converge, which will lead to the creation of a special political and economic community uniting the two oceans.
The Indo-Pacific notion immediately gained recognition in India – if only because the concept of “Asia-Pacific” categorically did not suit Indians. In a publication dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the article “Safety of sea routes: prospects for Indian-Japanese cooperation,” Khurana quoted the former chief of staff of the Indian Navy, Aruna Prakash, who, speaking in 2009 at the Shangri-La Dialogue forum, said:
Every time I hear about the Asia-Pacific region, it seems to me, as an Indian, that my country is left out of the box. This region seems to include northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and ends at the Strait of Malacca. But the whole world begins west of the Strait of Malacca.
The new term appeared at an opportune time: India was becoming increasingly aware of itself as an independent actor in the global arena, which was reflected in the national consciousness. As for Japan, at the beginning of the 21st century, it was already headed for rapprochement with India. Also in 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spoke about the special role of the two countries in Asia in an address to the Indian parliament.
He called for the creation of an “arc of freedom and well-being” along the outer rim of the Eurasian continent. The Indo-Japanese partnership, according to Abe, should be built on “common values, such as freedom, democracy and respect for fundamental human rights, as well as strategic interests”.
The Japanese prime minister painted a grand picture – through their joint efforts, the two countries would create a new “open and transparent” community of freedom and democracy that will unite the entire Pacific region, including the United States and Australia, and ensure the free movement of people, goods, capital and knowledge.
“CONFLUENCE OF THE TWO SEAS” SPEECH BY H.E.MR. SHINZO ABE, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AT THE PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA
By Japan and India coming together in this way, this “broader Asia” will evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and Australia. Open and transparent, this network will allow people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely.
The word “China” was not heard in Abe’s speech even once, but both parties understood each other perfectly. The “arc of freedom” neatly bypasses the PRC, and the Asian giant remains outside the brackets of the “wide open Asia” that the Japanese prime minister spoke of.
During his second term in office, Abe perfected this concept, making Indo-Pacific a central theme of Japan’s security policy, economic aid and investment, writes Robert Manning, author of the Valdai Paper “United States Indo-Pacific Strategy: Myths and Reality.”
In a 2016 speech, Abe defined this concept, explaining that “the goal of this strategy is to turn the Indo-Pacific region into a zone free from violence and coercion, where the rule of law reigns and where the market economy rules, ensuring regional prosperity”. The three main pillars, according to Tokyo, are: values and principles – democracy, the rule of law, free markets and the improvement of physical and institutional connectedness; safety and stability; and ensuring freedom of navigation.
Another country where the new concept was adopted with enthusiasm was Australia, which is logical, given that the country is actually washed by the waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, despite being on the periphery of the newly-imagined region.
For more than a decade, the economic development of the country has relied on trade with China, and in recent years Australian policymakers have been increasingly talking about the influence of Beijing on the nation’s domestic policy. Becoming overly dependent on “undemocratic” and “unfree” China is the main nightmare of the elites of one of the most “Western” countries in the southern hemisphere..
In 2013, the country’s White Paper on Defence noted: “The continuing rise of China as a global power, the growing economic and strategic weight of East Asia, and India’s imminent transformation into a global power are all key trends affecting the development of the Indian Ocean region as being of heightened strategic importance. Taken together, these trends contribute to the formation of the Indo-Pacific region as a single strategic arc.”
As for the United States, the first mention of the Indo-Pacific by their officials was in 2010. “We understand how important the Indo-Pacific basin is for global trade,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, emphasising the importance of the interaction between the US Navy and India in the Pacific. At long last, “Indo-Pacific” entered the American foreign policy lexicon with Donald Trump.
It was during his presidency that the format of the quadrilateral security dialogue (QUAD), proposed by Shinzo Abe back in 2007, was revived. In November 2017, Trump took part in two important East Asian forums over the course of several days: the APEC summit in Da Nang, Vietnam and the ASEAN summit in Manila, Philippines.
As Valdai Club expert Viktor Sumsky wrote, in public statements, Trump made no mention of the Pacific Rim, a key feature of APEC rhetoric, speaking instead about the Indo-Pacific region. A working meeting among the diplomats of four countries on the sidelines of the East Asian Summit caused a wave of publications about the formation of a new security configuration in the region – directed against China.
