History Of Achaemenid Iran 1A, Course I - Achaemenid Beginnings 1A
History of Achaemenid Iran 1A, Course I - Achaemenid beginnings 1A
Prof. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
Tuesday, 27 December 2022
Outline
Introduction; Iranian Achaemenid historiography; Problems of historiography continuity; Iranian posterior historiography; foreign historiography; Western Orientalist historiography; early sources of Iranian History; Prehistory in the Iranian plateau and Mesopotamia
1- Introduction
Welcome to the 40-hour seminar on Achaemenid Iran!
It is my intention to deliver a rather unconventional academic presentation of the topic, mostly implementing a correct and impartial conceptual approach to the earliest stage of Iranian History. Every subject, in and by itself, offers to every researcher the correct means of the pertinent approach to it; due to this fact, the personal background, viewpoints and thoughts or eventually the misperceptions and the preconceived ideas of an explorer should not be allowed to affect his judgment.
If before 200 years, the early Iranologists had the possible excuse of studying a topic on the basis of external and posterior historical sources, this was simply due to the fact that the Old Achaemenid cuneiform writing had not yet been deciphered. Still, even those explorers failed to avoid a very serious mistake, namely that of taking the external and posterior historical sources at face value. We cannot afford to blindly accept a secondary historical source without first examining intentions, motives, scopes and aims of it.
As the seminar covers only the History of the Achaemenid dynasty, I don't intend to add an introductory course about the History of the Iranian Studies and the re-discovery of Iran by Western explorers of the colonial powers. However, I will provide a brief outline of the topic; this is essential because mainstream Orientalists have reached their limits and cannot provide us with a real insight, eliminating the numerous and enduring myths, fallacies, and deliberately naïve approaches to Achaemenid Iran.
In fact, most of the specialists of Ancient Iran never went beyond the limitations set by the delusional Ancient 'Greek' (in reality: Ionian and Attic) literature about the Medes and the Persians (i.e. the Iranians), because they never offered themselves the task to explain the reasons for the aberration that the Ancient Ionian and Attic authors created in their minds and wrote in their texts about Iran. This was utterly puerile and ludicrous.
And this brings us to the other major innovation that I intend to offer during this seminar, namely the proper, comprehensive contextualization of the research topic, i.e. the History of Achaemenid Iran. To give some examples in this regard, I would mention
a - the tremendous, multilayered and multifaceted impact of the Mesopotamian World, Civilization and Heritage on the formation of the Achaemenid Empire of Iran, and more specifically, the determinant role played by the Sargonid Empire of Assyria on the emergence of the first Empire on the Iranian plateau;
b - the ferocious opposition of the Mithraic Magi to the Zoroastrian Achaemenid court;
c - the involvement of the Anatolian Magi in the misperception of Iran by the Ancient Greeks; and
d- the utilization of the Ancient Greek cities by the Anti-Iranian side of the Egyptian priesthoods, princes and administrators.
To therefore introduce the proper contextualization, I will expand on the Neo-Assyrian Empire and the Sargonid times, not only to state the first mentions of the Medes and the Persians in History, but also to show the importance attributed by the Neo-Assyrian Emperors to the Zagros Mountains and the Iranian plateau, as well as the numerous peoples, settled or nomadic, who inhabited that region.
There is an enormous lacuna in the Orientalist disciplines; there are no interdisciplinary studies in Assyriology and Iranology. This plays a key role in the misperception of the ancient oriental civilizations and in the mistaken evaluation (or rather under-estimation) of the momentous impact that they had on the formation of the World History. There are no isolated cultures and independent civilizations as dogmatic and ignorant Western archaeologists pretend.
Only if one studies and evaluates correctly the colossal impact of the Ancient Mesopotamian world on Iran, can one truly understand the Achaemenid Empire in its real dimensions.
2- Iranian Achaemenid historiography
A. Achaemenid imperial inscriptions produced on solemn occasions
Usually multilingual texts written by the imperial scribes of the emperors Cyrus the Great, Darius I the Great, Xerxes I, Artaxerxes I, Darius II, Artaxerxes II, and Artaxerxes III, as well as of the ancestral rulers Ariaramnes and Arsames.
Languages and writing systems:
- Old Achaemenid Iranian (cuneiform-alphabetic; the official imperial language)
- Babylonian (cuneiform-syllabic; to offer a testimony of historical continuity and legitimacy, following the Conquest of Babylon by Cyrus the Great, who presented himself as king of Babylon)
- Elamite (cuneiform-logo-syllabic; to portray the Persians in particular as the heirs of the ancient land of Anshan and Sushan that the Assyrians and the Babylonians named 'Elam' and the indigenous population called 'Haltamti' / The first Achaemenid to present himself as 'king of Anshan' is Cyrus the Great and the reference is found in his Cylinder unearthed in Babylon.)
and
- Egyptian Hieroglyphic (if the inscription or the monument was produced in Egypt, since the Achaemenids were also pharaohs of Egypt, starting with Kabujiya/Cambyses)
Imperial inscriptions are found in: Babylon (Cyrus Cylinder), Pasargad, Behistun, Hamadan, Ganj-e Nameh, Persepolis, Naqsh-e Rustam, Susa, Suez (Egypt), Gherla (Romania), Van (Turkey), and on various items
B. Persepolis Administrative Archives
This consists in an enormous documentation that has not yet been fully studied; it is not written in Old Achaemenid as one could expect but mainly in Elamite cuneiform. It consists of two groups, namely
- the Persepolis Fortification Archive, and
- the Persepolis Treasury Archive.
The Persepolis Fortification Archive was unearthed in the fortification area, i.e. the northeastern confines of the enormous platform of the Achaemenid capital Parsa (Persepolis), in the 1930s. It comprises of more than 30000 tablets (fragmentary or entire) that were written in the period 509-494 BCE (at the time of Darius I). The tablets were written in Susa and other parts of Fars and the territory of the ancient kingdom of Elam that vanished in the middle of the 7th c. (more than 130 years before these texts were written). Around 50 texts had Aramaic glosses. More than 2000 tablets have been published and translated. These texts are records of transactions, distribution of food, provisioning of workers, transportation of commodities, etc.; few tablets were written in other languages, namely Old Iranian (1), Babylonian (1), Phrygian (1) and Greek (1).
The Persepolis Treasury Archive was found in the northeastern room of the Treasury of Xerxes. It contains more than 750 tablets and fragments (in Elamite) and more than 100 have been published. They all date back in period 492-458 BCE. These tablets are either letters or memoranda dispatched by imperial officials to the head of the Treasury; they concern the payment of workmen, the issue of silver, and other administrative procedures. Only one tablet was written in Babylonian.
The entire documentation offers valuable information as regards the function of various imperial services, namely the couriers, the satraps, the imperial messengers, the imperial storehouse, etc. The archives shed light on the origin of the imperial administrators, as ca. 1900 personal names have been recorded: 10% were Elamites (who had apparently survived for long far from their country after the destruction of Susa by Assurbanipal (640 BCE), fewer were Babylonians, and the outright majority consisted of Iranians (Persians, Medes, Bactrians, Sakas, Arians, etc.).
C. Imperial Aramaic
The diffusion of the use of Aramaic started already in the Neo-Assyrian times and during the 7th c. BCE; the creation of the 'Royal Road', the systematization of the transportation, the improvement of communications, and the formation of the network of land-, sea- and desert routes that we now call 'Silk-, Spice- and Perfume- Road' during the Achaemenid times helped further expand the use of Aramaic. The linguistic assimilation of the Babylonians, the Jews and the Phoenicians with the Aramaeans only strengthened the diffusion of the Aramaic, which became the second international language ('lingua franca') in the History of the Mankind (after the Akkadian / Assyrian-Babylonian). Gradually, Aramaic became an official Achaemenid language after the Old Achaemenid Iranian.
Except the Aramaic texts attested in the Persepolis Administrative Archives, thousands of Aramaic texts of the Achaemenid times shed light onto the society, the economy, the administration, the military organization, the trade, the religions, the cults, the culture and the spirituality attested in various provinces of the Iranian Empire. At this point, only indicatively, I mention few significant groups of texts:
- the Elephantine papyri and ostraca (except Aramaic, they were written in Hieratic and Demotic Egyptian, Coptic, Alexandrian Koine, and Latin) – 5th and 4th c. BCE,
- the Hermopolis Aramaic papyri,
- the Padua Aramaic papyri, and
- the Khalili Collection of Aramaic Documents from Bactria (48 texts written on leather, papyrus, stone or clay, dating from the period 353-324 BCE, and mainly from the reign of Artaxerxes III whereas the most recent dates from the reign of Alexander the Great).
Here I have to add that the widespread use of Imperial Aramaic and its use as a second official language for Achaemenid Iran brought an end to the use of the Elamite (in the middle of the 5th c.) and, after the end of the Achaemenid dynasty and the split of the state of Alexander the Great, contributed to the formation of two writing systems, namely Parthian and Pahlavi which were in use during the Arsacid and the Sassanid times. Imperial Aramaic helped establish many other writing systems, but this goes beyond the limits of the present seminar.
3- Problems of historiography continuity
There are no historical references to the Achaemenid dynasty made at the time of the Arsacids (Ashkanian: 250 BCE-224 CE) and the Sassanids 224-651 CE); this situation is due to many factors:
- the prevalence of another Iranian nation of probably Turanian origin, namely the Parthians and the Arsacid dynasty,
- the rise of the anti-Achaemenid, anti-Zoroastrian Magi who tried to impose Mithraism throughout Iran during the Arsacid times,
- the formation of an oral epic tradition and the establishment of a legendary historiography about the pre-Arsacid past during the Sassanid times, and
- the scarcity of written sources and the terrible destructions that occurred in Iran during the Late Antiquity, the Islamic era, and the Modern times (early Islamic conquests, divisions of the Abbasid times, Mongol invasions, Safavid-Ottoman wars, Western colonial looting, etc.).
This situation raised Western academic questions of Iranian identity, continuity, and historicity. But this attempt is futile. Iranian historiography of Islamic times shows that these questions were fully misplaced.
4- Iranian posterior historiography (Iranian historiography of Islamic times)
With Tabari (839-923) and his voluminous History of Prophets and Kings we realize that there were, in spite of the destructions caused because of the Islamic conquests, historical documents on which he was based to expand about the Sassanid dynasty; actually one out of the 40 volumes of the most recent translation of Tabari to English (published by the State University of New York Press from 1985 through 2007) is dedicated to the History of Sassanid Iran (vol. 5). And the previous volume (vol. 4) covers the History of Achaemenid and Arsacid Iran, Alexander the Great, Nabonid Babylonia, Assyria and Ancient Israel and Judah.
Other important Iranian historians of the Islamic times, like Abu'l-Fadl Bayhaqi (995-1077), Rashid al-Din Hamadani (1247-1318) who wrote the truly first World History, Alaeddin Aṭa Malik Juvaynī (1226-1283), and Sharaf ad-Din Ali Yazdi (ca. 1370-1454), did not expand much on pre-Islamic periods as the focus of their writing was on contemporaneous developments.
However, the aforementioned historians and all the authors, who are classified in this category, represent only one dimension of Iranian historiography of Islamic times. A totally different approach and literature have been illustrated by Ferdowsi's Shahnameh (Book of Kings). Abu 'l Qasem Ferdowsi (940-1025) was not the first to compose an epic in order to standardize in mythical terms and legendary concepts the pre-Islamic Iranian past; but he was the most successful and the most illustrious. That is why many other epic poets followed his example, notably the Azeri Nizami Ganjavi (1141-1209) and the Turkic Indian Amir Khusraw (1253-1325).
Within the context of this poetical historiography, historical emperors of pre-Islamic Iran appear as legendary figures only to be then viewed as materialization of divine patterns. The origin of this transcendental historiography seems to be retraced in the Sassanid times, but all the major themes are clearly of Zoroastrian identity and can therefore be attributed to the Achaemenid world perception and world conceptualization.
It is essential at this point to state that, until the imposition of modern Western colonial academic and educational standards in Iran, Ferdowsi's Shahnameh and the corpus of Iranian legendary historiography was the backbone of the Iranian cultural, intellectual and educational identity.
It is a matter of academic debate whether an original text named Khwaday-Namag, written during the Sassanid times, and now lost, is at the very origin of Ferdowsi's Shahnameh and of the Iranian legendary historiography. The 19th c. German Orientalist Theodor Nöldeke is credited with this theory that has not yet been proved.
All the same, the spiritual standards of this approach are detected in the Achaemenid times.
5- Foreign historiography
Ancient Greek (in reality, Ionian and Attic), Ancient Hebrew and Latin sources of Achaemenid History exist, but first they are external, second they appear to be posterior in their largest part, and third they often bear witness to astounding inaccuracies, fables, untrustworthy data, misplaced focus, excessive verbosity without real substance, and -above all- an enormous and irreconcilable misunderstanding of the Iranian Achaemenid reality, values, world view, mindset, and behavior.
The Ancient Hebrew sources shed light on issues that were apparently critical to the tiny and unimportant, Jewish minority of the Achaemenid Empire; however, these Biblical narratives concern facts that were absolutely insignificant to the imperial authorities of Parsa. One critical issue is concealed by modern scholars though; although all the nations of the Empire were regularly mentioned in the Achaemenid inscriptions and depicted on bas reliefs, the Jews were not. This undeniable fact irrevocably conditions the supposed 'importance' of Biblical texts like Ezra, Esther, Nehemiah, etc. All the same, these foreign historical sources are important for the Jews.
The Ionian and Attic accounts of events that were composed by the Carian renegade Herodotus, the Dorian Ctesias, and the Athenian Xenophon present an even more serious problem. They happened to be for many centuries (16th – 19th c.) the bulk of the historical documentation that Western European academics had access to as regards Achaemenid Iran. This situation produced grave biases among Western academics, because they took all these sources at face value since they had no access to original documentation. The grave trouble persisted even after the decipherment of the Old Achaemenid cuneiform writing and the archaeological excavations that brought to daylight original Iranian imperial documentation.
Only recently, at the end of the 20th c., leading Iranologists like Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg started criticizing the absolutely delusional History of Achaemenid Iran that modern Western scholars were producing without even understanding it by foolishly accepting Ancient Ionian myths, lies and propaganda against the Iranian Empire at face value. This grave problem had also two other parameters:
- first, there was an enormous gap of civilization and a tremendous cultural difference between the Iranian imperial world view, the spiritual valorization of the human being, and the Zoroastrian monotheism from one side and the chaotic, disorderly and profane elements of the western periphery of the Empire. The so-called Greek tribes in Western Anatolia and in the South Balkans were not only multi-divided and plunged in permanent conflict; they were also extremely verbose on common issues, they desecrated the divine world with their nonsensical myths and puerile narratives, and they defiled human spirituality with their love stories about their pseudo-gods. But, very arbitrarily and quite disastrously, the so-called Ancient Greek civilization had been erroneously taken as 'classics' by modern Europeans at a time they had no access to Ancient Oriental sources.
- second, the vertical differentiation between Imperial Iran as the blessed land of divine mission and the disunited and peripheral lands of conflict, discord and strife that were inhabited by the Greek tribes was reflected on the respective, impressively different types of historiography; to the Iranians, few words written by anonymous scribes were enough to describe the groundbreaking deeds of divinely appointed rulers. But for the Greeks, the useless rumors, the capricious hearsay, the intentional lie, the nefarious expression of their complex of inferiority, the vicious slander, and the deliberate ignominy 'had' to be recorded and written down.
The fact that Herodotus' and Xenophon's long narratives have long been taken as the basic source of information about Achaemenid Iran demonstrates how disoriented and misplaced modern Western scholarship is. But by preferring to rely mainly on the Ancient Greek lengthy and false narratives, and not on the succinct, true and chaste Old Achaemenid Iranian inscriptions, they totally misrepresent Ancient Iranian History, preposterously extrapolating later and corrupt standards to earlier and superior civilizations.
And whereas Ancient Roman authors, who wrote in Latin (Pliny the Elder, Seneca the Younger, etc.), and Jewish or Christian historians, who wrote in Alexandrine Koine, like Flavius Josephus and Eusebius of Caesarea Maritima, reproduced the style of lengthy narratives that turns History to mere gossip, the great Babylonian scholar Berossus was very reluctant to add personal comments to his original sources or to allow subjective considerations and thoughts to contaminate his text.
In any case, the vast issue of the multilayered damages caused by the untrustworthy Ancient Greek historiography to modern Western academics' perception and interpretation of Achaemenid Iran is a topic that deserves an entirely independent seminar.
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To watch the video (with more than 110 pictures and maps), click the links below:
HISTORY OF ACHAEMENID IRAN - Achaemenid beginnings 1Α
By Prof. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
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To listen to the audio, clink the links below:
HISTORY OF ACHAEMENID IRAN - Achaemenid beginnings 1 (a+b)
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Download the text in PDF:
More Posts from S-afshar and Others
Russia, China, the Decayed Muslim World, and the Crumbling, Savage Western World - I
By Prof. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
Table of Contents
Introduction
I. Fake states of fake Arabs and fake Muslims
II. Turkey and Iran: the two exceptions
III. Unsophisticated, gullible and ignorant sheikhs and theologians
IV. How Turkey's and Iran's paranoid Islamists are manipulated by Western colonials
V. Russia, China, and the Utilization of the Muslim World by the Western Colonials
VI. What Russia and China must do
Introduction
Fourteen years ago, on 4th December 2007, I published an article under title 'Russia, Islam, and the West', which -within few days- was officially (ИноСМИ / Inosmi) translated into Russian (' Россия, ислам и Запад'). I wanted to briefly elaborate on how things would develop and to also identify possible allies for Russia within the so-called 'Islamic World'.
As the translated version of the article was extensively reproduced, I noticed that it was also well understood. Example: the great portal Centrasia (www.centrasia.org), while republishing the Russian translation, added an over-title for the use of its readers to state the following: "Экспансия западного мира не столько решала проблемы, сколько распространяла их вширь" (The expansion of the Western world did not so much solve problems as spread them in breadth). Indeed, there could not be better summary of my article's contents. The over-title was indeed an excellent reflection of my original perception and ultimate conviction, namely that the West wanted to use the senseless Islamic World against Russia.
Here you have the links:
In that article's last part, I put a title that appeared very odd, even to several Egyptian and other African friends of mine (at the time, I was living in Cairo): "Islam is Turkey and Iran". In that part, I explained why only these two countries could possibly be Russia's allies against the Western colonial contamination that threatens the entire world. The reason for this statement is that only these two countries had maintained until that time a correct sense of historical-cultural identity and an imperial-level establishment and diplomacy. As a matter of fact, the rest of the so-called Islamic world is constituted by fake states-puppets of the colonial powers (from Morocco and Nigeria to Egypt, Pakistan and Indonesia); unfortunately, the uneducated, ignorant, and idiotic elites of these neo-colonial structures never realized what 'national integrity' means.
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Continue reading and download the article here:
Rare photos for the Capital of Palestine - Alquds 1920 which is 29 years before the born of the Israeli occupation.
The Lycian Rock Tombs, Fethiye, Türkiye, c. 4th century BCE.
François Bocion - Venice at sunset (1874)
Αφρο-Ευρασιατική Γεωπολιτική, οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού, το Ινδο-Ειρηνικό Σύμπλεγμα, η Διάλυση της Δύσης και το Τέλος της Ψευτο-Ιστορίας του ‘Ελληνο-Ρωμαϊκού Πολιτισμού’
Afro-Eurasiatic Geopolitics, the New Silk Roads, the Indo-Pacific Region, the Collapse of the West, and the End of the Fake History of ‘Greco-Roman Civilization’
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 30 Αυγούστου 2019.
Στο κείμενό του αυτό, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης παρουσιάζει ορισμένα από τα δεδομένα τα οποία παρουσίασα σε μια ομιλία μου στο Πεκίνο τον Ιανουάριο του 2019. Κατά την ομιλία μου περιέγραψα τρόπους αντι-αποικιοκρατικής συνεργασίας των εθνών της Αφρο-Ευρασίας και του Ινδο-Ειρηνικού Συμπλέγματος πάνω στην κοινή τους πολιτισμική κληρονομιά και πολιτιστική παράδοση. Αυτές βρίσκονται στους αντίποδες εκείνων των αποικιοκρατικών χωρών (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, Ολλανδία, ΗΠΑ, Αυστραλία) και αντιστρατεύονται τα ρατσιστικά δόγματα και τις ιστορικές διαστρεβλώσεις που οι εν λόγω χώρες χρησιμοποιούν ως εργαλεία διαφθοράς και εξάρτησης. Επίσης, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης προσθέτει πολλά ενδιαφέροντα στοιχεία για το Eastern Economic Forum 2019, το οποίο είναι ένα εξαιρετικό βήμα ανταλλαγής γνωμών, αναλύσεων και προοπτικών ανάμεσα σε αρχηγούς κρατών, στελέχη κυβερνήσεων, επιχειρηματίες, στρατιωτικούς, βουλευτές, ακαδημαϊκούς και δημοσιογράφους από τις χώρες της Ασίας και του Ινδο-Ειρηνικού συμπλέγματος.
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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/αφρο-ευρασιατική-γεωπολιτική-οι-νέοι/ ===================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Τίποτα δεν υπογραμμίζει καλύτερα την αποδυνάμωση και αποσύνθεση του δυτικού κόσμου καλύτερα από την οικτρή εικόνα της τελευταίας συνάντησης των αρχηγών κρατών μελών της οργάνωσης G-7 στο Μπιαρίτς της Γαλλίας. Το 45ο G7 summit αναφέρθηκε στο ενδεχόμενο επιστροφής της Ρωσσίας στην οργάνωση και συνεπώς μετατροπής της και πάλι σε G -8, αλλά την καλύτερη απάντηση σ’ αυτή την ιδέα έδωσε το ρωσσικό think tank Valdai Club που πρόσκειται στον Ρώσσο πρόεδρο.
Σημειώνοντας ότι το G-7 δεν έχει πλέον την σημασία που είχε προ 20 ετών, το εν λόγω ίδρυμα σε σχετική δημοσίευσή του (δείτε παρακάτω) αναρωτήθηκε τι έχει πλέον σημασία, το G-7 ή το G-20!
Λεπτομέρειες υπάρχουν πολλές (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/45th_G7_summit), αλλά η πραγματικότητα φαίνεται σε λίγους μόνον αριθμούς:
Οι χώρες του G-7 (ΗΠΑ, Ιαπωνία, Γερμανία, Αγγλία, Γαλλία, Ιταλία και Καναδάς) με 766 εκ. πληθυσμό διαθέτουν μαζί το 30.1% του παγκοσμίου ΑΕΠ (σε αντιστοιχία αγοραστικής δύναμης / purchasing power parity).
Αλλά οι πέντε χώρες των BRICS (Κίνα, Ινδία, Ρωσσία, Βραζιλία, Νοτιοαφρικανική Ένωση) με 3165 εκ. εκπροσωπούν το 32.7% του παγκοσμίου ΑΕΠ, όντας έτσι πιο σημαντικές από το G-7, το οποίο είναι πολιτικά διαιρεμένο και οικονομικά κλυδωνιζόμενο.
Από την άλλη πλευρά, οι υπόλοιπες 7 χώρες του G-20 (το οποίο αποτελείται από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και 19 χώρες, οι οποίες απαρτίζονται από τους BRICS, το G-7 και άλλες 7 χώρες), ήτοι Ινδονησία, Μεξικό, Τουρκία, Νότια Κορέα, Αργεντινή, Σαουδική Αραβία, και Αυστραλία, με 633 εκ. πληθυσμό έχουν το 10.8% του παγκοσμίου ΑΕΠ.
Με άλλα λόγια το G- 20 εκπροσωπεί το 75% της παγκόσμιας οικονομίας, μη αφήνοντας εκτός καμμιά παγκοσμίως σημαντική χώρα.
Αλλά το πολύ εντυπωσιακό δεδομένο (συγκριτικά με τον κόσμο προ 20 ή 30 ετών) είναι ότι μαζί οι Ινδονησία, Μεξικό, Τουρκία, Νότια Κορέα, Αργεντινή, Σαουδική Αραβία, και Αυστραλία διαθέτουν ήδη περισσότερο από το 1/3 του ΑΕΠ των χωρών μελών του G-7. Αυτό από μόνο του δείχνει πόση ισχύς έχει χαθεί από τις παλιές μεγάλες οικονομίες της Δυτικής Ευρώπης, Βόρειας Αμερικής, και Ιαπωνίας (που κάποτε απεκαλούντο ‘ο πρώτος κόσμος’). Για το G- 20 θα βρείτε λεπτομέρειες εδώ:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G20
Αν στα παραπάνω συνυπολογιστούν η δυναμική της οικονομίας των εκτός του G-7 χωρών, το δημογραφικό πρόβλημα (το οποίο είτε είναι πολύ σοβαρό είτε προξενεί πολιτικές αναταραχές στην αντιμετώπισή του) και ο εκπαιδευτικός – επιστημονικός – μορφωτικός παράγοντας, τότε συμπεραίνουμε ότι η καταβαράθρωση της Δύσης θα είναι γρήγορη και απόλυτη. Αυτή η διάλυση θα είναι μάλιστα γενική και όχι μόνον οικονομική-πολιτική. Μαζί με την Δύση, θα βουλιάξει όλο το ιδεολόγημα που προέκυψε από την Αναγεννησιακή Ευρώπη και έφθασε στις μέρες μας.