It must be said that Beijing perceived the very first consultations in the quadrilateral format as being directed against China, and reacted with lightning speed. On the eve of the meeting, the representatives of Australia, India, the US and Japan in Manila on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in May 2007, China sent a note to each of the four countries. Beijing’s attitude toward the Indo-Pacific concept was and remains negative, and is characterised by Valdai club expert Zhao Huasheng as one of “coldness and suspicion.”
But can it really be considered anti-Chinese? To what extent are the QUAD members attempting to contain China or confront it? Looking ahead, let’s say: no one wants confrontation, but there are nuances.
The idea of the Indo-Pacific has an anti-Chinese sound only as interpreted by Washington, says Valdai Club expert Alexei Kupriyanov, a researcher at IMEMO RAN. “In the US interpretation, the Indo-Pacific is structured around the QUAD as a prototype of a defensive alliance that operates in the most acceptable form to other participating states – without commitments and exclusively through informal consultations,” he says. “The United States wants to demonstrate its interest in this project without extra spending and commitment, by trying to establish an anti-China alliance with the participation of India and Australia.”
In turn, India seeks to maximize the use of Americans as a counterweight to China, the expert said. Delhi does not want to get too close to Washington and commit itself – and at the same time wants to increase its economic and political ties with Japan. “India is trying to maintain a balance between the US and China,” says Kupriyanov. “Although India’s political and military leaders are emphatically anti-China, its economic interests require cooperation with China. Although India bluntly rejects the idea of becoming China’s junior partner, it does not intend to take part in any anti-Chinese actions outside the Indian Ocean. ”
Japan is in a similar situation. According to Kupriyanov, it has to simultaneously cooperate and compete with China. “In addition, Japan is interested in access to the promising markets of the African countries and preserving its positions in Southeast and South Asia.
In August 2018, Indonesia announced its own vision of Indo-Pacific, and this was an interesting turn in the development of the concept. “ The importance of this step is hard to overestimate,” writes Kupriyanov. “For a decade, the ASEAN states denied the Indo-Pacific region the right to exist, fearing that the new geopolitical construct would destroy the familiar, well-known Asia-Pacific region, in which ASEAN had already staked out a key role.
The decision of Indonesia, which claims to be the unofficial leader of the Association, to abandon this practice and henceforth build its policy within an Indo-Pacific framework means that one of the most serious opponents of the Indo-Pacific construct has moved to the camp of its supporters, and others will follow. ”
This step was quite logical, since it is Indonesia that serves as a link between the Indian and Pacific oceans. It is noteworthy that its vision of the Indo-Pacific region has no anti-Chinese overtones. As can be seen, the US desire to create an alliance against Beijing contradicts the objective interests of other countries of the region being created. They not only do not want confrontation with China, but also realize that trade and economic ties with the Asian giant are the key to their successful development.
However, Washington is aware of the reluctance of Asian countries to enter direct confrontation with China. Therefore, the system of restraining China’s regional ambitions will be “elegant and subtle”, rather than taking the form of a defensive alliance, wrote Valdai club expert Anton Tsvetov in March 2018. Despite the continuing statements about shared values, the nature of the union, the backbone of which will remain the QUAD, will be pragmatic.
This is quite natural, given that a number of states that are concerned about the strengthening of China do not fall into the category of “free” and “democratic” at all. We are talking primarily about Vietnam, which is actively developing relations with the United States and with India, despite the differences in political systems. This transition to pragmatism is reflected in the fact that the Indo-Pacific region is less and less often categorized in terms of “maritime democracies”, notes Tsvetov: “instead of this phrase, the expression ‘like-minded states’ is used.”
It is interesting to look at how countries from this still largely imaginary region look at Chinese infrastructure projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In Asia, this initiative is perceived ambiguously: both as a chance for development, and as a means of promoting Beijing’s influence.
In February 2018, the QUAD member countries first addressed the creation of alternatives to the Chinese initiative, and the development of “quality infrastructure” was among the themes during the Japanese presidency of the G20.
The term “quality”, as you might guess, means infrastructure created not under the leadership of China or with Chinese money. So far, the results have been rather modest, but this does not mean that in the future the two projects will not be able to compete, for the benefit of the countries which receive infrastructure assistance.