Άλλωστε, η Γερμανία είναι η Γερμανία του αφηγήματος του ‘ελληνορωμαϊκού ή ιουδαιοχριστιανικού πολιτισμού’, όσο παραμένει πληθυσμιακά όπως την ξέρουμε μέχρι σήμερα. Το ίδιο κι η Γαλλία, η Ιταλία ή η Αγγλία. Αλλά μια Γερμανία κατακλυσμένη από Τούρκους, Ιρανούς, Αφγανούς, Τουρκμένους κι Ιρακινούς αναγκαστικά χρειάζεται άλλο αφήγημα – κάτι που να την φέρνει κοντά στον Ταμερλάνο, στην Χρυσή Ορδή και στον Χουλάγκου Χαν.
Όλα αυτά φαίνονται ήδη πολύ καθαρά από τους κινητήριους μοχλούς σκέψης, τις γενικώτερες θεωρήσεις της Παγκόσμιας Ιστορίας, τις μεγάλες αναζητήσεις, και τις βασικές κατευθυντήριες γραμμές των κυριωτέρων σχεδίων που υλοποιούν οι εκτός του G-7 μεγάλες δυνάμεις. Η ανάδειξη της Κίνας σε πρώτη υπερδύναμη βγάζει αυτόματα τον Περικλή, τον Θουκυδίδη και τον Ιούλιο Καίσαρα από το επίκεντρο της Ιστορίας και εκεί τοποθετεί τον Κινέζο αυτοκράτορα Σουζόν (Suzong), ο οποίος έγραψε στον χαλίφη της Βαγδάτης ζητώντας του βοήθεια και στρατό για να καταστείλει την επανάσταση Αν Λουσάν ή τον ιδρυτή της δυναστείας Μιν αυτοκράτορα Χουνβού (Hongwu), ο οποίος το 1368 έγραψε ένα ποίημα 100 λέξεων για να εξυμνήσει τον Μωάμεθ Προφήτη του Ισλάμ.
Δεν είναι θέμα καν επιλογής ανάμεσα σε μια αλήθεια κι ένα ψέμμα. Είναι κάτι πολύ πιο μακριά από αυτό. Είναι θέμα ότι ‘αυτό’ ήταν η δική ‘σου’ αλήθεια και ‘εκείνο’ ήταν η δική ‘του’ αλήθεια, και τελικά αποδεικνύεται ότι η δική ‘σου’ αλήθεια (ακόμη κι αν είναι αληθινή) δεν είναι η πιο σημαντική, ή η πιο καθοριστική.
Πάρτε για παράδειγμα την βασική γεωπολιτική της Κίνας! Η Ευρώπη, ιδωμένη από το Πεκίνο, γίνεται νοητή ως μία χερσόνησος της Ασίας, δηλαδή κάτι σαν μια άλλη Ινδία, ενώ η Ασία κι η Αφρική νοούνται ως μία ενότητα γης της οποίας τα πολλά τμήματα είναι αλληλεξαρτώμενα, αλληλοσυνδεόμενα και αλληλοσυνεργαζόμενα, καθώς αποτελούν μια ενότητα. Και ακριβώς αυτή την θεώρηση αλλά και μέθοδο έρευνας κι ερμηνείας της Ιστορίας υλοποιεί το μεγαλόπνοο σχέδιο της Κίνας που εν συντομία αποκαλείται Νέος Δρόμος του Μεταξιού {Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ή One Belt One Road (OBOR); Один пояс и один путь; 一带一路}. Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative
https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/一带一路
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Один_пояс_и_один_путь
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Belt,_One_Road
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRACECA
Η ιστορική επιστροφή στους – κατά ξηράν, έρημον και θάλασσαν – Δρόμους του Μεταξιού ντε φάκτο συνενώνει την αφρο-ευρασιατική γήινη έκταση, σβύννοντας ψεύτικες κι αναθεωρητικές γραμμές που είχαν επιβάλει οι διάφοροι αποικιοκράτες και οριενταλιστές. Ψευτο-γεωπολιτικές παρουσιάσεις που χωρίζουν την Αφρο-Ευρασία πετιούνται εκ των πραγμάτων στα σκουπίδια ως ιστορικά ανυπόστατες και ως οικονομικά – πολιτικά άχρηστες και βλαβερές. Η Ενδιάμεση Περιοχή του Δημήτρη Κιτσίκη δεν υπάρχει: ήταν μια στρεβλή κι άχρηστη επινόησή του.
Το ίδιο έχει να κάνει και με το ρατσιστικό αφήγημα των αποικιοκρατών του 18ου και του 19ου αιώνα. Άγγλοι και Γάλλοι αποικιοκράτες, ακριβώς για να επιβάλλουν την αποικιοκρατία τους, επιχείρησαν να αναθεωρήσουν την Ιστορία και να αρνηθούν το τι μέχρι τότε είχε συμβεί.
Η αναθεώρηση της Ιστορίας που οι Αγγλογάλλοι ελληνιστές, λατινιστές κι οριενταλιστές επέβαλαν είχε να κάνει με
α. μια παρά φύσιν και ψεύτικη διαίρεση του κόσμου σε Ανατολή και Δύση,
β. μια ανιστόρητη κι αυθαίρετη ταύτιση της Δύσης με πολιτισμό και πρόοδο και της Ανατολής με βαρβαρότητα κι ‘απολυταρχία’ (λες κι η ‘απολυταρχία’ είναι κάτι το οπωσδήποτε κακό!),
γ. μια παρανοϊκή κι εξωπραγματική αναγωγή του λεγόμενου ‘ελληνορωμαϊκού πολιτισμού’ σε επίκεντρο της Παγκόσμιας Ιστορίας, κάτι που αντιστρατευόταν τις ίδιες τις ιστορικές πηγές, και
δ. μια ολότελα αφελή ταύτιση των νεώτερων Ευρωπαίων με τους αρχαίους Ρωμαίους, Έλληνες και ακόμη τους Μυκηναίους και τους Μινωΐτες της 2ης προχριστιανικής χιλιετίας σε μια οικτρά ρατσιστική απόπειρα να παρουσιασθεί το παρελθόν των Ευρωπαίων αποικιοκρατών ως ‘ανώτερο’ και ‘αρχαιότερο’ εκείνου των εθνών των αγγλικών και γαλλικών αποικιών.
Όλα αυτά τα ψευδή, αυθαίρετα κι ανιστόρητα ‘αξιώματα’ επιβλήθηκαν με τυραννικές μεθόδους στην Ασία, την Αφρική κι ακόμη την Ευρώπη, αλλά εις μάτην.
Με την αναφορά στην αλήθεια των Ιστορικών Δρόμων του Μεταξιού, η Ιστορία επιστρέφει, οι αναθεωρητικές και ρατσιστικές απόψεις των νεώτερων Ευρωπαίων για ‘ελληνορωμαϊκό’ ή ‘ιουδαιοχριστιανικό’ πολιτισμό σβύννονται, και η ισότιμη συμμετοχή όλων των εθνών στο μελλοντικό γίγνεσθαι στηρίζεται στην πραγματική Ιστορία, την έρευνά της, την εκμάθησή της, την διάδοσή της, χωρίς τους εθνοκεντρικούς και ιδεολογικούς, παραποιητικούς φακούς.
Ποια ήταν λοιπόν η Ιστορική Αλήθεια των Δρόμων του Μεταξιού που επιστρέφει για να γίνει κτήμα όλων όσων θα συμμετέχουν στην εξέλιξη της Ανθρωπότητας;
Ένα πλήθος εθνών συμμετείχαν στις εμπορικές, μορφωτικές, θρησκευτικές και γενικώτερα πολιτισμικές ανταλλαγές μεταξύ Ρώμης, Συρίας Αλεξάνδρειας, Ανατολικής Αφρικής, Ινδίας, Ινδοκίνας-Ινδονησίας, Μεσοποταμίας, Ιράν, Κεντρικής Ασίας, Σιβηρίας και Κίνας.
Έλληνες, Ρωμαίοι και γενικώτερα οι ευρωπαϊκοί λαοί επηρεάστηκαν κατακλυσμικά από ανατολικές λατρείες, μυστικισμούς, θρησκείες, θεουργίες, τέχνες, τρόπους ζωής και πολιτισμούς, και μάλιστα είχαν συνείδηση αυτού του συμβάντος.
Η αυτοκρατορική Ρώμη ήταν μια ασιατική πρωτεύουσα, ένα αντίγραφο της Περσέπολης, της Βαβυλώνας, ή ακόμη της Νινευή. Κάθε αρχαιοελληνική ‘επίδραση’ στην Ρώμη είχε πλέον ολότελα σβυσθεί.
Αν και μεγάλο κράτος, η Ρώμη πολύ περισσότερο επηρεάστηκε παρά επηρέασε άλλα έθνη πάνω στους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού, των Μπαχαρικών και των Αρωμάτων (Λιβανωτών). Έθνη που έπαιξαν καθοριστικό ρόλο στην ανάπτυξη αυτού του ιστορικού φαινομένου ήταν οι Ιρανοί, οι Αραμαίοι, οι Τουρανοί, οι Σογδιανοί, κι οι Υεμενίτες.
Οι Έλληνες αποδέχθηκαν τον Μιθραϊσμό, τις Ισιακές Λατρείες, Μυστήρια και Θεολογία, τον Μανιχεϊσμό, την Χριστιανωσύνη, και άλλα ανατολικά θρησκευτικά συστήματα.
Κανένας Αιγύπτιος, Βαβυλώνιος, Αραμαίος, Ιρανός ή Τουρανός δεν ενδιαφέρθηκε να μεταφράσει τα έπη του Ομήρου ή τους πλατωνικούς διαλόγους στα προχριστιανικά χρόνια.
Και κανένας Αιγύπτιος Βαβυλώνιος, Αραμαίος, Ιρανός ή Τουρανός δεν ελάτρευσε τον Ποσειδώνα ή την Αθηνά.
Αλλά η αποικιοκρατική και ρατσιστική, ευρωπαϊκή ακαδημαϊκή τάξη του 19ου και του 20ου αιώνα, αντί να αποκαλέσει την περίοδο από τον Αλέξανδρο έως τον Οκταβιανό ‘ανατολιστικά χρόνια’ (επειδή τότε σημειώθηκαν ανατολικές επιδράσεις πάνω σε Έλληνες, Ρωμαίους κι άλλους Ευρωπαίους), την ονόμασε ‘ελληνιστικά χρόνια’ (επειδή ορισμένοι ασιατικοί λαοί, όπως οι Φρύγες, οι Λυδοί, οι Κάρες, οι Λύκιοι κι οι Καππαδόκες εξελληνίστηκαν γλωσσικά).
Οι Ευρωπαίοι αποικιοκράτες έβλεπαν εαυτούς στην Ασία ως συνεχιστές εκείνων από τους Έλληνες στρατιώτες του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου που έμειναν σε διάφορα σημεία της Ασίας, ανήγειραν πόλεις, διατήρησαν την τέχνη τους.
Αλλά αυτό ήταν μια αυθαίρετη ασυναρτησία που δεν δημιουργεί Ιστορία.
Αντίθετα από την ρατσιστική, εθνοκεντρική διαστροφή της Ιστορίας που ήταν το επακόλουθο του αποικιοκρατικού αφηγήματος, η νέα αφρο-ευρασιατική γεωπολιτική πραγματικότητα και οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού δεν αφήνουν κανένα περιθώριο – ειμή μόνον τον εξευτελισμό – σε όσους επιμένουν να μιλάνε εθνοκεντρικά και να βλέπουν μια ‘ιστορική ανωτερότητα’ για τους προγόνους τους.
Όσοι άθλιοι κι αμόρφωτοι στην Ελλάδα μιλάνε υποτιμητικά για Μογγόλους μόνο γελοιοποιούν την Ελλάδα και δείχνουν ότι η χώρα είναι ένα άχρηστο σκουπίδι μιας περασμένης εποχής.
Άλλωστε οι πρόγονοι αυτών των σημερινών αμορρφώτων Ελλήνων πήγαιναν πριν από 600 χρόνια στην Κεντρική Ασία για να σπουδάσουν σε αστεροσκοπεία με Μογγόλους καθηγητές.
Όταν υλοποιείται ένα τόσο σημαντικό, κοσμοϊστορικό σχέδιο, όπως οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού, ισχυρές χώρες προσπαθούν να βρουν καλύτερους τρόπους να ενταχθούν σ’ αυτό και προς τούτο η ιστορία κι η γεωγραφία μελετούνται υπό διαφορετικά πρίσματα, αναπτύσσονται νέες συνθέσεις, και επινοούνται συμπληρωματικές ερμηνείες και προσεγγίσεις.
Το Ινδο-Ειρηνικό Σύμπλεγμα είναι μια καθαρά ινδική θέση που επινοήθηκε για να ενισχύσει την θέση της Ινδίας μέσα στους Νέους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού.
Ιστορικά στηρίζεται στους τεκμηριωμένους θαλάσσιους εμπορικούς δρόμους, οι οποίοι κυρίως χρησίμευαν για την μετακίνηση μπαχαρικών, λιβανωτών και άλλων προϊόντων και είχαν φέρει κοντά την Ανατολική Αφρική, την Ινδία, την Ινδοκίνα και την Ινδονησία.
Στα σύγχρονα πλαίσια, μια τέτοια προσέγγιση συμφέρει την Ινδία, επειδή το Δελχί, βάζοντας έτσι στο αφρο-ευρασιατικό παιχνίδι σημαντικές οικονομίες όπως η Ινδονησία κι η Αυστραλία αλλά κι η Ανατολική Αφρική, λειτουργεί εξισορροπητικά απέναντι στην εμφανή κυριαρχία της Κίνας στο καθαρά ηπειρωτικό ευρασιατικό επίπεδο.
Αυτό είναι μια πολύ γνωστή τακτική στις διεθνείς σχέσεις: διευρύνεις το πεδίο ανταγωνισμού, όταν σε πιο ‘στενά’ όρια γίνεσαι ουραγός. Αλλά δείχνει ότι η Ινδία καταλαβαίνει ότι οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού είναι μονόδρομος των παγκοσμίων εξελίξεων. Και όπως είναι εύκολο να καταλάβει ο οποιοσδήποτε, είτε μουσουλμάνοι είτε ινδουϊστές, οι Ινδοί περιμένουν ανυπόμονα την ημέρα που οι παλιές αποικιοκρατικές δυνάμεις Γαλλία κι Αγγλία θα έχουν απομείνει με τόση ισχύ διεθνώς όση και η Σρι Λάνκα ή η Μαλαισία.
Αντίθετα, το σύνολο του αμόρφωτου, άρρωστου και ουσιαστικά σάπιου ελληνικού πολιτικού, πανεπιστημιακού και δημοσιογραφικού κατεστημένου εξακολουθεί να νομίζει ότι η Ελλάδα μπορεί να επιβιώσει μέσα στον σημερινό κόσμο είτε με προσήλωση στις παλιές συμμαχίες (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, ΕΕ, ΗΠΑ, ΝΑΤΟ), είτε με ελπίδες στηριγμένες στην ξεκάρφωτη, έωλη κι ανυπόστατη συμμαχία με το Ισραήλ και την Αίγυπτο.
Η αλήθεια είναι ότι η Ιστορία θα κτυπήσει τραγικά το νεώτερο αναθεωρητικό ψευτοκράτος Ελλάδα, όταν οι δημιουργοί του (Γαλλία, Αγγλία) παύσουν να υφίστανται.
Τόσο θα καταλάβουν όλοι οι Ρωμιοί ότι η Ελλάδα, αποσχισμένη από την Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία, στερημένη από τη ρωμέικη ορθόδοξη ταυτότητά της, κι εκμαυλισμένη λόγω εκδυτικισμού, πίστευε για δική της μια ‘ελληνοκεντρική’ ψευτοϊστορία τόσο ψεύτικη όσο και το κρατίδιο του Όθωνα.
Με τον επερχόμενο θάνατο και διάλυση των δημιουργών του ψευτοκράτους, θα σβύσουν και τα ρατσιστικά αποικιοκρατικά αφηγήματα για την τάχα σημασία του αρχαίου ελληνικού πολιτισμού, την δήθεν κοσμοϊστορική απήχησή του, και την υποτιθέμενη επίδρασή του σε άλλα έθνη.
Δηλαδή, κοντά είναι η μέρα που, αν κάποιοι κομπλεξικοί, υστερικοί και διεστραμμένοι σκατόψυχοι ισχυριστούν ότι υπήρχαν Έλληνες στην Αρχαία Κίνα, ότι η επαρχία Γιουν-νάν της Κίνας είναι ελληνική (επειδή οι Έλληνες λέγονται ‘Γιουνάν’ στα αραβικά!!!!!), κι ότι τα αγάλματα (από τερακότα) του κινεζικού στρατού στο Σιάν (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terracotta_Army) είναι φτειαγμένα από Έλληνες, θα τρώνε κι ένα σκεπάρνι στο κεφάλι για να ξεμπερδέψουμε μια και καλή από τους ψευτομασώνους της κακιάς ώρας.
Στην προώθηση κι εμπέδωση των μακρόπνοων σχεδίων της αφρο-ευρασιατικής επανασύνδεσης συμμετέχει με ιδιαίτερη έμφαση και η Ρωσσία, επειδή έχει καταλάβει ότι αυτή η εξέλιξη συμφέρει και στην Μόσχα.
Το Eastern Economic Forum-2019, το οποίο λαμβάνει χώρα σε λίγες μέρες στο Βλαδιβοστόκ, είναι μια κορυφαία εκδήλωση απ’ αυτή την άποψη.
Ως μείζον γεγονός φέρνει μαζί αρχηγούς κρατών, υπουργούς, βουλευτές, διευθυντές κρατικών οργανισμών, εκπροσώπους της ιδιωτικής πρωτοβουλίας και του επιχειρηματικού κόσμου, πανεπιστημιακούς, ειδικευμένους επιστήμονες, και δημοσιογράφους οι οποίοι εξετάζουν δυνατότητες και παρουσιάζουν προτάσεις για την υλοποίηση του φιλόδοξου προγράμματος των Νέων Δρόμων του Μεταξιού.
Είναι μια κοσμογονία που στην Ελλάδα δυστυχώς θα μείνει ολότελα άγνωστη και δεν θα καλυφθεί από τα διαπλεκόμενα ΜΜΕ και τα social media των κρετίνων αρχαιολατρών κι ελληνο-αυνανιστών.
Παράλληλα και εντός των πλαισίων της οργάνωσης του Eastern Economic Forum-2019, κορυφαία think tanks οργανώνουν ιδιαίτερα σεμινάρια και συζητήσεις που φωτίζουν όψεις της αφρο-ευρασιατικής αναγέννησης.
Στην συνέχεια θα βρείτε μια σειρά από παρουσιάσεις εκ μέρους του ρωσσικού think tank Valdai Club το οποίο συμμετέχει επίσης στο γεγονός.
Στο τέλος, σύνδεσμοι σας παραπέμπουν στο σάιτ του Eastern Economic Forum. Επίσης επισυνάπτω μια έκδοση του Valdai Club για το Μέλλον του Πολέμου (The Future of War) για να δείτε πόσο διαφορετική μορφή θα έχουν οι αυριανοί πόλεμοι: κανένας στρατός δεν θα μπορεί να τους αντιμετωπίσει και μόνον οι επί τούτω οργανωμένες ιδιωτικές στρατιωτικές εταιρείες θα είναι ικανές να τους διεξαγάγουν επιτυχώς.
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Valdai Club at the Eastern Economic Forum-2019
This year, the Valdai Club will take part in the Eastern Economic Forum for a fourth time. On September 4, at 10:00 the Club will hold a session titled “The Asian Mirror: The Pivot to the East Through the Eyes of our Asian Partners” and on the same day, at 14:30, it is due to present a book titled “Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East”.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/own/valdai-club-at-the-eastern-economic-forum-2019/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
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Valdai Club at the EEF-2019: The Asian Mirror: The Pivot to the East Through the Eyes of Our Asian Partners. Special Session
This year, the Valdai Discussion Club will take part in the Eastern Economic Forum for the fourth time. On September 4, at 10:00 the Club will hold a session titled “The Asian Mirror: The Pivot East Through the Eyes of Our Asian Partners”.
Logically and thematically, the session is a continuation of a series of events dedicated to the key focus of the Club’s work in 2019 – Russian politics in the East.
Our interest in the topic is due to the strengthening of Russia’s position in the East, the ambition of the country’s leaders to enhance the Eastern aspect of foreign policy, and the geopolitical events in the region, which have had an effect on the entire world.
The Valdai session’s main goal won’t be to discuss plans for the development of the Far East and its integration in the Asia-Pacific Region, but rather the things that have already been achieved. Russia’s turn to the East is gaining momentum.
The time has come to summarise its interim results and to hear the position of our Asian partners on how successful Russian policy has been, from their point of view.
The session will feature prominent experts and public opinion leaders from Russia and several Asian countries.
Together, they will answer: how do they regard the results of Russia’s turn to the East? What has it managed to do? What role does Asia want Russia to play?
Speakers:
To Anh Dung, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam
Fan Weiguo, Chief of Eurasian Bureau of Xinhua News Agency
Lee Jae-Young, President, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Michael Tay, Founder and Director of the Foundation for the Arts and Social Enterprise, Ambassador of Singapore to Russia (2002-2008); Founder of the Russia-Singapore Business Forum
Andrey Bystritskiy, Chairman of the Board of the Foundation for the Development and Support of the International Valdai Discussion Club
Apurva Sanghi, Lead Economist, World Bank in Russia
Moderator:
Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE
Working languages: Russian, English.
Venue: Vladivostok, Far Eastern Federal University, Building B, Conference Hall 6.
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Valdai Club at the EEF-2019: Presentation of a Book ‘Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East’
On September 4, at 14:30, in the framework of Eastern Economic Forum-2019, the Valdai Discussion Club is going to present a book titled “Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East”.
For years, the Valdai Discussion Club has been Russia’s leading analytical centre for discussing and developing the agenda for Russia’s turn to the East. Since 2013, when Russia’s leaders proclaimed that the development of the Far East is “a national task for the 21st century”, this project has become the most important engine of the country’s foreign and domestic policy.
Since 2012, the Club has published six analytic papers under the general title “Toward the Great Ocean”, which refers to the credo used by Russian pioneers from the 16th century until the early 20th century. The papers aim to both summarise the achievements and challenges of Russia’s turn to the East, and make suggestions for its development.
“Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East” is a collection of all the six analytic papers (2012–2018), as well as detailed comments by project manager Sergei Karaganov on each of its parts, as well as essays on the topic, delivered by prominent Asian scholars.
During the presentation of the book, attendees will also learn about the research work carried out by the Valdai Club and its plans for future publications.
Speakers:
Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE
Andrey Bystritskiy, Chairman of the Board of the Foundation for the Development and Support of the International Valdai Discussion Club
Sergei Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University Higher School of Economics; Honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy
Thomas Graham, Senior Director, Kissinger Associates
Moderator:
Victoria Panova, Vice-President for International Affairs, Far Eastern Federal University
Working languages: Russian, English.
Venue: Vladivostok, Far Eastern Federal University, Roscongress & Governors ’Club, Building A, Level 4.
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The Indo-Pacific Concept First Hand: Indian Foreign Minister Speaks at Valdai Club
On Tuesday, August 27, Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met with the Valdai Discussion Club’s experts. During the open part of the meeting, he spoke about the concept of the Indo-Pacific, as New Delhi sees it, about the key trends in modern international relations and the prospects for bilateral cooperation.
The day before, Mr. Jaishankar had arrived in Russia on his first visit as Minister of External Affairs in preparation for the Eastern Economic Forum, whose main foreign guest will be Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It is worth noting that the professional career of Subrahmanyam Jaishankar took him to Moscow almost forty years ago: for two years he worked at the Embassy of India as the third, and then the second secretary. At the beginning of the meeting at the Valdai Club, the Minister optimistically said that much has changed in the world over the years, but the Russian-Indian relations remain one of the stable factors in international life.
According to the minister, the most important trend in international relations is a movement towards multi-polarity. This is due to the weakening of US dominance, established after the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of new centres of power. “We believe that economic, political and technological power is more distributed around the world than ever before in history after 1945,” he said.