“Currently, the BRI and the ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific region are competing initiatives,” says Samir Saran, President of the Indian Observer Analytical Centre Research Foundation. However, the real choice will be made by developing states, who are currently leveraging both initiatives to obtain better deals.
It’s not inconceivable that in the long term, some multilateral arrangement will accommodate both initiatives. The ‘viability’ of these competing propositions will depend on which resonates more with the development and security needs of developing states in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific. In the short term, both will co-exist and compete.”
Japan, despite being one of the key countries interested in creating an alternative to the Belt and Road, is “inclined to cooperate with China on the BRI to advance its own commercial interests,” adds Saran. As for India, it does not plan to participate in the BRI, believing that this project undermines its sovereignty and makes it difficult to defend interests in other areas. “On the other hand, China can become the largest investor in the economy of India. Delhi will have to pursue a steadfast course in foreign policy and develop economic cooperation with China,” the expert emphasises.
The Indo-Pacific project is only considered by Washington as a zero-sum game, says Alexei Kupriyanov: “For the US, freezing or liquidating all Chinese infrastructure and trade initiatives is beneficial, as it undermines China’s economic and political opportunities, destroys its safe rear, and forces resources and funds to be removed from the main, from the American point of view, theatre – the Pacific Ocean.”
For the rest of Asia, Indo-Pacific offers an alternative to the land projects of the Belt and Road. “It is quicker and easier to transport some goods by land and others by sea. If there is a problem with one, the other could compensate. The Indo-Japanese-Indonesian version of the Indo-Pacific and the Belt and Road project could be integrated if both sides are interested and have the political will: both initiatives increase Eurasia’s transport potential.”
That is why Russia should closely monitor the implementation of the Indo-Pacific concept, seeing in it not as a threat, but a chance for itself. “Russia should support the Indo-Japanese-Indonesian view of the Indo-Pacific as a maritime Eurasia to counterweigh the US concept of it as a space for an anti-China alliance. It is necessary to uphold the inclusive character of the Indo-Pacific (probably including renaming the concept the Indo-Asia-Pacific) and to facilitate China’s involvement in it,” Kupriyanov says.
“The Indo-Pacific project gives Moscow leverage with China in Eurasia,” believes Samir Saran, reflecting India’s traditional concern about the close ties between Moscow and Beijing. “Currently, Russia is subservient to China’s economy and, by consequence, its political vision. Moscow should recognize that while China may seek a multipolar world, its vision for Eurasia is unipolar. Russia will only benefit if both the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia are truly multipolar in their power structures.”
In this regard, questions arise regarding the quality of Russia’s relations with India and the ASEAN countries, as key participants in the region being created. This topic was discussed during two important events held by the Valdai Club in 2019: the Russia-India and Russia-Vietnam conferences. The participants have stated that there is a “demand for Russia” both in India and in Southeast Asia, but Russia’s ability to increase its economic and political presence in the region is limited. Moreover, the existing bias towards military technology cooperation (especially in relations with India) may result in the loss of strategic positions in the long run.
Therefore, it is time for Russia to form its own vision of Indo-Pacific and, importantly, bring it to the countries of the region. “A provision to the effect that Russia’s regions in the Far East (Primorye Territory and Kamchatka) are an inalienable part of the Indo-Pacific should play a key role in this respect,” Kupriyanov says.
“These regions should be viewed as gates to the north that can provide access to the wealth of northern Eurasia and the joining of great Eurasian overland routes with the sea routes along its southern coast. They should also be seen as gates to the Arctic, a storehouse of resources. The Far East should be positioned as one of the centers of attraction in the Indo-Pacific, its resource, scientific and, in perspective, also its production base.”
Thus, connecting to the Indo-Pacific project could provide for Russia an addition to its large-scale turn to the East. By providing an alternative to the main sea trade route of Eurasia, Indo-Pacific also fit into the logic of building a Greater Eurasia, as Moscow advocates. Washington’s attempts to “encircle” China run up against the resistance of regional powers that do not want confrontation with Beijing, as well as excessive US influence in Asia. The geostrategic landscape is changing rapidly, and the main thing for Russia is to keep up with these changes, taking advantage of opportunities as they arise.
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/goodbye-pacific-rim-hello-indo-pacific/
Σχετικά με το Eastern Economic Forum-2019, 4-6 Σεπτεμβρίου 2019:
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https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/cultural/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/organizing-committee-reception/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/combat-night/
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