“Now there are more sources of influence in the world order, and the idea that one country can play a decisive role is out-dated.” This process is accompanied by the weakening of established rules and the growth of uncertainty. According to Mr. Jaishankar, the world goes from a system of alliances to a system of convergences, when countries join forces to solve common problems without entering into formal alliances.
As one example of such convergence, he named the concept of the Indo-Pacific region, which has become the hallmark of Indian foreign policy in recent years.
According to the minister, the connection between the regions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans have existed for centuries: five hundred years ago, India’s cultural, political and economic presence was felt in Southeast Asia and on the coast of China, and the policy of the British, who made India the centre of their colonial empire in Asia, can be described as Indo-Pacific project.
Everything changed after the Second World War, when the United States, which became the hegemon in the region, shifted its focus to the Pacific Ocean and made Northeast Asia the centre of gravity. Mr. Jaishankar believes that the concept of the Indo-Pacific region has allowed for the restoration of the artificially-broken connection between the regions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
The minister welcomed the fact, that the problems of the Indo-Pacific are beginning to be discussed more and more widely in Russia. According to him, it would be good if Russia formulates its own vision toward the Indo-Pacific region. “India is a strong power in the Indian Ocean with a serious interest in the Pacific Ocean, Russia is a strong Pacific power with an interest in the Indian Ocean,” he said.
‘How can we harmonize these interests – that’s the matter. We have such experience in the Eurasian space. It is important today to see where our interests in maritime cooperation can be translated into real interaction.”
Mr. Jaishankar emphasized that the concept of the Indo-Pacific is not directed against any countries, particularly China. According to him, the opinion that this concept is being promoted by Washington to contain Beijing’s influence is out-dated and reflects the Cold War paradigm. “India views the Indo-Pacific region in a more comprehensive manner,” he said.
Presentation of the Valdai Discussion Club’s Analytical Report “The Future of War”
On August 27, at 11.00, the Valdai Discussion Club hosted a presentation of Club’s new analytical report titled “The Future of War”.
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The Big Seven: The West Can No Longer Solve All Problems Alone
What is the “West”? Does the West still exist as such – in light of Britain’s exit from the EU and the US drift towards unilateral approaches? This question concerns many people now – mainly in Old Europe, writes Arnaud Dubien, head of the Observo Franco-Russian Analytical Centre.
Today, the G7 is going through difficult times – and even, perhaps, suffering a real existential crisis. This is due to at least two factors.
First, there is the presence in this club of an element that contrasts itself with the rest of the member countries – this, of course, is the United States. Since the US is the largest Western power, it has made the work of the organisation problematic: many experts say that on many issues it’s incorrect to think of the group as the G7, but rather “six plus one”.
Second, the weight and legitimacy of the Seven has been called into question, not only in connection with the absence or possible return of Russia to the group, but also because it is impossible to seriously discuss the fate of the world without China, India and other major world powers.
It would be more appropriate here to return to the idea of another French president – Giscard d’Estaing, who launched this project in the 1970s and saw what would become the “seven” as an informal conversation among Western democracies.
Now it better resembles something between the old “seven” and the current G20 with a joint agenda, which does not contribute to a better understanding of the group’s current tasks.
Even though, in order to avoid disagreements, the leaders of the G7 didn’t attempt to publish a joint communique, the benefits of the Biarritz summit were more than expected. Emmanuel Macron showed considerable energy and a lot of questions were brought up for discussion – these not only concerned the fate of the West, but also trade wars and Brazil’s fires.
As for Macron’s discussions about the future of the West and the role the G7, one can see here that the development of those thoughts surrounded his meeting with Vladimir Putin: the French president understands that the West can no longer solve all problems alone and that its influence is diminishing, although this does not need to be overestimated.
On the other hand, what is the “West”? Is there still the West as such – in light of Britain’s exit from the EU and the US drift towards unilateral approaches? This question is of concern to many now – mainly in Old Europe. If initially the European Union was created out of fear of the USSR, now it has to dissociate itself from the United States. If Europe, as Macron says, wants to be sovereign, it will have to assert itself and go against the ideas that have dominated for sixty years. Therefore, this process is becoming harder.
Whether negotiations with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif following his somewhat unexpected appearance at the summit have succeeded in influencing the fate of the JCPOA is not known, and one can only hope for that. However, in general, this once again shows that even within the G7, the United States has adopted an isolated stance on this issue.
Although this initiative originally belonged to Macron, it seems to have been supported by all other countries in Europe and even Japan. In other words, this is an attempt to show that Europe, at least on this issue, can assert its identity, take a unified position and force the United States to talk, and maybe even make concessions.
As for the question of Russia’s return, Moscow has little interest in re-creating the G8, because it never felt comfortable there; on the contrary, it often found itself alone against everyone else.
However, the very fact that this issue is being discussed, that new watersheds have appeared and frictions have arisen, is positive for Russia: this means that the topic is big and important for discussion in a club where Moscow does not represent itself.
This confirms Macron’s thesis that without Russia, serious global problems cannot be solved. For Moscow, at this stage, this is the most positive development.
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G7 Summit in Biarritz: The End of Westernization
Biarritz was, if we must believe the French media, the centre of the world, on the occasion of the G7 summit this weekend (24th – 26th August). It was a summit that was dedicated, officially, to fighting inequality, but one where contentious topics were discussed: the GAFA tax, which had the unusual effect of uniting the French and the British against the Americans, the environment, the trade dispute between the United States and China, and the question of Iran, regarding which the US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA agreement has been widely criticised among European countries.
But this G7 summit, despite communications operations – like the arrival, presented as a “surprise,” by the Iranian Foreign Minister – could well turn out to be a failure. The member countries have taken action so that national policies and bilateral relations now outweigh multilateralism. In addition, it should be added that we are no longer where we found ourselves during the 1980s or 1990s. The G7, which claims to be the “club” of the richest and most powerful countries, has today been overtaken by the BRICS. In fact, it is the G20 that is increasingly emerging as the legitimate institution for dealing with the interweaving of economic, financial and strategic affairs.
The G7, official and unofficial agenda
Officially, therefore, the expected decisions concerned the reduction of inequality, an important topic in a world torn apart by inequalities. However, it is a subject on which we can expect a lot of beautiful words and very little concrete action. The issue of the environment has taken some urgency because of the devastating forest fires ravaging the Amazon.
This is obviously an important question, but also an issue where there is a lot of hypocrisy. This is because the Amazon isn’t just burning in Brazil (fires have also ravaged Bolivia, Paraguay and other countries), and also because the Amazon is not the only major forest to burn: forest fires that today rage in Africa are equally important, but no one speaks of it.
Similarly, this summer’s fires, which are certainly disastrous, are only slightly more numerous than those of 2016: 75,336 fires versus 69,310. It is true that the problem of deforestation, induced by the pressure of livestock and the cultivation of soybeans, is a major issue today in the Amazon. But it was, perhaps, an even more pressing problem twenty years ago.
Source:
https://rainforests.mongabay.com/amazon/deforestation_calculations.html#content
The issue of trade negotiations and the role of multilateralism were also discussed. The United States and other countries differ on this point in important ways. We can also note that some issues which were not explicitly on the agenda were addressed: the instrumentalisation of trade in dollars for political purposes by the United States is a major problem, as well as the growing risks of recession and global crisis.
The United States has clearly expressed dissatisfaction with multilateral negotiations. The countries of the European Union are, rightly or wrongly, more attached to it. The membership of the United States in the WTO has therefore been called into question; it is indeed a central issue. If the US government were to decide to walk out of the WTO, it would probably sound the death toll for the organisation.
The question of Iran was also raised at the summit. The European countries have denounced the US decision to walk away from the agreement with Iran on nuclear weapons and technology. They have also denounced the US sanctions policy, which is hurting the European countries much more than Iran. The arrival of the Iranian Foreign Minister testifies to Emmanuel Macron’s willingness to restart negotiations at this point.
The challenges of this summit
Emmanuel Macron, who happens to be the President of the G7 this year, was playing a high-stakes game with this meeting. A clear failure, as in 2018 in Canada, would have lastingly compromised his claims to present himself as a great negotiator. He is also aware that the influence of the G7 has greatly diminished over the last ten years. The G7 is the distant heir of the G5, which was formed to try to coordinate the monetary policies of the major Western powers following the dissolution in 1973 of the Bretton Woods agreements.
Originally, the G7 was the brainchild of French President Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981). The G7 has been tasked with coordinating currency movements as exchange rates have become flexible. Called first informally the G5, then provisionally the G6 when it was formally established in 1975, and later the G7 with Canada’s integration in 1976, its influence soon spread to other aspects of the economy, beyond mere monetary policy problems.
The G7 nations still had, at the end of the twentieth century, a dominant role in the world economy. This is no longer the case today. The process of the emergence of new economies has clearly changed the whole ball game. The expulsion of Russia from the G8 in 2014, an expulsion that is now regretted by both the Japanese and Italian leaders as well as Donald Trump, has certainly hastened its decline. Moreover, if we calculate in purchasing power parity terms, the G7’s share of global GDP is today lower than that of the BRICS, a forum which brings together five emerging market countries.
It is obvious that Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to invite other countries, such as Australia, India, South Africa and Chile, is a recognition of this state of affairs. However, it must be noted here that China and Russia were not invited, despite the major role they play. The invitations that were made were therefore intended to mask the G7’s loss of influence and prestige in comparison with the G20.
G7 or G20?
It is clear today that any closed club of rich countries no longer has any legitimacy making decisions on behalf of the emerging market countries or even just proposing them. The United States, for its part, has understood that it would like to re-invite Russia to participate in the G7, according to a statement mirroring one made by the Japanese prime minister. But it is unlikely that Russia would really be moved by such a proposal. It knows full well that the G7 is an institution that is nearing the end of its life. The G7 is thus being overtaken by the BRICS not only in terms of its percentage of world PPP-adjusted GDP, but also in terms of the proportion of investment being made worldwide.
This reflects not only the rise of investments being made in China, India and Russia, both internally and worldwide, but also the significant slowdown in investments made in the G7 countries, whether they be German or US investments. Again, it can be seen that until 2000, the G7 countries accounted for about 60% of global investment. The turning point therefore dates from the 21st century. Emerging market countries have significantly increased their share of investment. They caught up with the G7 countries in 2009, and they overtook them.
In fact, a comparison of the G20 with the G7 shows that the first group has taken precedence over the second. It is the G20 that has become the global forum that really counts. And this is true when you compare the weight of the G7 with that of the G20.
The G20 currently accounts for 73.6% of global GDP. The group is comprised of the G7 nations, the European Union, the BRICS and six other countries. It is this set of countries (along with the EU) that is most economically relevant.
What are final results of this summit?
The record that we can draw today from this summit is very mixed. Clearly, we have not gone beyond rhetoric in addressing the question of inequality or the environmental emergency. It could not have been otherwise, given the significant differences among the G7 countries.
The trade dispute between China and the United States, meanwhile, is more beautiful. On Friday, August 23rd, China re-launched the escalation of the trade war, with further tariff increases on products imported from the United States. The US administration immediately responded by increasing duties on products imported from China.
All this has been observed, by the European G7 countries, which have not reacted. Germany, in particular, fears being dragged into this trade war, as its economy is on the verge of a recession. Regarding the GAFA tax, which both the French and British governments are pushing for, an agreement could possibly be reached, but at the probable price of making a mockery of the very idea of taxing Internet giants.
With respect to the Iranian issue, it is clear that the discussions will continue. Both the United States and Iran want to find a way out of the current crisis. It is perhaps on this issue that progress is possible.
However, this summit has rammed home an important lesson. So we are witnessing the end of the Westernisation of the world, a process that took place between the late eighteenth century and the end of the twentieth century. We must make note of this. It is why Russia does not particularly want to return to the G7, even though it has been pleased to hear Donald Trump’s statements about its possible return.
The centre of gravity of the global economy is indeed no longer the Atlantic Ocean. It has moved to Asia with the rise of China, the world’s second largest economy (and even first if we calculate in Purchasing Power Parity terms) and a direct interlocutor of the United States. And this is not to mention India, which is also gaining strength and is now in 5th place, ahead of France. This is why the meeting of the G7 in Biarritz was no longer able to decide for the world, whatever the major French media and its journalists think.
The G7 countries, since the summit held in Canada in 2018, have measured what it would be like to show off their differences. At the same time, never have the latter been so important, and above all, seemed irremediable and irreconcilable. So, we cannot exclude the notion that the group is witnessing open failure. However, it is more likely that diplomats will find some beautiful hollow formulas that proclaim that the “club” still works even though it is patently acknowledged that the group is paralyzed and, above all, that it no longer has the importance it had 20 years ago.
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Goodbye Pacific Rim, Hello Indo-Pacific?
THE EASTERN PERSPECTIVE
01.07.2019
By Anton Bespalov
In recent years, the term “Indo-Pacific” has been used more and more frequently. According to some analysts, it is replacing the well-established concept of the Asia-Pacific region, reflecting a new balance of power in Asia. Beijing is suspicious of the fact that the Indo-Pacific concept is being actively promoted by Washington, believing that its ultimate goal is to contain China.
We are investigating whether or not this is so – and whether Russia should be wary of the emergence of a new regional construct.
“Indo-Pacific” appeared for the first time as a geostrategic concept in a January 2007 article by analyst Gurprit Khurana for the magazine Strategic Analysis. The author, an Indian naval captain, postulates that for India, the safety of sea routes has become more and more important, since almost all of its foreign trade, including the import of energy resources, is by sea. Japan is in a similar situation – and therefore, in his opinion, the interests of the two countries will increasingly converge, which will lead to the creation of a special political and economic community uniting the two oceans.
The Indo-Pacific notion immediately gained recognition in India – if only because the concept of “Asia-Pacific” categorically did not suit Indians. In a publication dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the article “Safety of sea routes: prospects for Indian-Japanese cooperation,” Khurana quoted the former chief of staff of the Indian Navy, Aruna Prakash, who, speaking in 2009 at the Shangri-La Dialogue forum, said:
Every time I hear about the Asia-Pacific region, it seems to me, as an Indian, that my country is left out of the box. This region seems to include northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and ends at the Strait of Malacca. But the whole world begins west of the Strait of Malacca.
The new term appeared at an opportune time: India was becoming increasingly aware of itself as an independent actor in the global arena, which was reflected in the national consciousness. As for Japan, at the beginning of the 21st century, it was already headed for rapprochement with India. Also in 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spoke about the special role of the two countries in Asia in an address to the Indian parliament.
He called for the creation of an “arc of freedom and well-being” along the outer rim of the Eurasian continent. The Indo-Japanese partnership, according to Abe, should be built on “common values, such as freedom, democracy and respect for fundamental human rights, as well as strategic interests”.
The Japanese prime minister painted a grand picture – through their joint efforts, the two countries would create a new “open and transparent” community of freedom and democracy that will unite the entire Pacific region, including the United States and Australia, and ensure the free movement of people, goods, capital and knowledge.
“CONFLUENCE OF THE TWO SEAS” SPEECH BY H.E.MR. SHINZO ABE, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AT THE PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA
By Japan and India coming together in this way, this “broader Asia” will evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and Australia. Open and transparent, this network will allow people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely.
The word “China” was not heard in Abe’s speech even once, but both parties understood each other perfectly. The “arc of freedom” neatly bypasses the PRC, and the Asian giant remains outside the brackets of the “wide open Asia” that the Japanese prime minister spoke of.
During his second term in office, Abe perfected this concept, making Indo-Pacific a central theme of Japan’s security policy, economic aid and investment, writes Robert Manning, author of the Valdai Paper “United States Indo-Pacific Strategy: Myths and Reality.”
In a 2016 speech, Abe defined this concept, explaining that “the goal of this strategy is to turn the Indo-Pacific region into a zone free from violence and coercion, where the rule of law reigns and where the market economy rules, ensuring regional prosperity”. The three main pillars, according to Tokyo, are: values and principles – democracy, the rule of law, free markets and the improvement of physical and institutional connectedness; safety and stability; and ensuring freedom of navigation.
Another country where the new concept was adopted with enthusiasm was Australia, which is logical, given that the country is actually washed by the waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, despite being on the periphery of the newly-imagined region.
For more than a decade, the economic development of the country has relied on trade with China, and in recent years Australian policymakers have been increasingly talking about the influence of Beijing on the nation’s domestic policy. Becoming overly dependent on “undemocratic” and “unfree” China is the main nightmare of the elites of one of the most “Western” countries in the southern hemisphere..
In 2013, the country’s White Paper on Defence noted: “The continuing rise of China as a global power, the growing economic and strategic weight of East Asia, and India’s imminent transformation into a global power are all key trends affecting the development of the Indian Ocean region as being of heightened strategic importance. Taken together, these trends contribute to the formation of the Indo-Pacific region as a single strategic arc.”
As for the United States, the first mention of the Indo-Pacific by their officials was in 2010. “We understand how important the Indo-Pacific basin is for global trade,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, emphasising the importance of the interaction between the US Navy and India in the Pacific. At long last, “Indo-Pacific” entered the American foreign policy lexicon with Donald Trump.
It was during his presidency that the format of the quadrilateral security dialogue (QUAD), proposed by Shinzo Abe back in 2007, was revived. In November 2017, Trump took part in two important East Asian forums over the course of several days: the APEC summit in Da Nang, Vietnam and the ASEAN summit in Manila, Philippines.
As Valdai Club expert Viktor Sumsky wrote, in public statements, Trump made no mention of the Pacific Rim, a key feature of APEC rhetoric, speaking instead about the Indo-Pacific region. A working meeting among the diplomats of four countries on the sidelines of the East Asian Summit caused a wave of publications about the formation of a new security configuration in the region – directed against China.
It must be said that Beijing perceived the very first consultations in the quadrilateral format as being directed against China, and reacted with lightning speed. On the eve of the meeting, the representatives of Australia, India, the US and Japan in Manila on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in May 2007, China sent a note to each of the four countries. Beijing’s attitude toward the Indo-Pacific concept was and remains negative, and is characterised by Valdai club expert Zhao Huasheng as one of “coldness and suspicion.”
But can it really be considered anti-Chinese? To what extent are the QUAD members attempting to contain China or confront it? Looking ahead, let’s say: no one wants confrontation, but there are nuances.
The idea of the Indo-Pacific has an anti-Chinese sound only as interpreted by Washington, says Valdai Club expert Alexei Kupriyanov, a researcher at IMEMO RAN. “In the US interpretation, the Indo-Pacific is structured around the QUAD as a prototype of a defensive alliance that operates in the most acceptable form to other participating states – without commitments and exclusively through informal consultations,” he says. “The United States wants to demonstrate its interest in this project without extra spending and commitment, by trying to establish an anti-China alliance with the participation of India and Australia.”
In turn, India seeks to maximize the use of Americans as a counterweight to China, the expert said. Delhi does not want to get too close to Washington and commit itself – and at the same time wants to increase its economic and political ties with Japan. “India is trying to maintain a balance between the US and China,” says Kupriyanov. “Although India’s political and military leaders are emphatically anti-China, its economic interests require cooperation with China. Although India bluntly rejects the idea of becoming China’s junior partner, it does not intend to take part in any anti-Chinese actions outside the Indian Ocean. ”
Japan is in a similar situation. According to Kupriyanov, it has to simultaneously cooperate and compete with China. “In addition, Japan is interested in access to the promising markets of the African countries and preserving its positions in Southeast and South Asia.
In August 2018, Indonesia announced its own vision of Indo-Pacific, and this was an interesting turn in the development of the concept. “ The importance of this step is hard to overestimate,” writes Kupriyanov. “For a decade, the ASEAN states denied the Indo-Pacific region the right to exist, fearing that the new geopolitical construct would destroy the familiar, well-known Asia-Pacific region, in which ASEAN had already staked out a key role.
The decision of Indonesia, which claims to be the unofficial leader of the Association, to abandon this practice and henceforth build its policy within an Indo-Pacific framework means that one of the most serious opponents of the Indo-Pacific construct has moved to the camp of its supporters, and others will follow. ”
This step was quite logical, since it is Indonesia that serves as a link between the Indian and Pacific oceans. It is noteworthy that its vision of the Indo-Pacific region has no anti-Chinese overtones. As can be seen, the US desire to create an alliance against Beijing contradicts the objective interests of other countries of the region being created. They not only do not want confrontation with China, but also realize that trade and economic ties with the Asian giant are the key to their successful development.
However, Washington is aware of the reluctance of Asian countries to enter direct confrontation with China. Therefore, the system of restraining China’s regional ambitions will be “elegant and subtle”, rather than taking the form of a defensive alliance, wrote Valdai club expert Anton Tsvetov in March 2018. Despite the continuing statements about shared values, the nature of the union, the backbone of which will remain the QUAD, will be pragmatic.
This is quite natural, given that a number of states that are concerned about the strengthening of China do not fall into the category of “free” and “democratic” at all. We are talking primarily about Vietnam, which is actively developing relations with the United States and with India, despite the differences in political systems. This transition to pragmatism is reflected in the fact that the Indo-Pacific region is less and less often categorized in terms of “maritime democracies”, notes Tsvetov: “instead of this phrase, the expression ‘like-minded states’ is used.”
It is interesting to look at how countries from this still largely imaginary region look at Chinese infrastructure projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In Asia, this initiative is perceived ambiguously: both as a chance for development, and as a means of promoting Beijing’s influence.
In February 2018, the QUAD member countries first addressed the creation of alternatives to the Chinese initiative, and the development of “quality infrastructure” was among the themes during the Japanese presidency of the G20.
The term “quality”, as you might guess, means infrastructure created not under the leadership of China or with Chinese money. So far, the results have been rather modest, but this does not mean that in the future the two projects will not be able to compete, for the benefit of the countries which receive infrastructure assistance.
“Currently, the BRI and the ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific region are competing initiatives,” says Samir Saran, President of the Indian Observer Analytical Centre Research Foundation. However, the real choice will be made by developing states, who are currently leveraging both initiatives to obtain better deals.
It’s not inconceivable that in the long term, some multilateral arrangement will accommodate both initiatives. The ‘viability’ of these competing propositions will depend on which resonates more with the development and security needs of developing states in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific. In the short term, both will co-exist and compete.”
Japan, despite being one of the key countries interested in creating an alternative to the Belt and Road, is “inclined to cooperate with China on the BRI to advance its own commercial interests,” adds Saran. As for India, it does not plan to participate in the BRI, believing that this project undermines its sovereignty and makes it difficult to defend interests in other areas. “On the other hand, China can become the largest investor in the economy of India. Delhi will have to pursue a steadfast course in foreign policy and develop economic cooperation with China,” the expert emphasises.
The Indo-Pacific project is only considered by Washington as a zero-sum game, says Alexei Kupriyanov: “For the US, freezing or liquidating all Chinese infrastructure and trade initiatives is beneficial, as it undermines China’s economic and political opportunities, destroys its safe rear, and forces resources and funds to be removed from the main, from the American point of view, theatre – the Pacific Ocean.”
For the rest of Asia, Indo-Pacific offers an alternative to the land projects of the Belt and Road. “It is quicker and easier to transport some goods by land and others by sea. If there is a problem with one, the other could compensate. The Indo-Japanese-Indonesian version of the Indo-Pacific and the Belt and Road project could be integrated if both sides are interested and have the political will: both initiatives increase Eurasia’s transport potential.”
That is why Russia should closely monitor the implementation of the Indo-Pacific concept, seeing in it not as a threat, but a chance for itself. “Russia should support the Indo-Japanese-Indonesian view of the Indo-Pacific as a maritime Eurasia to counterweigh the US concept of it as a space for an anti-China alliance. It is necessary to uphold the inclusive character of the Indo-Pacific (probably including renaming the concept the Indo-Asia-Pacific) and to facilitate China’s involvement in it,” Kupriyanov says.
“The Indo-Pacific project gives Moscow leverage with China in Eurasia,” believes Samir Saran, reflecting India’s traditional concern about the close ties between Moscow and Beijing. “Currently, Russia is subservient to China’s economy and, by consequence, its political vision. Moscow should recognize that while China may seek a multipolar world, its vision for Eurasia is unipolar. Russia will only benefit if both the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia are truly multipolar in their power structures.”
In this regard, questions arise regarding the quality of Russia’s relations with India and the ASEAN countries, as key participants in the region being created. This topic was discussed during two important events held by the Valdai Club in 2019: the Russia-India and Russia-Vietnam conferences. The participants have stated that there is a “demand for Russia” both in India and in Southeast Asia, but Russia’s ability to increase its economic and political presence in the region is limited. Moreover, the existing bias towards military technology cooperation (especially in relations with India) may result in the loss of strategic positions in the long run.
Therefore, it is time for Russia to form its own vision of Indo-Pacific and, importantly, bring it to the countries of the region. “A provision to the effect that Russia’s regions in the Far East (Primorye Territory and Kamchatka) are an inalienable part of the Indo-Pacific should play a key role in this respect,” Kupriyanov says.
“These regions should be viewed as gates to the north that can provide access to the wealth of northern Eurasia and the joining of great Eurasian overland routes with the sea routes along its southern coast. They should also be seen as gates to the Arctic, a storehouse of resources. The Far East should be positioned as one of the centers of attraction in the Indo-Pacific, its resource, scientific and, in perspective, also its production base.”
Thus, connecting to the Indo-Pacific project could provide for Russia an addition to its large-scale turn to the East. By providing an alternative to the main sea trade route of Eurasia, Indo-Pacific also fit into the logic of building a Greater Eurasia, as Moscow advocates. Washington’s attempts to “encircle” China run up against the resistance of regional powers that do not want confrontation with Beijing, as well as excessive US influence in Asia. The geostrategic landscape is changing rapidly, and the main thing for Russia is to keep up with these changes, taking advantage of opportunities as they arise.
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/goodbye-pacific-rim-hello-indo-pacific/
Σχετικά με το Eastern Economic Forum-2019, 4-6 Σεπτεμβρίου 2019:
https://forumvostok.ru/en/about-the-forum/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/cultural/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/organizing-committee-reception/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/combat-night/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/sport-programme/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/social-platform/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/partner-events/
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Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/ss-250591302
https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/afro-eurasiatic_geopolitics_30_8_2019.docx
https://vk.com/doc429864789_619665631
Χούνζα, Μπαλτί, Ισλάμ, Βουδισμός, οι Στρατιώτες του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου κι οι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού, των Μπαχαρικών και των Λιβανωτών
Hunza Valley, Baltistan, Islam, Buddhism, Alexander the Great's soldiers, and the Silk-, Spice-, and Incense Roads
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 8η Μαΐου 2019.
Ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης ανασυνθέτει υλικό από πρότερες δημοσιεύσεις μου για τους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού και στοιχεία από ομιλία μου σχετικά με τους Δρόμους των Λιβανωτών και των Μπαχαρικών ανάμεσα στο Κέρας της Αφρικής και την Κεντρική Ασία, την οποία έδωσα στο Καζακστάν τον Ιανουάριο του 2018.
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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/05/08/χούνζα-μπαλτί-ισλάμ-βουδισμός-οι-στρ/ ==================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Κοντά στα σύνορα με την Κίνα, στο βόρειο άκρο του Πακιστάν και τριγύρω από το Γκιλγκίτ, πολλές μικρές κοιλάδες κατοικούνται από διαφορετικά μικρά έθνη με μεγάλη Ιστορία και μεγαλύτερο ηρωϊσμό.
Οι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού, των Μπαχαρικών και των Λιβανωτών δεν περνούσαν πάντοτε από εδώ. Στην εντελώς αρχική τους μορφή, οι εμπορικοί δρόμοι ξεκινούσαν από την Μεσοποταμία και κατέληγαν στην Κίνα και στην Ινδία: επρόκειτο για διαφορετικούς δρόμους.
Και η Μεσοποταμία, αν και μακρύτερα, ήταν πολύ πιο νωρίς συνδεδεμένη με την Κίνα, επειδή πολιτισμός στην Ινδία (ακόμη κι ο πρώιμος, μη ινδοευρωπαϊκός ‘πολιτισμός της Κοιλάδας του Ινδού’) είναι μία πολύ καθυστερημένη περίπτωση, αν πάρουμε ως μέτρα και σταθμά την Σουμέρ, το Ελάμ, την Ακκάδ, την Ασσυρία και την Βαβυλώνα.
Επίσης, στην αρχική μορφή των εμπορικών δρόμων, το Μετάξι δεν ήταν ένα από τα προϊόντα. Αλλά πολύτιμοι λίθοι, σπάνια ορυκτά, μπαχαρικά και λιβανωτά ήταν πάντοτε στο επίκεντρο του εμπορικού ενδιαφέροντος.
Η πραγματική ‘επανάσταση’ στους εμπορικούς δρόμους ανάμεσα στην Μεσοποταμία, την Κίνα και την Ινδία έγινε στα αχαιμενιδικά χρόνια (550-330 π.Χ.) και κυρίως χάρη στην τεράστια σημασία που έδωσαν οι πρώτοι σάχηδες του Ιράν να εγκαθιδρύσουν ένα πολύ σύνθετο σύστημα αυτοκρατορικών οδών, πολύ καλά οργανωμένων, επιμελημένων και προστατευμένων, διά ξηράς, ερήμου και θαλάσσης.
Το μεγάλο αυτό συγκοινωνιακό και εμπορικό δίκτυο προσέφερε πολλές εναλλακτικές δυνατότητες: αντί να στείλουν προϊόντα, αποστολές, στρατό, κοκ από την Αίγυπτο (ιρανική αχαιμενιδική σατραπεία) διά ξηράς στο Φαρς (κεντρική επαρχία του Ιράν), δηλαδή μέσω Παλαιστίνης, Συρίας, Μεσοποταμίας και Ελυμαΐδας (: Νότιας Υπερτιγριανής), μπορούσαν να τα στείλουν από τα αιγυπτιακά λιμάνια της Ερυθράς Θαλάσσης στον Περσικό Κόλπο.
Ο Δαρείος Α’, προνοητικός, άνοιξε εκ νέου την από αιώνες κλεισμένη, αρχαία διώρυγα του Σουέζ, η οποία ήταν ολότελα διαφορετικής κατεύθυνσης από την σύγχρονη (δηλαδή από τα δυτικά προς τα ανατολικά) και συνέδεε τον Νείλο (από την περιοχή περίπου του σημερινού Καΐρου) με την Ερυθρά Θάλασσα.
Κάτι ακόμη πιο σημαντικό που επιτεύχθηκε από την αχαιμενιδική ιρανική εμπορική και συγκοινωνιακή κοσμογονία ήταν το γεγονός ότι διαφορετικοί εμπορικοί δρόμοι αλληλεξαρτήθηκαν για πρώτη φορά, έτσι καθιστώντας γνωστά σε πολύ μακρινά σημεία πολλά προϊόντα μέχρι τότε άγνωστα.
Το εμπόριο μεταξύ Μεσοποταμίας και Κίνας, ή Μεσοποταμίας και Ινδίας (: Κοιλάδας του Ινδού) ανάγεται εύκολα στην 3η προχριστιανική χιλιετία στα τέλη της οποίας βλέπουμε ένα πλήθος διαδοχικών αρχαιολογικών χώρων να χαράσσουν μια γραμμή που μέσω Κεντρικής Ασίας συνέδεε την κοιλάδα των Διδύμων Ποταμών (Τίγρη κι Ευφράτη) με την κοιλάδα του Κίτρινου Ποταμού. Αλλά η Αίγυπτος ελάχιστα επωφελήθηκε των ασσυροβαβυλωνιακών εμπορικών δρόμων κι ανταλλαγών.
Από την άλλη, η Αίγυπτος είχε ήδη από τα τέλη της 3ης προχριστιανικής χιλιετίας διαμορφώσει ένα μεγάλο εμπορικό δίκτυο διά του Αρχαίου Βασιλείου του Κους (: Αιθιοπίας, δηλαδή του σημερινού Σουδάν) με την Σαχάρα, διά της Λιβύης με τον Άτλαντα, και διά της Ερυθράς Θαλάσσης με το ανεξάρτητο σομαλικό βασίλειο του Πουντ στην ανατολική ακτή της Αφρικής πέρα από το Κέρας της Αφρικής. Αλλά η Ασσυρία κι η Βαβυλώνα ελάχιστα επωφελήθηκαν των αιγυπτιακών εμπορικών δρόμων κι ανταλλαγών.
Όμως στα αχαιμενιδικά χρόνια, όλα αυτά τα εμπορικά δίκτυα αναμείχθηκαν και αλληλοσυνδέθηκαν σε ένα μείζον εμπορικό και συγκοινωνιακό δίκτυο από τον Αφρικανικό Άτλαντα μέχρι τα ανατολικά παράλια της Ασίας.
Η πρώτη παγκοσμιοποίηση ήταν γεγονός.
Ήταν απλώς θέμα χρόνου πάνω στους εμπορικούς δρόμους αυτούς να μην μετακινούνται μόνον προϊόντα αλλά επίσης γραφές, γλώσσες, θρησκείες, λατρείες, πίστεις, κοσμογονίες, θεουργίες, μυστήρια και μυστικά κυκλώματα.
Μια πρώιμη μετακίνηση ήταν αυτή του εκδιωκόμενου από την Βόρεια Ινδία Βουδισμού προς τις ανατολικές επαρχίες του αχαιμενιδικού Ιράν ήδη τον 6ο – 5ο προχριστιανικό αιώνα.
Σ’ αυτό βοήθησε πολύ η θρησκευτική ανοχή που επικρατούσε στην αχανή αυτοκρατορία που ξεκινούσε από τα σύνορα της Ινδίας με το Πακιστάν κι έφθανε στο Αιγαίο, ενώ είχε συνενώσει όλες τις εκτάσεις από το Ουζμπεκιστάν και την νότια Ουκρανία μέχρι το Σουδάν και το Ομάν.
Από το ανατολικό αχαιμενιδικό Ιράν (δηλαδή τις εκτάσεις των σημερινών Πακιστάν, Αφγανιστάν κι Ουζμπεκιστάν), ο Βουδισμός διαδόθηκε αργότερα προς την Κεντρική Ασία κι έγινε μια από τις πολλές θρησκείες που πολλά τουρανικά έθνη αποδέχθηκαν. Από εκτάσεις της Κεντρικής Ασίας (του σημερινού Καζακστάν και Ανατολικού Τουρκεστάν, δηλαδή της βορειοδυτικής επαρχίας Σινκιάν της Κίνας) διαδόθηκε αργότερα ο βουδισμός στην καθαυτό Κίνα.
Το ίδιο εμπορικό δίκτυο συνέχισε να λειτουργεί μετά την εκ μέρους του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου κατάληψη της αχαιμενιδικής αυτοκρατορίας και ανάληψη καθηκόντων σάχη και συνεπώς εγγυητή και συνεχιστή της αυτοκρατορικής παράδοσης.
Το ίδιο συνέβηκε και στα χρόνια των Επιγόνων παρά τους διάφορους πολέμους που οι ίδιοι δεν έπαυσαν να κάνουν.
Με τους Αραμαίους να ελέγχουν το διά ξηράς και δι’ ερήμου εμπόριο και με τους Υεμενίτες (οργανωμένους στα ανεξάρτητα και πολύ εύπορα βασίλεια Καταμπάν, Χιμυάρ, Σαβά και Χαντραμάουντ) να ασκούν μια σχεδόν αποκλειστική θαλασσοκρατορία στην Ερυθρά Θάλασσα και στον Ινδικό Ωκεανό (μέχρι την Ινδοκίνα και την Ινδονησία), η αλληλεξάρτηση των συμβαλλομένων μερών εντάθηκε.
Η σύσταση από Χαλδαίους Αραμαίους εμπόρους της Γέρρας, της πόλης με τα αλάτινα τείχη, στα δυτικά παράλια των συγχρόνων Εμιράτων, δυτικά του Αμπού Δάμπι, ήταν ένα κοσμοϊστορικό γεγονός.
Οι Χαλδαίοι έμποροι που ίδρυσαν την μεγαλύτερη εμπορική πόλη του κόσμου ανατολικά της Αλεξάνδρειας ήξεραν πάρα πολύ καλά τι έκαναν: εκμεταλλευόμενοι την σχετική αδυναμία του παρθικού αρσακιδικού κράτους του Ιράν βρήκαν ένα κομβικό σημείο από όπου περνούσε ένα μεγάλο τμήμα του εμπορίου μεταξύ Δύσης κι Ανατολής και θεμελίωσαν εκεί μια πόλη-εμπορείο που μπορούσε να θησαυρίσει και από το εμπόριο μεταξύ Νότου και Βορρά.
Η Γέρρα – στην οποία αναφέρονται ο Πτολεμαίος Γεωγράφος, ο Στράβων κι ο Πλίνιος – προσέφερε στην Κίνα ανατολικό αφρικανικό εμπόρευμα το οποίο, αντί να περιπλέει την Ινδία και την Νότια Ασία, διοχετευόταν από την Υεμένη στα νότια παράλια του Περσικού Κόλπου κι από κει προς την Κεντρική Ασία, εκτός των συνόρων του Ιράν έτσι αποφεύγοντας δασμούς.
Με τον τρόπο αυτό όμως ενισχύθηκαν φυγόκεντρες τάσεις στο Ιράν και συστάθηκαν ανατολικά ιρανικά και τουρανικά κράτη, όπως το ινδοπαρθικό κράτος με πρωτεύουσα την Μινναγάρ και επίνειο το Βαρβαρικόν (κοντά στο σημερινό Καράτσι) και το Κουσάν με πρωτεύουσα την Καπίτσα (κοντά στην Καμπούλ) που ήταν τρόπον τινά μια συνέχεια του βασιλείου της Βακτριανής.
Τότε ανοίχθηκε για πρώτη φορά (κατά τον πρώτο προχριστιανικό αιώνα) ο εμπορικός δρόμος που συνέδεε την Κοιλάδα του Ινδού με την Γιαρκάντ και το Χοτάν στα νότια άκρα του Ανατολικού Τουρκεστάν.
Φυσικό ήταν να ακολουθήσει ένα νέο στάδιο διάδοσης του Βουδισμού από τις ανατολικές ιρανικές επαρχίες (ή αυτονομημένα βασίλεια) προς την Κεντρική Ασία και αυτό να ακολουθήσει τον νέο αυτό δρόμο. Λίγο αργότερα, από κει (όπως και από αλλού) θα περνούσαν ο Μανιχεϊσμός και το Ισλάμ.
Ανάμεσα στους Χούνζα σήμερα έχει επικρατήσει το Ισλάμ αλλά ανάμεσα στους Μπουρούσο του Μπαλτιστάν υπάρχουν ακόμη βουδιστές.
Ο εξισλαμισμός των Μπαλτί ήταν υπόθεση 15ου – 16ου αιώνα. Όμως οι Χούνζα αποδέχθηκαν το Ισλάμ νωρίτερα. Αλλά το αίμα των απογόνων των στρατιωτών του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου έβραζε στις φλέβες τους μέχρι πρόσφατα.
Αν και ελάχιστοι τον αριθμό, πριν από 400 χρόνια οι Μιρ (ισλαμικός περσικός τίτλος κατ’ αποκοπήν από το αραβικό εμίρ/εμίρης) των Χούνζα αναγνώριζαν το μικροσκοπικό κράτος τους και την Κίνα ως τα ισχυρώτερα κράτη στον κόσμο!
Η διασπορά των απογόνων των Επιγόνων ήταν μεγάλη αλλά μετά από αρκετές γενεές, είτε είχαν αποδεχθεί τον Βουδισμό, είτε πίστευαν σε διάφορες μορφές ανατολικών Μιθραϊσμών, είτε είχαν ασπασθεί τον αρσακιδικό ζενδισμό (που ήταν μια ηθική ερμηνεία της ζωροαστρικής μεταφυσικής), όλοι τους αποτελούσαν τμήμα των ανατολικών πολιτισμών, παιδείας και παραδόσεων.
Η φυλετική αναγωγή τους στους στρατιώτες του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου δεν είχε κανένα ρατσιστικό ή εθνικιστικό χαρακτήρα επειδή δεν υπήρχε κάτι τέτοιο στην Αρχαιότητα.
Ήταν θέμα ηθικής, πολιτισμικής κι εσχατολογικής διάστασης γι’ αυτούς και οι στρατιωτικές επιτυχίες του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου ήταν ένα ολότελα ασήμαντο σημείο αναφοράς μπροστά στο ψυχικό έργο του και στον μυθικό, μεσσιανικό κι αποκαλυπτικό συμβολισμό του έργου του.
Ήταν συνεπώς φυσιολογικό για τους τελευταίους ελληνόφωνους απογόνους των Επιγόνων να αναμειχθούν με διαφορετικά κατά τόπους έθνη, επειδή η φυλετική – εθνική υπόστασή τους ήταν για τους ίδιους ολότελα ασήμαντη μπροστά στην ένταξή τους σε ένα Θείο Έργο ψυχικών διαστάσεων και κοσμοϊστορικής σημασίας που είχαν ήδη επιτελέσει οι πρόγονοί τους μαζί με τον Μεγάλο Αλέξανδρο – ένα έργο-προτύπωση του Έργου του Μεγάλου Βασιλέα (Αποκάλυψη ΙΔ’ 14) στο Πλήρωμα του Χρόνου.
Αυτό το Έργο πρώτος κατέγραψε σε ελληνικά στον Βίο Αλεξάνδρου ο ανώνυμος συγγραφέας που αποκαλείται Ψευδο-Καλλισθένης επειδή δεν σχετίζεται με τον γνωστό ιστορικό.
Για τους τελευταίους ελληνόφωνους απογόνους των Επιγόνων η Μόνη Αλήθεια κι Αξία στα ανθρώπινα πράγματα ήταν ο Μύθος – κι όχι ο σατανικός κι απάνθρωπος ‘Λόγος’.
Κι έτσι στον Μύθο αποτυπώθηκε όλη η ουσία του κορυφαίου έργου του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου που μόνον σημερινοί κρετίνοι ψάχνουν να βρουν σε ‘στρατιωτικές κατακτήσεις’ και σε ψέμματα περί ‘εκπολιτισμού άλλων εθνών’.
Μυούμενος ο Αλέξανδρος σε ανατολικά μυστήρια, στην Αίγυπτο, στην Περσία, και στην Βαβυλώνα, εκπολιτίσθηκε ο ίδιος κι έγινε Μεγάλος.
Και γι αυτό σήμερα βρίσκουμε την αναφορά στους στρατιώτες του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου σε πολλά και διαφορετικά έθνη που μιλάνε ολότελα διαφορετικές γλώσσες και πιστεύουν ολοσχερώς αντίθετες θρησκείες, και όμως θεωρούν εαυτούς απογόνους των στρατιωτών του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου. Οι Καλάς και οι Χούνζα του βόρειου Πακιστάν είναι μόνον ένα μικρό παράδειγμα. Θα χρειαζόταν μια ολόκληρη εγκυκλοπαίδεια για να καταγραφούν μικρές και μεταξύ τους διαφορετικές πληθυσμιακές ενότητες που ανάγουν την καταγωγή τους στους στρατιώτες του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου.
Σημεία της ορεινής γης των Χούνζα και των Μπαλτί
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Форт Балтит в долине Хунзы: маленький Тибет на севере Пакистана
https://ok.ru/video/1362004609645
Baltit Fort in Hunza Valley: a Small Tibet in Northern Pakistan
https://vk.com/video434648441_456240158
Κάστρο Μπαλτίτ στην Κοιλάδα Χούνζα: ένα Μικρό Θιβέτ στο Βόρειο Πακιστάν
Περισσότερα:
Baltit Fort is situated in Karimabad, once was capital of the state of Hunza, now Tehsil Headquarter of District Gilgit. It is approached by Karakuram Highway from Gilgit, the capital of Northern Areas, Pakistan. The Baltit Fort stands on a artificially flattened spur below the Ulter Glacier. Strategically located with a commanding view of the Hunza Valley and its tributaries, its inhabitants controlled the seasonal trans-Karakuram trade between south and Central Asia. The Baltit Fort is rectangular in plan with three floors and stands on a high stone plinth Fig-I. Whilts the ground floor consist mainly of storage chambers, the first floor is oriented around as open hall.
A staircase leads to the second floor which was mainly used during the winter months and contains an audience hall, guest room, dining hall, kitchen and servants quarters. A further staircases leads up to the third floor, which is partly open to the elements and contains the summer dining room, audience chamber, bedroom and reception hall. Inhabited by the Mir, or ruler of Hunza until 1945.
The conservation work carried out in the 1990 indicated that the core of the structures, a single defensive timber and stone tower, had been built in the eight century A.D. This tower was augmented by additional towers and linked by a single story construction consisting of small rooms and sub-surface storage chambers. The complex was then later expanded by the addition of a second, and then a third floor. The structure’s stone walls, built in an area of frequent seismic movements, were provided with a traditional internal framework of timber for greater stabilisation. https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/1882/
Also: Baltit Fort (Urdu: قلعہ بلتت) is a fort in the Hunza valley, near the town of Karimabad, in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of northern Pakistan. Founded in the 8th CE, it has been on the UNESCO World Heritage Tentative list since 2004. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baltit_Fort and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cultural_heritage_sites_in_Gilgit-Baltistan
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Σχετικά με τους Χούνζα και τους Μπαλτί:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunza_Valley
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mir_of_Hunza
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunza_(princely_state)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burushaski
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burusho_people
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baltistan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balti_people
Σχετικά με την διάδοση του Βουδισμού στο Πακιστάν, Ιράν, Κεντρική Ασία και Κίνα:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism_in_Pakistan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kargah_Buddha
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gondrani
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism_in_Central_Asia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dharmaguptaka
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gandh%C4%81ran_Buddhist_texts
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarvastivada
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mulasarvastivada
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silk_Road_transmission_of_Buddhism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silk_Road_transmission_of_Buddhism#Central_Asian_missionaries
https://studybuddhism.com/en/tibetan-buddhism/about-buddhism/the-world-of-buddhism/spread-of-buddhism-in-asia
http://www.silkroadfoundation.org/artl/buddhism.shtml
http://www.silk-road.com/artl/buddhism.shtml
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism_in_Iran
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/buddhism-i
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137022943_2
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According to a Buddhist legend preserved in Pali (an ancient Prakrit language, derived from Sanskrit, which is the scriptural and liturgical language of Theravada Buddhism), the first instance of Buddhism entering Iran seems to have been during the life of the historical Buddha, Sakyamuni (roughly 5/6th century BCE.
The legend speaks of two Merchant brothers from Bactria (modern day Afghanistan) who visited the Buddha in his eighth week of enlightenment, became his disciples and then returned to Balkh (major city of Bactria) to build temples dedicated to him.
Whatever the historical validity of this story, there is strong evidence to show that Balkh did become a major Buddhist region and remained so up until the Arab Muslim invasion of the 7th century.
http://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Religions/non-iranian/buddhism_iran.htm
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Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/ss-250645898
https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/hunza_balti_islam_buddhism_alexander_the_great
https://vk.com/doc429864789_620740190
https://www.docdroid.net/9CAJCUX/xounza-mpalti-islam-boydismos-oi-stratiwtes-toy-meghaloy-aleksandroy-ki-oi-dromoi-toy-metaksiou-docx
King Lear performed in the fire-damaged ruins of Teatro Municipal de Lima (c. 1999), conceived by architect Luis de Longhi
Clepsydra of Karnak
The oldest water clock of which there is physical evidence dates to ca. 1391-1353 BC, during the reign of Amenhotep III where it was used in the Temple of Amen-Re at Karnak. This alabaster water clock has 12 carved columns of 11 false holes, corresponding to the hours of the night. The water flowed through a very small hole made in the center of the bottom, emerging on the outside under the figure of a seated baboon. To know the time, one had to look inside the basin to observe the water level and read the time according to the nearest false hole. The outside surface of this clepsydra, or water clock, is decorated with figures and text that show symbols of certain planets and constellations and give a list of the protective spirits for each of the ten days of the ancient Egyptian week. The middle register, or section, is occupied by the circumpolar stars under the aspects of various gods and animals. Now in the Egyptian Museum, Cairo. JE 37525 Read more
Κοσμάς Μεγαλομμάτης, Ατόν: Παγκόσμια Μυθολογία-1989
Κοσμάς Μεγαλομμάτης, Ατόν: Παγκόσμια Μυθολογία, Ελληνική Εκπαιδευτική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια, 1989
Кузьма Мегаломматис, Атон: мировая мифология, Греческая педагогическая энциклопедия, 1989
Kosmas Megalommatis, Aton: Weltmythologie, Griechische Pädagogische Enzyklopädie, 1989
Kosmas Gözübüyükoğlu, Aton (veya Aten): Dünya Mitolojisi, Yunan Pedagoji Ansiklopedisi, 1989
قزمان ميغالوماتيس، آتون : اساطیر جهانی، دایره المعارف آموزشی یونانی، 1989
Côme Megalommatis, Aton: Mythologie mondiale, Encyclopédie pédagogique grecque, 1989
1989 قزمان ميغالوماتيس، آتون : الأساطير العالمية، الموسوعة التربوية اليونانية،
Cosimo Megalommatis, Aton (o Aten): mitologia mondiale, Enciclopedia pedagogica greca, 1989
Cosimo Megalommatis, Atón: mitología mundial, Enciclopedia pedagógica griega, 1989
Cosmas Megalommatis, Aten (or Aton): World Mythology, Greek Pedagogical Encyclopedia, 1989
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Archaic Greek painting with the Assyrian eyes makes me rabid… The lines of the calves the lines in the hair? I know what you are
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